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Abstract 
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War there has been a new radicalism 
across the social sciences espousing the need for global democracy. Taking its inspiration 
from theorisations of late 20th and early 21st century globalisation, advocates of Global 
Democratic Theory (GOT) look to transcend the violence, inequality and suffering that have 
often accompanied modernity. GOT thus offers normative visions and practical steps 
towards securing global citizenship and democracy, which would secure economic and 
social justice for all citizens of the world. The thesis proposes that GOT, due to its pursuit of 
its normative agenda, actually tells us very little about the current state of global politics. In 
order to move beyond the limitations of GOT, the thesis provides both theoretical and 
empirical advances. On the theoretical side, the thesis outlines how John Oewey's work in 
The Public and its Problems (1927) sets out an evolutionary form of democracy in response 
to a rapidly globalising economy. This Deweyan approach to global democracy and the 
lessons it provides has not been fully appreciated by contemporary scholars of globalisation. 
On the empirical side, Deweyan insights are used to interpret and explain the politics of the 
'Financial Crisis' of 2008 and subsequent 'The Great Recession' in order to provide a richer 
account of the current state of global politiCS and the possibility of global democracy. In all, 
the thesis demonstrates how Oewey's work serves not only as a timely rejOinder to the 
theories of GOT but also offers important insights into the politics of contemporary 
globalisation. 
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Part One: Cosmopolitan Horizons 
- WH Auden, "Musee des Beaux Arts" 
1 
Introduction- Global Democracy: On the rise of an anti-Auden philosophy 
The words of WH Auden's Musee de Beaux Arts, his reflection of the Breughel's painting 
Landscape with the Fall oJ Icarus, provides a take on the 'human position' and its ability to 
react to the plight of others beyond our daily lives. Auden appears to embrace the idea of 
an indirect and perpetual apathy humanity shows to towards one another's suffering. In 
juxtaposing the extraordinary event of the fall of Icarus and the indifference shown by 
witnesses, preoccupied with their mundane day to day tasks or leisurely pursuits, Auden 
attempts to reveal how our moral reaction to the suffering and plight of others beyond our 
daily lives is often one of atomised indifference. The moral of Auden's poem is not, 
however, simply about suffering but also about the possibility of the collective human 
community. The human position of suffering seems to disclose the fact that the events of 
our daily lives are taken by Auden to take place beyond an event horizon where it appears 
impossible for such events to affect and communicate to outside observers. The idea of 
community and the coming together of humanity to bear witness or indeed change the 
course of events are simply never considered by Auden. In Musee de Beaux Arts it is 
therfore the absence of the idea of community, which casts an immense shadow over the 
poem's landscape. 
To most past and contemporary social science there is a hollow ring to Auden's almost 
religious like acceptance of the suffering of others and the implicit comment on the idea of a 
human community. Auden's philosophy of suffering seems to be making the fatal error of 
merely interpreting the 'human position' without contemplating the point of its possible 
change. And such a philosophy finds its contemporary opposite in what we can dub Global 
Democratic Theory (GOT). As Robert Fine (2007: 1-6) points out, since the fall of the Berlin 
2 
Wall and the end of Cold War there has been an emergence of a new radicalism across the 
social sciences, which espouses a global form of democracy (Beck 2005, Held 2010, Oryzek 
2006, Bohman 2007). The overriding rationale of GOT is that the violence, inequality and 
suffering that currently affects large parts of the world stem from the consequences of late 
20th and early 21st century globalisation and, moreover, that these consequences can be 
controlled or even eradicated through the use of global democracy to manage globalisation. 
In contemporary academic parlance the word 'globalisation' is rather causally thrown 
around here and there and has become somewhat of a theoretical cushion that appears to 
mould to the posterior of whoever seems to sit upon it. This phenomenon is not new, even 
in the mid 90's, with globalisation fast becoming one of the favourite buzzwords of 
academic and political fashionistas, Susan Strange (1995: 293) railed against evocations of 
the term which simultaneously appeared to mean both everything and nothing. Yet, for 
1 
• 
• 
theorists associated with GOT, the term 'globalisation' is taken to concern a spatial f 
phenomenon based on a continuum of the 'local' at one end and the 'global' at the other. 
Globalisation thus implies an increasing interconnectedness across different domains of 
human activity, between states and their inhabitants, from the economic to the cultural to 
the political. This increased interconnectedness represents a shift in ' ... human organisation 
and activity to intercontinental or interregional patterns of activity, interaction and the 
exercise of power' (Held 2010: 28-29). 
Such interconnectedness between countries are said to be measurable via mapping how 
trade, finance, communications, pollutants and violence move across borders and lock 
nation states into relationships and patterns of behaviour. And whilst GOT accepts that the 
spatial phenomenon of globalisation is a process that has historical precedents or eras of 
3 li 
globalisation that predate the 20th century, the assumption is that the deep underlying 
drivers of the post 1945 multilateral order have been marshalled by political and economic 
forces to create a distinct and historically unprecedented form of globalisation (Held at al., 
1999: 7-10 cf., Beck 2005, Hardt and Negri 2000: xii-xiii, 31).1 
The underlying deep drivers of contemporary globalisation are best described as the 
following:2 
• The IT Revolution - The 'time space compression' (Giddens: 1990) associated with 
the changing nature of global communication technology (internet, real time 
TV/News, mobile phones) 
• Global Markets - The development of global markets in goods and services such as 
finance and manufacturing, and the new global division of labour that decentralises 
production away from developing nations to developing countries such as China and 
India. 
• Global Governance - The emergence of multilayered and multilevel politics, where 
the nation state increasingly looks 'downwards' towards city and sub national 
politics and 'upwards' towards supra national, regional and global associations, laws 
and institutions (e.g. UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO, NAFTA, EU, G20 etc). 
• Democratic Values - The spread of democratic values across the regions of the world 
and negative backlashes against such values since the end of the Cold War. 
1 
Globalisation as a historical process is a much-contested field with estimates of the rise of globalisation 
ranging from the 11th century right up to the 19th century. I shall return in more detail to debates surrounding 
the history of globalisation in chapter 5. 
: This list of deep drivers is adapted from Held (2004: 11) and (2010: 28-29, 149-50). 
As Wade (2009a: 145) points out the terms Washington Consensus, Globalisation Consensus or Neo-Liberal 
Consensus are often used interchangeably. Indeed, one could add to this list the terms market 
~ u n d a ~ e n t a l i s m , , globalism, world-market ideology and Neo-Liberal globalisation. To aid conceptual clarity I 
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• Global Migration - The pressure of migration and movements of peoples linked to 
, 
, 
shifts in demography and the growth of populations. 
• The internationalisation and integration of Security - The onset of global terrorism 
, 
and consequent globalisation of the 'War on terror' since 9/11 and the proliferation r I 
of weapons of mass destruction. 
GOT views these deep underlying drivers as marking the post 1945 multilateral order out as ) 
a distinct form of globalisation because they provide a historically unprecedented form of 
interconnectedness. For example, the increased globalisation of trade, production and 
t 
finance are seen as interconnecting countries as never before. And despite the divisions and l 
conflict of the present age, it is argued that societies are so interconnected today that 
developments at the local level -whether economic, political or social - can acquire almost 
instantaneous global consequences and vice versa (Held 2010: 29-30, 148-49). 
Whilst writers associated with GOT believe that the deep underlying drivers of our present , 
age of globalisation are structurally irreversible, or at least likely to be operative for the 
foreseeable future, they throw questions as to the normative destinations globalisation 
should be allowed to take us towards (Held and McGrew 2007: 213). GOT writers therefore 
argue that the extension of democracy beyond the confines or sheer naked interest of the 
nation state would help to not only manage the consequences of globalisation but marshal 
globalisation for greater global equality, prosperity and peace. And as GOT writers are often 
quick to point out, they view the present order as holding the seeds of growth for the 
flourishing of global democracy (Beck 2006, Held 2004;Dryzek 2006;Bohman 2007). 
Through placing economic globalisation, human rights, international law and global 
governance at the centre of its intellectual and political agenda GOT not only sees the 
5 
suffering of any parts of humanity as a contingent state of affairs created by socio-economic 
and political circumstance but also as an undeniable moral problem which must be 
addressed by those with power to do so. Advocates of global democracy therefore look to 
counter human suffering globally through offering normative visions and practical steps 
towards securing forms of citizenship and democracy which would secure economic and 
social justice for all citizens of the world. In many ways, then, GOT presents the most cogent 
normative response to both Auden's philosophy of suffering and the lack of social and 
economic justice within our present age of globalisation. 
Why the need for this study then? Surely the paradigm of GOT appears to provide the social 
sciences with the normative goals to reject Auden's religious and anti-modern view of 
human suffering and embrace practical plans to address injustices ofthe present. However, 
as Nietzsche reminds us, poets act shamelessly towards their experiences because they 
constantly exploit them. Just because one finds the morality of Auden's take on the absence 
of human community to be insufferable does not disqualify its potential validity. And on a 
more thoughtful appreciation, one which rejects its religious acceptance of the enduring 
reality of suffering, the real message of Auden's poem may be the reality of the perpetual 
indifference humans have shown towards each other and the questioning of this perpetual 
indifference? 
Indeed, one need not disagree with GOT's normative wishes to disagree with the prognosis 
that the current order holds the seeds for global democracy's flourishing. When one takes a 
cursory glance at the levels of global democracy evident around global issues such as 
climate change, global poverty or the upholding of international law it becomes rather 
dispiriting. Moreover, even writers associated with GOT seem to acknowledge that the 
6 
I ••• evidence is wanting that we are getting better at building appropriate governance 
capacity' (Held 2010: 146). The first goal of this study is thus to show that Auden's spectre, 
the one derived from the deeper appreciation of his words, haunts global democracy 
because it reveals the contingent nature of the human community and global political 
action. Moreover, I shall seek to bring to light that whilst the normative goals of global 
democracy are admirable, such theory readily fails to come to terms with the nature of 
community and how this is linked to an extension of democracy beyond the nation state. 
To accomplish this, the study will return and recover the work of Pragmatist philosopher 
John Dewey on the relationship between democracy, community and what he called 
'publics'. Pragmatism and the work of Dewey in particular has a chequered past. Having 
risen to prominence at the start of the 20th Century both Pragmatism and Dewey seemed to 
lose this prominence by the 1950's. By the late 20th century, however, Richard Rorty's 
idiosyncratic evocation of classical Pragmatist thinkers such as Dewey brought new eyes to 
both Pragmatism and the work of Dewey in particular (Westbrook 1991). Although 
Pragmatism today is a flourishing paradigm of thought (Westbrook 2005) it is safe to say 
that its political philosophy is still very under appreciated. 
In particular, contemporary writers, favouring his work on epistemology, ethics and 
education, have largely ignored Dewey's political philosophy. And this is also apparent in 
how writers within GOT have also ignored Dewey's insights into democracy and its fate as a 
global endeavour. I aim to highlight that Dewey's political writinsg from the 1920's onwards 
revolve around the arguments for an evolutionary form of democracy in response to a 
rapidly globalising economy. Moreover, I will argue that the central contention of Dewey's 
political philosophy essentially fills in the gaps that exist within GOT about the contingent 
7 
, 
/ 
; 
nature of the human community and global political action. The second goal of this study is 
therefore to highlight how a Oeweyan approach to global democracy not only provides a 
timely rejoinder to other theories of global democracy but also offers important insights 
into the future examination of global democracy. 
Chapter Outline 
To achieve the study's dual mandate of highlighting the inherent weaknesses of GOT and 
how Oewey's work can help us overcome such philosophical shortcomings the study will 
consist ofthree parts: 
The first part of the study will comprise of three chapters, which will seek to introduce the 
problematic and justification of global democracy vis-a-vis Neo-Liberal globalisation. 
Chapter 1 will take on the challenge of introducing readers to the subtle difference 
proponents of GOT evoke between the underlying drivers of globalisation and the policy 
prescriptions of Neo-Liberal globalisation. This chapter shall also include an analysis of the 
apparent consensus about the Neo-Liberal globalisation by revisiting its claim to have 
delivered a fairer and more equal global economy. Chapter 2 will examine how, in the face 
of the perceived failure of Neo-Liberal globalisation to deliver such a fairer and more equal 
global economy, proponents of GOT offer normative visions to reform such a state of affairs. 
This will revolve around examining the difference between a global democracy from 
'above'; those who favour a heavily designed institutional framework for global democracy, 
and a global democracy from 'below'; those who favour a more agential and experimental 
form of institution and policy creation. 
8 
Chapter 3 will function to provide a critique of GDT by arguing that all strands of it embrace 
an 'ontology of paradox'. The overriding point of this chapter being that advocates of global 
democracy not only fail to engage with the research of others about the limits and obstacles 
facing global democracy, but also fail to engage and explain the very obstacles and limits 
that they themselves acknowledge hinder the path to global democracy. 
i 
• I 
The second and third parts of the study will attempt to provide a theoretical and empirical \ 
answer to the questions I pose towards global democracy. In the second part I aim to 
highlight how the central contention of John Dewey's work within The Public and its 
Problems (1927), which revolves around an evolutionary form of democracy in response to a 
rapidly globalising economy, has not been fully appreciated by contemporary scholars. To 
accomplish this, part two will proceed via three chapters of argument. In chapter 4, I shall 
highlight the context of The Public and its Problems by returning to the 1920's debate 
between Waiter Lippmann and John Dewey about the nature of the public(s) and their 
relation to democracy. This shall include examining Dewey's response to Lippmann and 
Democratic Realism and his outlining of his own form of pragmatic 'Creative Democracy'. 
Following on, in chapter 5 I will examine how Dewey's idea of The Great Society and its 
impact on democratic praxis centre on issues of globalisation and the possibility of global 
community and political praxis. Moreover, I shall argue that Dewey's arguments concerning 
the nature of publics and their relationship to democracy, too often narrated around nation-
state politiCS, actually raise issues that highlight his advocacy and subsequent 
problematization of global democracy. In chapter 6, I shall reflect on the Deweyan lessons 
handed down to 21st century observers and advocates of global democracy. Ultimately, the 
chapter will contend that the nature, political efficacy or viability of any conception of 
9 
'global democracy' can only be adequately gauged by revisiting and confronting Deweyan 
concerns about the political efficacy or viability of publics and their relation to democratic 
praxis. 
The final part of the study will focus on the empirical examination of global democracy by 
focusing on the events that have unfolded since the onset of 'The Great Recession' in 2008. 
This will consist of three chapters. Chapter 7 will narrate the 'Bank Recapitalisation' and 
'Keynesian Stimulus' publics of elites and experts, which emerged after the collapse of 
lehman Brothers and enacted the stimulus packages of 2008-2009. And will conclude by 
examining how 'bourgeois democracy' and rehabilitation of neo-liberalism were at the heart 
of policy after the collapse of lehman Brothers. Chapter 8 moves the story onto the rise of 
the 'Austerity' public of elites that emerged to complete the rehabilitation of neo-liberalism 
and perpetuate 'bourgeois democracy'. After highlighting how austerity is simply a litter of 
half-truths, I turn in chapter 9 to the citizen publics who have emerged in response to 
austerity and rampant bourgeois democracy. I will end the chapter by examining whether 
such movements provide strong evidence for the viability of global democracy in a climate 
of elite and expert smokescreen and subterfuge. Through taking The Great Recession as a 
critical case study, I shall highlight how Dewey's work helps us comprehend not only the 
politics of globalisation, but also the present and future of global democracy. 
10 
Chapter 1: What's the problem: The reckless driving of Neo-Liberal Globalisation 
1.1 Driving Under the Influence: Neo-Liberal Globalisation 
Before we examine the strands of GOT in detail, I think it would serve us best if we begin 
from the problem that the normative visions of GOT wish to correct. This requires us to 
understand the distinction such thinkers make between the terms 'globalisation' and what 
is often dubbed the Washington Consensus, Globalisation Consensus, Neo-liberal 
globalisation or simply Neo-liberalism3• 
As outlined in the introduction, GOT view these deep underlying drivers of modern 
globalisation as marking the post 1945 multilateral order out as a distinct form of 
globalisation because they provide a historically unprecedented form of 
interconnectedness. For example, the increased globalisation of trade, production and 
finance are seen as connecting the economies of nations as never before. And despite the 
divisions and conflict of the present age, it is argued that societies are so interconnected 
today that developments at the local level -whether economic, political or social - can 
acquire almost instantaneous global consequences and vice versa (Held 2010: 29-30, 148-
49). On the other hand, however, these underlying deep drivers form the basis of the battle 
for the politics of globalisation and the foundation of the normative visions of global 
democracy. Whilst such theorists believe that the deep underlying drivers of our present 
age of globalisation are structurally irreversible or at least likely to be operative for the 
3 As Wade (2009a: 145) points out the terms Washington Consensus, Globalisation Consensus or Neo-Liberal 
Consensus are often used interchangeably. Indeed, one could add to this list the terms market 
fundamentalism, globalism, world-market ideology and Neo-Liberal globalisation. To aid conceptual clarity I 
shall here on in defer to only using the terms Neo-Liberalism or Neo-Liberal globalisation. 
11 
foreseeable future, they ask hard questions as to the normative destinations such drivers 
should be allowed to take us towards (Held and McGrew 2007: 213). 
TABLE 1: Derived from Rodrik (2007) 
AUGMENTED NEO-LlBERAL GLOBALlSATION 
Original Neo-Liberal Globalisation "Augmented" Neo-Liberal Globalisation 
the previous 10 items, plus: 
1. Fiscal Discipline 11. Corporate Governance 
2. Reorientation of public expenditure 12. Anti-Corruption 
3. Tax Reform 13. Flexible Labour Markets 
4. Financial Liberalization 14. WTO agreements 
5. Unified and competitive exchange rates 15. Financial Codes and Standards 
6. Trade Liberalisation 16. "Prudent" capital account counting 
7. Openness to DFI 17. Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes 
8. Privatisation 18. Independent Bank/Inflation Targeting 
9. Deregulation 19. Social Safety Nets 
10. Secure property Rights 20. Targeted Poverty Reduction 
It is this sense of there being scope to manage or more aptly drive the very drivers of 
globalisation (what we can call the politicS of globalisation) that forms the basis of GOT's 
critique of Neo-Liberal globalisation. Since the 1980's, Neo-Liberal globalisation or quite 
simply Neo-liberalism, has been the hegemonic policy prescription for how national 
economies should adapt to the effects of the deep drivers of globalisation and how the 
drivers themselves should be driven forward4• The hegemonic ascent of Neo-Liberalism, 
4M . Y pOint here is subtle rather than simply straight forward. On one hand, I am stressing that the underlying 
drivers of globalisation and Neo-Liberal globalisation whilst currently entwined are not the same thing. 
However, globalisation and its underlying drivers are not an autonomous and objective thing in itself but 
12 
both in economic and political circles, can be traced back to the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods regime and its form of 'Embedded Liberalism'. 
Embedded Liberalism, the name given by John Ruggie to the international monetary system 
established at the Bretton Woods conference in July 1944, had essentially created a post-
war order of globalisation in a largely Keynesian image. With the goal of avoiding the inter-
state rivalries that had caused World War 11 Embedded Liberalism put forward a multilateral 
international monetary system that favoured domestic interventionism (Ruggie 1982: 393). 
The Iynchpins of this international monetary system were new (IFI's) International Financial 
Institutions (IMF, World Bank, GATT) and a new monetary regime of fixed exchange rates, 
founded on the convertibility of US Dollars into gold at a fixed price, which provided enough 
trade liberalisation to secure healthy world commerce whilst allowing national governments 
to pursue domestic social and economic agendas. 
This pursuit of domestic social and economic agendas was achieved primarily through 
Embedded Liberalism's international monetary system facilitating the emergence of 
'embedded liberal states' or what we commonly see as modern welfare states (Blyth 2002: 
4-5). In practise embedded liberal states were empowered by the embedded liberalism 
regime to make the underlying drivers of globalisation subservient to domestic policy 
objectivities such as full employment, economic growth, social insurance and social welfare. 
This was pursued through national polices such as state subsidises for R&D, state owned 
rather sets of human practises which create transnational effects. Neo-Liberalism should rather be seen as 
offering economic and political policies on how to best adapt national economies to the effects of the 
underlying drivers of globalisation. However, one must also appreciate how Neo-Liberalism's policy 
prescriptions have come to have effects on the trajectory of the underlying drivers of globalisation themselves. 
For instance, as we have all lately been made aware of as of 2008, Neo-Liberal globalisation and its conception 
of financial liberalisation have been instrumental in transforming the global markets in services such as 
finance. 
13 
enterprises and capital controls; the allowance of such national polices through the GATT's 
failure to include the liberalisation of areas such as agriculture and services (banking, 
insurance); and the GATT's rather functional failure to enforce global free trade in the areas 
opened up to liberalisation. Somewhat ironically, these policy diversions from standard free-
trade principles would actually lead to a rather successful global economy. Embedded 
Liberalism is today commonly known as the Golden Age of Capitalism because it oversaw 
'.,.the most rapid rates of economic growth and most enduring economic stability in modern 
history.' (Frieden 2006:300)5, 
Nevertheless, the perceived failure of Embedded Liberalism to deal with the stagflation 
associated with the economic downturn of the 1970's led to the very political and economic 
basis of the Bretton Woods regime being challenged6, Enacted through the military success 
of General Pinochet in Chile (1973) and subsequent political successes of Margret Thatcher 
(1979) and Ronald Reagan (1980), Neo-Liberal globalisation essentially replaced the 
dominant Keynesian assumptions of Embedded Liberalism with Freidman style 
monetarism7 • The main policy recommendations of Neo-Liberal globalisation, spelt out in 
Table 1 above, basically update 18th Century economic liberalism with modern day notions 
of political democracy and monopoly e.g. patent law (Chang 2007: 13), However, Neo-
Liberal globalisation is still fundamentally founded on the old liberal's twin belief of the 
'efficient markets hypothesis' and 'comparative advantage theory', These two theories, 
5 
We shall return to these growth figures below but for more detail on the Bretton Woods system see Friden 
(2006: chapters 12&13) and for arguments for a new Bretton Woods style settlement for the 21st century see 
Rodrik (2011). 
6 This itself had been started by a number of factors such as the OPEC oil cartel that emerged in 1973 and 
~ o n s e q u e n t t spike in the oil price. 
For more detail on the history of the rise of Neo-Liberalism globalisation as a hegemonic economic paradigm 
and its political implementation see: Harvey (2005), Dumenil & Levy (2004), Blyth (2002) and Frieden (2006), 
Skidelsky (2009). 
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when combined, provide the foundation of the argument that the free market offers 
maximum economic efficiency and growth, whilst government intervention (capital 
controls, import quotas, welfare schemes) is harmful because it reduces such competition. 
Such unhindered competition on a global scale allocates national economies to areas of 
specialisation in which their production techniques are as high in value as possible. 
In sharp contrast to the shallow form of integration under Embedded Liberalism, where the 
global trade regime allowed relative autonomy for the domestic policy arena (tariffs, capital 
controls), Neo-Liberal globalisation favours deep forms of global integration, or what Dani 
Rodrik calls 'Hyperglobalisation'. Under the tenets of hyperglobalistaion, economic 
globalisation becomes an end in itself and is summed up in the belief: 
I •••• that national economies with more liberalization of trade and finance, higher 
market integration across borders, easier hostile takeovers of corporations, and a 
narrower economic role of the state experience higher economic growth, less 
poverty, higher social mobility and less inequality than those with less, other things 
being equal. The normative conclusion is that market liberalisation, increasing 
economic integration across borders, and the exit of the state from trying to steer 
the composition activity is the right direction of policy reform everywhere.' Wade 
(2009a: 142-43) 
In practise, the implementation of the core tenets of Neo-Liberal globalisation, both within 
nation states and at international level, result in the distinction and hierarchy between 
domestic policy and global trade policy disintegrating. This translates into a scenario where 
national governments embark on polices that they believe will earn them global market 
confidence and trade and capital flows via: 
lS 
-.d 
' ... the insulation of economic policy-making bodies (central banks, fiscal authorities, 
regulators, and so on), the disappearance (or privatisation) of social insurance, the 
push for low corporate taxes, the erosion of the social compact between business 
and labour, and the replacement of domestic developmental goals with the need to 
maintain market confidence.'{Rodrik 2011: 202 ). 
The result is that the domestic control over economic policy becomes restricted and 
subservient to the interest and requirements of the global economy and its agents and 
agencies. Not only are national domestic policy choices, such as welfare provision or labour 
laws, seen as a possible impediment to the core tenets of Neo-Liberal globalisation, but the 
tenets of Neoliberal globalisation inherently attempt to frame all domestic policy choices in 
their own ideal of hyperglobalisation (ibid., 83). 
After its initial cementing in the Anglo-Sphere in the 1980's the doctrine of Neo-liberalism 
was then transported across the globe to Latin America, Africa and the ex-Communist States 
of Eastern Europe through a redesign of the mission objectives of what became known as 
the 'Unholy Trinity': the IMF, World Bank and latterly established WT08• This is inherently 
seen as a panacea to the 'bad old days' of state interventionism and economic 
protectionism by Third World countries during the 1960's and 1970's (Chang 2007: 21-27). 
And by the mid 1990's Neo-Liberal globalisation had seemingly come to stand in for the 
term globalisation altogether and became hegemonic in US economic departments, the 
8 This was nominally achieved through structural adjustment programmes (SAP's) in the wake on the 3rd world 
debt crisis of 1982 and transition of ex-Communist states into democratic market economies at the start of 
1990's. These programmes were essentially loans with inbuilt conditionalities, which imposed tenets of Neo-
Liberal globalisation, such as the privatisation of state owned enterprises, upon the economies of recipient 
countries with or without their wish to embrace Neo-liberal globalisation (Chang 2007: 32-34). For more 
detail on Neo-liberalism's enforcement by the IMF, World Bank and WTO in the tropics and ex-Communist 
states see Bello (1999), Chossudovsky (2003), Easterly (2006), Friden (2006), Harvey (2005), Klein (2008) and 
Stiglitiz (2002). For an attempt at a more 'balanced' account of this process and the actions of the International 
Financial Institutions see Woods (2007). 
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international financial institutions and the domestic policy agendas of left-of-centre, Third 
Way advocates such as Blair and Clinton. In fact Harvey (2005: 93) argues that it was Blair 
and Clinton rather than Thatcher and Reagan who did the most to consolidate Neo-liberal 
globalisation both domestically and internationally. The high pOint of this process being the 
establishment of the World Trade Organisation in 1995, whose remit is to maintain Neo-
Liberal standards and rules for the global economy. Collectively, this convergence of 
domestic and international policy around Neo-Liberal globalisation in the 1990's became 
known (by John Williamson's term) as 'The Washington Consensus' (ibid., cf. Stiglitz 1996)9. 
The hegemonic ascent and implementation of Neo-Liberal globalisation within policy circles 
led to a series of academic, political and popular writings on the effects of Neo-liberal 
globalisation and possible policy choices for nation states. These hyper-globalist writers 
present Neo-Liberal globalisation and its spread across the globe, whether for the better or 
the worse, as a presently unfolding reality which nation states, national economies and 
national societies have little power in resisting. For instance, summing up the zeitgeist of 
hyper-globalist thinking, Tom Friedman's The Lexus and the Olive Tree (2000), made a 
division between those countries who were intent on modernising through Neo-liberal 
9 One has to qualify here, however, that whilst neo-liberal globalisation has gained hegemonic status in the 
Anglosphere it has not conquered every major economy outside of the Anglosphere. A number of national 
economies in Europe and Asia for instance have not totally adopted Neo-Liberal policy or have embarked upon 
such a process slowly (Blyth 2008). As Harvey (2005:87-88) points out, often Neo-Liberal globalisation has been 
impelled through a process of uneven geographical development where states or regions place pressure on 
neighbours to follow their lead. However, even this is tempered by local political conditions and asymmetric 
relations between First and Third World countries. For example, Margret Thatcher and successive 
governments, in the face of popular resistance, have never been able to fully privatise healthcare or the 
education system. Ronald Reagan and latterly George W. Bush also saw fit to break with neo-liberal policy and 
run budget deficits to respectively fund the Cold War and the War Against Terror. And as Weiss (2009) states, 
elements of the US and UK economies such as R&D subsides are inherently anti-Neo-Liberal. Equally in the 
Third World and ex-Communist states where neo-liberalism has been enacted in purer forms there has often 
been a tempering of such polices by the resurgence of anti-democratic or populist politics (e.g. Putin's Russia). 
However, as Wade (2009b) makes clear, the neo-liberalism of the Anglosphere has called the shots in terms of 
global policy 'norms'; even if they are adapted to local circumstances. 
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globalisation, the Lexus producing world, and those who were still embattled over who 
owns which olive tree. 
This division for Friedman, was itself false because the 'electronic herd' of international 
financers, who could instantly move billions of dollars with the click of a mouse, were 
forcing all countries to adopt the "'Golden Straight jacket" of Neo-Liberal globalisation 
anyway. Not only was such a straight jacket unavoidable but it was the only sure fire way to 
achieve economic prosperity and join the Lexus buying world (Friedman 2000)10, And by 
2004, Martin Wolf's influential Why Globalisation Works argued that the potential for 
greater economic integration had been barely tapped and that enlarging of global markets 
was now needed to raise the living standards of the poor of the world. In line with 
Thatcher's famous idiom of 'There being No Alternative' to Neo-Liberal globalisation, other 
approaches to economic development were now to be seen as mere 'commentary' (Wolf 
2004) 
10 Although I have presented hyper-globalism in terms of its narration by economic liberals it should be noted 
that hyper-globalism spans the entire political spectrum and unties normally antagonistic bedfellows such 
economic liberals on the right with centrist Third Way advocates (Giddens 2000; Blair 1998) and Neo-Marxist 
authors of the left (Hardt and Negri 1999; Glyn 2006). For example, Hardt and Negri view Neo-Liberal 
globalisation's driving of the underlying drivers of globalisation as founding the rise of a capitalist Empire that 
stretches across the globe. In such a Neo-Marxist account, capital has always been driven towards forming an 
unrestrained global market but has historically been constrained by doing so by nation state interests (e.g. 
mercantilism/colonialism/ imperialism). For example, whilst the practises of 19th century imperialism provided 
avenues for the expansion of capital into foreign territories its spatially fixed boundaries and subservience to 
nation state interests created a 'straight jacket' for free flow of money, technology, people and goods (Hardt 
and Negri 2000: 31, 332). With the hegemonic ascent of Neo-liberal globalisation, however, capital is no 
longer constrained by imperialism or the nationalist interests of the embedded liberalism order. And through 
the founding and perpetuating of decentralised and deterritoralised global networks of production and 
division of labour capital has now found a 'smooth space' akin to the conception of a world market. The 
ultimate symbol of this 'smooth space' being the transnational corporations that now directly distribute 
'labour power over various markets, functionally allocate resources and organise hierarchically the various 
sectors of world production.' (Hardt and Negri 2000: 31-32). What differs in these hyper-globalist accounts of 
the impact of Neo-Liberal globalisation, however, is not the empirical reality of hyper-globalism but the 
normative appraisals of such policies and practises. Neo-Marxist authors such as Hardt and Negri who uphold a 
hyper globalist account of Neo-Liberal globalisation see such a process as increasing inequality, poverty and 
unequal distribution of wealth rather than actually fostering economic development and greater equality. 
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1.2 Challenging the Consensus 
The apparently unquestionable consensus on the merits of Neo-Liberal globalisation is 
unsurprisingly open to be questioned. On a simple theoretical level, the idea that self 
regulating free markets with little government intervention function to produce prosperity 
for all is a myth. As Rodrik outlines, whether considering domestic or global variants: 
' ... markets and governments are opposites only in the sense that they form two sides 
of the same coin. Markets require other social institutions to support them. They 
rely on courts to enforce property rights and regulators to rein in abuse and fix 
market failures. They depend on stabilising functions that lenders of last resort and 
countercyclical fiscal policy provide. They need the political buy-in that redistributive 
taxations, safety-nets, and social insurance help generate. In other worlds markets 
do not create, regulate, stabilise or sustain themselves. The history of capitalism has 
been a process of learning and relearning this lesson.' (2011: 237 cf. (hang 2010: 1-
10) 
A 'market' and what is deemed 'free' within it are not objectively determined but actually 
political choices. It was not so long ago, for example, that men, women and children were 
traded as commodities across the globe. Even if Neo-liberal globalisation favours some 
social institutions (property rightS/immigration control) and practises of government (WTO 
rules) over others (social insurance/ redistributive taxation), it is mere anathema to suggest 
that free markets are in fact free of governance. The implementation of Neo-Liberal 
globalisation required and perpetually requires constant government intervention both 
within the nation state and at the international level of global governance. 
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Of course, it would be quite easy for supporters of Neo-liberal globalisation to see such a 
critique as theoretical brinkmanship. One can admit Neo-liberal globalisation inherently has 
social institutions and practises of government but that such social institutions and practises 
of government create the optimal conditions for 'free' markets and the chances of 
prosperity for all. The proof is in the pudding after all and the hegemony of Neo-liberal 
globalisation is ultimately based on the empirical claim that the enactment of Neo-Liberal 
globalisation since the 1980's has been an economic success. This rests on claims that Neo-
liberal globalisation has bequeathed strong economic growth; that developing countries 
incomes are catching up with developed countries incomes; and that global poverty rates 
and inequality have fallen significantly (Wade 2009a: 143, Held: 151). However, the problem 
with the above narrative for GOT and indeed others outside the paradigmll is that the 
driving of the deep underlying drivers of globalisation via the tenets of Neo-liberal 
globalisation has actually been that economically successful. Moreover, Neo-Liberal 
globalisation's economic record shows devastating economic divergence or stagnation 
rather than economic catch-up. 
As a whole, the world economy, in terms of global real GDP, grew on average 4.8% under 
Embedded Liberalism (1951-1973) compared to 3.2 % per year under Neo-Liberalism (1980-
2009). This may not sound like a significant decrease but had Embedded Liberalism's 
average growth figures been maintained, the world economy would be over 50% larger than 
it is today (Skidelsky 2009: 118). This slowdown in growth is also reflected in per capita 
terms, during the 1960's and 1970's the world economy grew at 3%, whilst since the 1980's 
11 
Neo-Liberal globalisation has garnered itself a whole panoply of critics from different theoretical 
backgrounds, from Marxists such as Harvey (200S), Glyn (2006) and Dumenil & Levy (2004); Third World 
activists such as Bello (2004); Polanyian critics such as Blyth (2002) development economists such as 
Chossudovsky (200S), Chang (2007, 2010), Wade (2009), Rodrik (2007, 2010) and Stiglitz (2002, 2006, 2009); 
and conservative writers such as John Gray (2002). 
it has grown at a rate of 1.4% per year. And the same trend can be found in the growth 
figures of individual developed countries. For instance, the US per capita income rates grew 
at 2.6% per year under Embedded liberalism but declined to 1.6 under Neo-liberal 
globalisation. Equally, the UK saw its per capita income rates grow at 2.4 under Embedded 
liberalism but decline to 1.7 under Neo-Liberal globalisation. In fact the developed 
countries of Western Europe have been unable to ever match the growth rates of 
Embedded liberalism (4-5% per year) under the tenets of Neo-Liberal globalisation (Chang 
2010:19,142,145)12. 
When turning to the economic performance of developing countries it must firstly be noted 
that any estimates of the performance of developing countries under Neo-Liberal 
globalisation are highly misleading because of the rapid development of China and (to a 
lesser extent) India in the same period. Whilst China and India have since the 1980's posted 
strong growth figures and reduced poverty numbers, accounting for 30% of the total of 
developing countries income by 2000, both countries did not subscribe to Neo-Liberal 
globalisation and have plotted their development behind protectionist economic policies 
such as tariffs, capital controls, controls on FDI and other forms of government intervention. 
As it turns out, then, the biggest benefactors under Neo-Liberal globalisation have not really 
been Neo-Liberal economies (Chang 2007: 29-30, Rodrik 2011: 149-156, Wade 2009a) 13. 
12 It should be noted that not all critics of Neo-Liberalism are necessarily as complementary of Embedded 
Liberalism. Harvey (2005:11 cf. Silver 2005) maintains that whilst embedded liberalism expanded export 
markets in South East Asia, most notably Japan, and parts of South America the attempt to export 
development to the rest of the world stalled. According to Harvey Embedded Liberalism was thus largely a 
Western regime and that for the Third World it represented a mere 'pipe dream'. 
13 Some within the Anglopshere have attempted to argue that China and India's growth has been down to 
policies of Neo-Liberal globalisation. Equally, some left wing writers such as Harvey (2005) see China as a state 
which has embraced Neo-Liberal globalisation, albeit with 'Chinese Characteristics'. This, however, seems to 
miss the point that the 'Chinese Characteristics' that underpinned China's economic growth bear more 
resemblance to the embedded liberalism era than Neo-liberal globalisation (see Rodrik 2011, Chang 2007 and 
2010 and Arrighi & Zhang 2011). Equally India saw its initial leap in economic growth under reforms and 
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With that said, even with China and India included, the economic performance of 
developing countries has been far worse under Neo-Liberal globalisation than the period of 
Embedded Liberalism that preceded it. For instance, annual growth rates in the developing 
world between 1980-2000 halved (1.7%) from those experienced between 1960's-1970's 
(3.0%). In the areas where Neo-Liberal globalisation was specifically exported through the 
IMF and World Bank programmes such as Latin America and Africa the stalling of economic 
growth has been profound. In Latin America annual growth rates dropped from 3.1% in the 
1960's and 1970's dropping to 1.7% in the 1990's and flat lined to 0.6% between 2002-2005 
(Chang, 2007: 27-28). Africa's plight under Neo-Liberalism has been even worse, with the 
modest annual growth between the 1960's and 1970's of 1-2%, replaced with basically 
nothing (0.2%) between 1980-2009 (Chang 2010: 118-119). 
This evidence of economic divergence or stagnation rather than catch up is also reflected in 
average income statistics. Including China in calculations of average income catch-up 
between developing and developed word yields some catch up from the late 1980's to 2007 
but still sees average Third World income at only 18% of First World income. And when one 
takes China out of such calculations there is no catch up at all. Indeed from the 1980's there 
is a decline and a relative flat line through the 1990's and early 2000's, reaching 15% of 
average First World income by 2007 (Wade 2009a: 150-51, see also Freeman 2009). And 
furthermore, income inequality in developed nations has itself increased. In the UK, for 
regulations that were protective of its economy. This is of course does not valorise China's authoritarian state, 
which is inherently anti-democratic. Nor does this obscure the fact China and India's development has seen 
bad effects such as rising wealth inequality and environmental degradation or that both countries may move 
towards or are in fact currently embracing more Neo-Liberal polices (e.g. China's ascension to WTO). However, 
it seems better I believe to see China and India from the 1980's through to the first decade of 2000's as 
prospering and playing a vital role in the global arena of Neo-Liberal globalisation through non-Neo-Liberal 
means rather than as fully fledged Neo-Liberal states who bucked the trend of Neo-Liberal globalisation's 
economic failures (see Arrighi & Zhang 2011 for a position that ponders whether or not China's economic 
strategy may equal a new Bandung consensus). 
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example, the average income of the top 10% of £55,000 in 2008 was almost a 12 times 
higher than that of the bottom 10%, who had an average income of £4,700. This 12 to 1 
ratio marks a move from the 1 to 8 ratio found in 1985. At the same time, the share of 
national income by the top 1% of UK income earners also increased from 7.1% in 1970 to 
14.3% in 2005. The US also saw its ratios jump, between 1979 and 2006, the top 1% of 
earners doubled their share of national income from roughly 10 % to 22.9% and the top 
0.1% increased their share from 3.5% to 11.6 % in the same period. Thus, where as in the 
1980's the ratio between the average income of the top 10% in relation to the bottom 10% 
was 10 to 1, by 2008 this had become 15 to 1 (DECD: 2008, Chang 2010: 144). 
When one considers the poverty headcount again, how one factors in China drastically 
affects the results. Poverty is measured on two counts, the 'extreme' count which is based 
on those living $1 a day and the 'ordinary' count of $2 per day. According to the World Bank 
the number of people living in extreme poverty dropped by 400 million between 1981 & 
2001 from 1.5 billion to 1.1 billion. This saw the proportion of the world population living in 
extreme poverty fall from 33% to 18% in the same time period. However, the problem is 
that the fall of the extreme poverty count relies mainly on China which did not practise the 
tenets of Neo-Liberal globalisation. And when one considers the 'ordinary' poverty level, 
even with China included, there has been a rise in poverty between 1981-2001 (Wade 
2009a: 151 see also Held and Kaya 2007). These figures have seen even World Bank 
researchers admit that the developing countries have not benefitted as much from Neo-
liberal globalisation as first thought (Chen and Ravaillion, 2008). 
The statistics concerning growth rates, income catch up and poverty headcounts all point to 
the fact that whilst the development of parts of Asia, through measures that are counter-
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intuitive to the tenets of Neo-Liberal globalisation, has seen global inequality - the 
distribution of income between all the world citizens regardless of statehood- fall slightly, 
the world has not become drastically more economically equal under Neo-Liberal 
globalisation. In fact subtracting China from the calculation of inequality between countries 
since 1980 translates into a scenario of rising inequality between countries (Held 2010: 153). 
Those currently excluded from the world economy such as sub-Saharan Africa and parts of 
Latin America, the 'bottom billion', face the daunting prospect of having to wait until wage 
gaps in Asia open up room for their own development in the same vein as wage gaps 
emerged between Asia and the First world in 1980 (Collier 2007: 86). And on a world scale, 
the First World has seen the number of challenger states - states whose average income in 
the next two generations would put them within 2/3rds or more of per capita incomes of the 
poorest First World states- actually fall between 1978-2000 (Wade 2009a). 
In sum, then, contra the claim of its advocates, Neo-Liberal globalisation has been both a 
relative economic and ethical failure. It has neither brought about greater economic growth 
nor been the harbinger of greater equality and economic prosperity for the world's 
developed and developing countries. More to the point, Neo-Liberal globalisation seems to 
have made the world a structurally more unequal place. As Chang (2010: 145) points out, 
the irony is that: 
' ... since the 1980's we have given the rich a bigger slice of our pie in the belief that 
they would create more wealth, making the pie bigger than otherwise possible in the 
long run. The rich got the bigger slice of the pie all right, but they have actually 
reduced the pace at which the pie is growing.' 
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What theorists of GOT do with such evidence, however, is not just question the faulty 
economics of Neo-liberal globalisation but also the also the political system which 
underpins such a regime. As we shall explore in the next chapter, GOT suggests that Neo-
liberalism has not just been an economic and ethical failure but also, due to its commitment 
to hyper globalisation, a democratic failure. GOT authors look to highlight how a greater 
extension of democracy across the globe to help regulate the underlying drivers of 
globalisation would secure greater economic prosperity and ethical responsibility for 
humanity and her planet. And it is to those normative visions of global democracy that we 
now turn to in the next chapter. 
25 
Chapter 2: Global Democratic Theory 
Across the various positions of Global Democratic Theory (GOT) Neo-liberal globalisation 
appears to be an erroneous economic theory at best and at worst,an ideological front set up 
to maintain the hegemony of the First World countries and their dominant elites. The key 
point, however, is that the normative visions of GDT all wish to offer different ways of 
driving the underlying drivers of globalisation. Thus, whilst writers with different normative 
visions of what constitutes global democracy all see globalisation as being currently tied to 
the practises of Neo-Liberal globalisation, they also hold steadfast with the conviction that, 
pace Thatcher's TINA doctrine, the aforementioned deep underlying drivers of globalisation 
can be driven differently and towards different normative ends. The problematic of GDT is 
therefore not how to destroy globalisation but rather, the proper forms that globalisation 
should take to reach economic and social justice. 
To get to grips with GOT I believe it best to see the paradigm as being split between 
advocates of a global democracy from 'above', those who favour a heavily designed 
institutional framework for global democracy, and advocates of a global democracy from 
'below', those who favour a more agential and experimental form of institution or policy 
creation. Of course, there will be critics of this approach who point towards the 
homogenisation of thinkers or futility of stressing the division between the respective 
strands of GOT. On both counts I plead guilty, because, as I aim to show below, despite their 
superficial theoretical differences, the two sets of GDT inherently end up with same flawed 
ontological assumptions concerning the political potentialities oftheir own theories. 
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2.1 Global Democracy from Above: Cosmopolitan Democracy 
Global democracy from above can largely be summed up in two words: Cosmopolitan 
Democracy (in an ever increasing literature archetypal examples of Cosmopolitan 
Democracy can be found in Archibugi 2004, 2008, Beck 2005, 2006, Held 1995, 2004, 2010, 
Held et al. 1999, Kaldor 2003, McGrew 1997, 2002).14 In direct contrast to liberal 
approaches to global governance, which look to extend deliberation through traditional 
nation state structures, at the heart of Cosmopolitan Democracy beats the desire to 
'globalise democracy, while at the same time, democratising globalisation' (Archibugi 2004: 
438).15 In short, Cosmopolitan Democracy looks to radically reform the post-war multilateral 
order to achieve the normative goals of greater democracy and economic and social justice. 
This translates into the provision of institutional plans and processes that would not only 
increase the democratic deliberation and decision making between nation states but also 
the number of centres and non-state actors involved in such democratic deliberation and 
decision making (Smith and Brassett 2008: 79). 
Cosmopolitan Democracy primarily justifies its proposals to radically reform the post-war 
multilateral order by highlighting how underlying drivers of contemporary globalisation 
create global political problems that the current multilateral geo-political order and the 
Neo-liberal globalisation cannot solve. On one hand, Cosmopolitan Democrats point to the 
fact that underlying drivers of contemporary globalisation and its unprecedented form of 
14 There others such as Habermas (2006), Monbiot (2003), Ruggie (2003), Stiglitiz (2002, 2006) and ex- UN 
diplomats such as Annan (2005) and Malloch-Brown (2011) who whilst not advocates of Cosmopolitan 
Democracy per se, are advocates of achieving Global Democracy primarily through reform of the macro 
institutions of global governance. Although I do not cover the work of these authors, the questions I ask of 
Cosmopolitan Democracy and all positions of global democracy in the next chapter should be extended to the 
work of these authors. 
15 By liberal approaches to global governance, following Brassett and Smith's typology (2008) I am thinking of 
the work inspired by Rawls (1999) such as Cohen (2004) and Buchanan & Q'Kehonae (2006). 
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interconnectedness create unprecedented transnational consequences (Held 2010: 4). 
These consequences of contemporary globalisation are best seen as 'global problems' such 
as sharing the planet (climate change, water deficits), sustaining humanity (economic 
security, poverty, food security, conflict prevention) and developing global rules (global 
trade, tax and finance law, nuclear proliferation). The increasing magnitude and impact of 
such global problems on the daily lives of citizens across the world brings to the fore that we 
no longer live in discrete national communities but rather are members of interconnected 
'communities of fate' (Held 2004: 168) or 'communities of risk' (Beck 2005: 82, 103) where 
the fortunes of one nation are tied, often asymmetrically, with the trajectory of another: 
' .. .it is not only the violent exception that links people together across borders; the 
very nature of every problem and process joins people in multiple ways. From the 
movement of ideas and cultural artefacts to the fundamental issues raised by 
genetic engineering, from the conditions of financial stability to environmental 
degradation, the fate and fortunes of each of us are thoroughly intertwined' (Held 
2010: 118). 
The recognition of the problems of global interconnectedness also reveals for Cosmopolitan 
Democrats that no single nation state can solve these problems alone (Held 2010: 14). On a 
simple governance level, the underlying drivers of globalisation and the global problems 
they bequeath, such as the formation of world markets or climate change, are simply 
beyond the institutional reach of one nation to control. For instance, the emergence of 
global markets and actors such as MNC's raise questions about the true effectiveness of 
national economic policy; whilst climate change cannot be solved through one nation's 
energy policy alone. 
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At the same time, proponents of Cosmopolitan Democracy also embrace the idea that the 
nation state is no longer, if it ever was, the sole locus of political power (Beck 2005: 53-54, 
63-64). This is the aforementioned process by which the underlying drivers of globalisation 
see the nation state's power transformed and interlinked with new complex networks and 
agents of power at regional and global levels. The consequence of these transformations is 
that there has been a process of deterritorialization of political authority and sovereignty 
away from the nation state and subsequent reterritorialization which now includes, but 
goes beyond, the nation state. A situation compounded, if not accelerated, by Neo-
Liberalism's form of hyperglobalisation, which not only makes the nation state subservient 
to free-market economic policies but establishes the authority of global governance 
institutions (IMF, WTO, World Bank) and global markets over the nation state. The result of 
this process if that the classic conception of 'modern sovereignty', where autonomous 
nation states exercise unquestionable authority within bounded political communities and 
resolved their differences with another through 'reason of the state' and diplomacy, is now 
essentially defunct (Held and McGrew 2007: 211 cf. Archibugi 2008). 
Instead of taking the collapse of modern sovereignty to translate into the idea that 
hyperglobalisation is the only alternative, however, Cosmopolitan Democrats argue that 
nation states must come to terms with such reality. In this sense, nation states must seek a 
collective and democratic multilateralism, which includes all those whose fates are 
interlocked in networks of economic, political and environmental interaction, if we are to 
have any chance of solving our collective global problems (Held 2010: 4, 160). The paradox 
of our times for Cosmopolitan Democrats, however, is that given underlying drivers of 
contemporary globalisation and the emergence of global problems, there has been little 
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attempt to really pursue a collective and collaborative multilateralism. In fact, perversely, 
our primary tools for dealing with globalisation and its problems are argued to be 
predominantly national and local, weak and incomplete. This is primarily because the post 
1945 multilateral order appears to be structurally flawed. For instance, Held (2010: 160) 
identifies 4 current deep rooted problems that afflict the institutional nexus of post 1945 
multilateral order: 
1) The lack of a clear division of labour between the various international organisations 
of global governance, whose functions overlap and objectives often contradict one 
another. 
2) The inertia or inability of such international organisations to mount collective 
problem-solving, which results in the cost of inaction outweighing potential action. 
3) The lack of ownership of global problems at the global level, which leads to global 
problems slipping between agencies at the global level e.g. climate change. 
4) The accountability deficit and asymmetric nature of international organisations. For 
example, multilateral bodies such as the IMF and World Bank are rarely able to be 
held account to non-state actors and bodies such as the IMF, World Bank the UN are 
set-up (e.g. voting power/permanent security council) with asymmetric relations of 
power between developed and developing countries. 
The institutional weakness of the post 1945 multilateral order is compounded by Neo-
Liberal globalisation's policy objectivities becoming the 'internal compass' for nation states 
and the international institutions of global governance such as IMF, World Bank and WTO 
(Beck 2005: 71-87, 79-80, 87). The prioritisation of market liberalisation above all other 
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factors is purported to have led to political resistance or unwillingness to address areas of 
market failure such as global environmental degradation or rising global poverty and 
inequality levels; the underemployment or unemployment of available resources to rectify 
issues such as global poverty; and the emergence of global capital flows which destabilise 
and often hold national economies to ransom {Held and McGrew 2007: 227-228, Beck, 
2005: 52-54}. 
Cosmopolitan Democrats thus claim that the hegemonic influence of Neo-Liberal 
globalisation and its handing over of power from governments to market forces has further 
weakened the potential governance of the underlying drivers of globalisation at local , 
national, inter-state and global levels. The combined outcome of the hegemony of Neo-
Liberal globalisation and such deep rooted institutional problems is that the current 
composition of the world's multilateral order resembles anything but the collective and 
collaborative arena it needs to be in order to deal with globalisation and its inherent global 
problems. 
It comes as no surprise, then, that Cosmopolitan Democrats believe that the collective and 
democratic multilateralism that could solve such a geo-political crisis is Cosmopolitan 
Democracy. But what exactly is Cosmopolitan Democracy? The most sustained explanation 
of Cosmopolitan Democracy is to be found in the work of David Held {1995, 2004, 2010).16 
16
't is on the issue of the actual architecture of Cosmopolitan Democracy where one finds the greatest 
difference and nuances of emphasis between the various theorists of Cosmopolitan Democracy. For instance 
despite being perpetual co-authors, both Held and Archibugi differ over whether one should hold onto and 
expand the concept of sovereignty (Held 2004, 2010), or junk the term altogether and embrace a global 
constitutionalism (Archibugi 2008). Also, within David Held's (1995, 2004, 2010) work, one will find quite 
detailed institutional blueprints as to how a global Cosmopolitan Democracy, which is Social Democratic in 
nature, should be set up. On the other hand, Ulrich Beck focuses less on institutional blueprints and in his 
own treatises about Cosmopolitan Democracy (2005, 2006) he talks far more generally about Cosmopolitan 
strategies going forward and attempts to also re-orient social science research to deal with the contours of 
globalisation. I thus focus primarily on Held's work because it offers the most substantive statement of what a 
Cosmopolitan Democracy would look like in reality. However, despite some clear differences of emphaSis 
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Primarily, Held articulates that in order to manage globalisation towards the goals of social 
and economic justice there must be political reform that bequeaths both the centralization 
and decentralization of political power. Taking its philosophical foundations from Kantian 
conceptions of Cosmopolitan hospitality,17 Held firstly argues for the centralisation of 
political power through the establishment of a global Democratic Public Law (Held 2010: 16-
17 cf. Held 1995: 238). In essence, Democratic Public Law points to the existence of basic 
rights or standards that no agent, irrespective of being a representative of government, 
state, or civil association can violate. This principle is fleshed out in the stance that: 
' ... human beings are in a fundamental sense equal and that they deserve equal political 
treatment; that is, treatment based upon the equal care and consideration of their agency 
irrespective of the community in which they were born or brought up' (Held 2002:23). 
In practice, Held's Democratic Public Law would find its institutional expression in the form 
of a global framework of law which would subordinate regional, national and local 
sovereignties and form the basis for the equal treatment of all {Held 1995: 234}. This would, 
for example, see the entrenchment of universal sets of rights and obligations through the 
formation of a new overarching set of cosmopolitan rights; an interconnected global legal 
system on human rights and economic, criminal and environmental law; the submission of 
all nations to the Intentional Court of Justice and International Criminal Court jurisdiction; 
and the creation of new international human rights and international environmental courts 
to address global problems (Held 2010: 104-105). 
there are also clear affinities between the thinkers of Cosmopolitan Democracy as regards to the historical 
foundations of Cosmopolitan Democracy, how post-war multilateral order should change, the new role of the 
nation state in the 21st century and how conceptions of global citizenship figure in such changes. 
17 I . 
t IS not my intention to extensively examine how Stoic and Kantian forms of Cosmopolitanism inform and 
are critiqued by practitioners of forms of New Cosmopolitanism. For a more detailed historical overview of this 
relationship between Classical and New Cosmopolitanism see the introduction and the respective 
contributions of Nussbaum and Brown in Brown and Held (2010). 
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Somewhat counter intuitively, Held views the centralisation of political power that 
Democratic Public Law inaugurates as providing the grounds for the decentralisation of 
political power. This is based on Democratic Public Law dovetailing with Held's principle of 
conception of democratic 'all-inclusiveness'. At its most simplest the principle of democratic 
all-inclusiveness articulates a conception of democracy that mandates that all those 
affected by public decisions should have an equal opportunity to influence or regulate 
(directly or indirectly through representatives), those public decisions (Held 2010: 173-74). 
The key point here, Held argues, is that such a political principle exposes the fallacy of the 
hegemonic link between democracy and modern sovereignty. 
Traditionally, democracy and the relationship it evokes between decision makers and 
decision takers has been seen to revolve around the concept of a bounded political 
community within a nation state. However, Held (2004: 98) points to the fact that such a 
link has only ever been contingent in the expression of democracy; that is, when the 
decision makers and decision takers were bound by geographic proximity. As we have seen , 
however, due to globalisation the relations between decision makers and decision takers is 
no longer simply contained within the territory of the nation-state, but citizens of one 
nation state find their fate bound with citizens in other nation states; in communities of 
fate. The principle of all-inclusiveness thus brings to the fore that not only must democracy 
not be conflated with the nation state but that it must adapt to the contours of 
contemporary globalisation (Held 2010: 173-177 cf. Held 1995: 228, Archibugi 2008). 
In Held's eyes, Democratic Public Law founds a form of Cosmopolitan Sovereignty, which 
recognises the principle of democratic all-incJusiveness and challenges the apparent 
congruence between sovereignty, democracy and the nation state. This is because under 
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Cosmopolitan Sovereignty the very concept of sovereignty is taken ' ... as the networked 
realms of public authority shaped and delimited by an overarching cosmopolitan legal 
framework' (Held 2010: 19). The outcome is that Cosmopolitan Democracy and its take on 
sovereignty is defined by the principle of "heterarchy", where there is a "divided authority 
system subject to cosmopolitan democratic law" rather than a single nation state or 
overarching world government (McGrew 1997: 250 cf. Archibugi 2004: 454). 
This ultimately facilitates three wholesale changes in the pursuit of democratic all 
inclusiveness. The first is that legitimate exercise of democracy is linked with the upholding 
of Democratic Public Law rather than being simply located in bounded political communities 
and nation states. The nation state 'withers away' as sole power and is embedded within a 
complex array of local, regional and transnational democratic arenas that utilize and seek to 
enforce cosmopolitan law (Held 2010: 19, 101-101). The second is the interlinked notion 
that such arenas of democracy can be flexibly used to tackle political problems when 
necessary. For instance, under Democratic Law, local problems such as housing, education, 
and poliCing are to be solved within spatially delimited arenas (city, region or state) and 
global problems such as climate change and poverty are to be pursued within regional and 
transnational arenas. In turn, the system aims to be fluid; allowing for local arenas to be 
supplemented by regional and transnational ones if they are found to be unable to include 
all those affected by public decisions (Held 2004: 107-8). 
Finally, the third wholesale change that Cosmopolitan Sovereignty inaugurates is the rise of 
what Held calls 'cosmopolitan citizenship'. In this sense, the very meaning of citizenship 
would move from its current articulation of membership of a bounded political community, 
which grants rights and responsibilities, to citizenship under Democratic Law that provides 
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all persons with rights and responsibilities. This is fundamentally the idea that all people 
will have ' ... an equality of status with respect to the fundamental processes and institutions 
which govern their life expectancy and life chances' (Held 2010: 179). Cosmopolitan 
citizenship would see individuals become members of diverse and changeable political 
communities -locally, nationally, region ally and globally- if the principle of democratic all-
inclusiveness is to be held within the context of a historically unprecedented form of 
globalisation. And as Held reminds his readers, just like democracy, there is only a 
historically contingent connection between citizens and the national community. A link that 
is continually weakened as globalisation places humanity in various communities of fate 
(Held 2010: 180). 
To achieve the enactment of Cosmopolitan Sovereignty, its recognition of democratic all-
inclusiveness and rise of Cosmopolitan Citizenship, Held puts forwards a whole raft of 
possible institutional reforms to the multilateral order. At the heart of this would be the 
extension of democratic and deliberative forums and bodies at regional and global levels. 
This would include for example, a radical reform of the United Nations and its General 
Assembly, which would become a global assembly or global parliament. The agenda of a 
new global assembly would be the examination of global problems and the setting out of 
legal and institutional frameworks to address such global problems. In addition, Held 
suggests the reforming of the UN security Council, so that each nation is represented on 
equal footing; the creation of an independent and permanent peacekeeping force to deal 
with regional and global security threats; the creating of regional parliaments and 
governance (for example in Latin America and Africa) and the enhancing of the EU's power; 
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and the creation of an Economic and Security Council that could deal with issues of natural 
and human disasters (Held 2004: 109-14, 164-65). 
Nevertheless, it is not just political reform of the multilateral system that Held's 
Cosmopolitan Democracy endeavours to achieve. In tandem with the reform of the 
multilateral political order via Democratic Law and Cosmopolitan Sovereignty the global 
economic system is also paramount to securing the tenets of Democratic Law and 
Cosmopolitan Sovereignty. Primarily, this economic reform would entail the replacement of 
Neo-Liberal globalisation with a new form of embedded liberalism or what Held (2010: 166) 
denotes as 'social democratic globalisation'. Following the work of Ruggie (2003), Held puts 
forward the idea of reconstructing social democracy for the global arena (Held 2004: 16-
Shifting the traditional idea of social democracy, where national government both utilizes 
and mitigates market mechanisms through social democratic institutions such as the 
welfare state and redistribution of the profits of growth, social democratic globalisation 
would aim for the global calibration of markets towards global poverty reduction and the 
protection of the vulnerable. Such a new economic agenda could be achieved, it is argued, 
through two key legal and institutional movements. The first would entail the use of 
overarching tenets of Democratic Law to not only provide the ethical codes of particular 
industries but the use of human rights and law to mitigate the basic laws of the free market 
and corporate practise. This would see the creation of laws that link economic, human 
18A . s pOinted out at the onset of the chapter, Ruggie (2003) does not explicitly tie his own ideas of reforming 
social democracy and creating a new global regime of 'embedded liberalism' to Cosmopolitan Democracy. He 
is also sceptical of the claim that the current practises and institutions of the post World War Two multilateral 
order seen are an expression of Cosmopolitan Democracy. 
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rights, commercial, environmental and transnational law together much like the Social 
Chapter ofthe Maastricht Agreement and the NAFTA regime (Held 2004: 154-155). 
The second movement of economic reform would attempt to restore the principle of 
democratic all-inclusiveness to the global economic system and deal with the perceived 
asymmetric relations between developing and developed countries that Neo-Liberal 
globalisation both justifies and perpetuates. The immediate task of such reform would be 
to stem the hegemonic enforcement of Neo-liberalism as the sole route to economic 
development, both within national and international policy circles, to facilitate the 
necessary space for individual countries to pursue their own development polices (Held 
2010: 169). This would entail a fundamental remodelling of the architecture of the global 
economy through the reforming of International Financial Institutions to make them more 
democratic and representative of developing countries and to re-orient their focus towards 
securing the ethical principles of Democratic Public Law (Held 2004: 112). 
Moreover, this would mean the elimination of unsustainable debt; seeking ways to reverse 
the outflow of capital assets from the poorest countries to the north; new forms of global 
taxation on financial transactions (Tobin Tax) and Carbon/Fossil Fuel use whose proceeds 
would be used to fund development; and the creation of new finance facilities for 
development in the poorest countries (Held 2004: 55-70, 164-65). The overall impact of 
such reforms being the perceived reconciliation of the development goals of the West and 
the nations who make up the proverbial 'rest' (Held 2010: 169). 
For writers, such as Held (2010: 240) and Beck (2005: 65), the political project of 
Cosmopolitan Democracy does not simply begin from the political ether or normative 
imagination. On the contrary, Cosmopolitan Democracy is said to already be partly 
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constituted by the post World War Two multilateral order which, shaped and formed by the 
lessons of the Holocaust and the Second World War and in founding human rights and the 
United Nations, recognised that human well being, respect, and the satisfaction of basic 
human needs went beyond geographic boundaries. This in turn has laid the ground for the 
development of multilateralism, international law and multilayered governance. In many 
respects, then, the founding of Cosmopolitan Democracy will complete an 'unfinished' 
project begun post 1945. And for Cosmopolitan Democrats the agents who could bring 
about such change are to be found in the emergence of Global Civil Society and the nation 
states who now find their sovereignty being challenged by the effects of Neo-Liberal 
globalisation. 
In the first instance, Cosmopolitan Democrats (Kaldor 2003, Beck 2005, Held 2010) point to 
an emerging global civil society of 'new' social movements and NGO's as offering a new 
form of global politics through the creation of transnational civil networks. Global Civil 
Society has been most fully examined by Mary Kaldor (2003), who traces its origins to the 
ascendency of 'new' social movements and the end of the cold war. 'New' Social 
movements, as they have come to be known, trace their own origins to the 1968 protests 
and contrast with 'Old' social movements. Old social movements tended to be associated 
with labour movements or movements towards self-determination/liberation such as anti-
colonial movements. Organised hierarchally, with committees and chairmen, such 
movements addressed the nation state and were essentially mass membership movements. 
New social movements, on the other hand, focused on new issues (human rights, 
environmentalism, Feminism, Third world solidarity) and have far more decentralised and 
participatory organisational structures. 
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On the back of such organisational structures, New social movements pioneered new forms 
of protest and the use of the modern media technology such as TV to further their 
campaign goals (Kaldor 2003: 84-85). Global Civil Society consequently emerged, Kaldor 
argues, when 'new' social movements, during the Cold War, utilised modern 
communication technology (telephones, faxes,) and the advent of cheaper travel to 
challenge the segmentation of the world into East and West blocs with a conception of 
human rights and freedom. Out of the revolutions of 1989 and into the 1990's, a new 
conception of global civil society (one which made radical demands for the global account of 
political and personal rights that went beyond the state), was brought about by a new wave 
transnational activism and the explosion of international NGO's (ibid., 74-77). 
At present, global civil society functions as a social space where transnational civil networks , 
which can encompass NGO's (Oxfam, Amnesty International), social movements (anti-
globalisation, anti-global poverty) and individuals, create forums of communication and 
information exchange through the use of ever changing and more advanced forms of 
communication technology (internet, social networking, indymedia). The power of Such 
transnational networks, argues Kaldor, lays in their ability to create a 'boomerang effect' 
when local issues are made transnational issues and the subsequent transnational support is 
used to buttress progressive arguments and impel change from states and international 
institutions (e.g. movement against Apartheid). And even more pOignantly, SUch 
transnational civil networks can help the steps towards Cosmopolitan Democracy when they 
induce what Kaldor (2003: 96) calls the 'double boomerang effect'. This transpires when the 
publicising and movement of local issues to the transnational arena facilitates the 
recognition that such local problems, such as Land Mines or Human Right abuses, are in fact 
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global problems which demand the creation or development of globally binding 
Cosmopolitan Law (Ottawa treaty on Land Mines) or Cosmopolitan Institutions 
(International Criminal Court). 
Nonetheless, whilst viewing the power of global civil society as being valuable to the cause 
and despite being less powerful than ever before in its history, Cosmopolitan Democrats still 
believe that the project of Cosmopolitan Democracy must be linked to the power of nation 
states. As Beck points out, whilst there cannot be Cosmopolitan Democracy without global 
civil society, there can also be no Cosmopolitan Democracy without the alliance of 
politicians and national governments. For whilst the actions of global civil society can keep 
national and international political institutions to account, ultimately 'without the state, 
there can be no collectively binding decisions, no legitimation.' (Beck 2005: 251). Held 
(2010: 246-249) illustrates this further when he suggests that it is a collation of political 
groupings that could in theory bring forth Cosmopolitan Democracy in the 21st century. 
This collation of political groupings, whilst including global civil society, largely focuses on 
nation states, such as those European countries with social democratic traditions and faith 
in multilateralism such as the EU project, the USA when under progressive President's and 
the newly powerful BASIC countries. 19 A political scenario where nation states, who realise 
the impotency of modern sovereignty in the face of Neo-Liberal globalisation, come 
together to enact the foundations of Cosmopolitan Democracy through the ' ... strengthening 
of multilateralism, building new institutions for providing publics goods, regulating global 
19 
The BASIC countries are made up of Brazil, South Africa, India and China. The bloc was founded by an 
agreement in 2009 to act jointly at the Copenhagen conference on climate change to represent the common 
interest of such developing countries and challenge the dominance of Western advanced states at 
international meetings. The BASIC countries are not to be confused with the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, 
India China), which has moved from simply being an acronym for newly developing countries (who in the 
future will change the balance of economic power between developing and developed countries) to an actual 
geo-political bloc who now meet annually. 
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financial markets, creating a new global trade regime that puts the poorest first, 
ameliorating urgent social injustices that kill thousands of men, women and children daily, 
and tackling climate change and other environmental problems' (Held 2010: 249). 
2.2_ Global Democracy from below: Transnational Deliberative Democracy 
There are a whole plethora of theoretical positions and authors we could place under the 
rubric of global democracy from 'below': from the environmental; to the human rights 
movement; to the anti-globalisation movement and continuing relevancy of Communism.2o 
However, I believe that the best example of global democracy from below emerges from 
exponents of transnational deliberative democracy. Exponents of transnational deliberative 
democracy can be said to offer the most plausible expressions of global democracy from 
below because, whilst such positions correspond with others in the belief that the top-down 
nature of Cosmopolitan Democracy is at best insufficiently democratic and at worst a 
potential source of domination, they in turn offer coherent and extensive counterproposals 
to the democratic enactment of global democracy. Archetypal examples of such 
transnational deliberative democracy can be found in the respective work of John Dryzek 
(2006) and James Bohman (2007), who, whilst not entirely agreeing with each other, do 
correspond in the belief that transnational forms of deliberative democracy are more 
favourable than Cosmopolitan Democracy in extending democracy globally. 
20 In addition to the deliberative democratic thinkers I have chosen to discuss one could easily put under the 
rubric of global democracy from below other writers from other traditions, who whilst differing on the details 
also advocate the bottom up agential power in the formation of global democracy. Examples can be found i ~ ~
rival accounts of Global Civil Society (Keane 2003); the anti-globalisation/global justice movement [Klein 
(2002), della Porta et al. (2006) and Smith (2008)]; Human Rights activism [Keck and Sikkink (1998)]; global 
environmentalism [Newell (2000) and Faber (2005)]; and the global Labour movement [Evans (2008, 2010) and 
Silver (2005)]. This not to say anything of Neo-Marxist authors such as Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004), Callinicos 
(2003) and Harman (2009) who still invest their faith of global Communism in the rise from below by in a 
multitude or traditional conception of the Proletariat. Whilst I do not extensively tackle the work of these 
authors it is my contention that the problem of the 'normative figure', which I address at the end of this 
chapter, haunts any intention to spread democracy beyond the nation state. As such, the questions I ask at the 
end of this chapter of the discussed forms of global democracy would also apply to the work of these authors. 
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The main driving force of transnational deliberative democracy's arguments against the 
soundness of Cosmopolitan Democracy revolves around the issue of its perceived reduction 
of democracy's normative expression to self-determination by a singular demos. As James 
Bohman points out, democracy has historically and philosophically come to mean the rule of 
a people or demos rather than the peoples or demoi. Taken to be a singular political subject, 
the demos signified inhabitants of a singular territorial space, whether that be a city, district 
or nation (Bohman 2007: vii). This conception of a self-legislating demos, which is both the 
author and subject of its own laws, is essentially the democratic component of modern 
sovereignty. And as we have seen, with the collapse of the effectiveness of modern 
sovereignty in the light of globalisation, authors point to a simultaneous collapse in the 
effectiveness of national democracy. Where Cosmopolitan Democracy goes wrong, Bohman 
contends, is in viewing the goal of global democracy as the re-establishing of the demos on 
a global scale. This is because such an attempt to reconstruct the demos on a global scale 
does not acknowledge that the reality of the transnational polity is made up of demoi: 
multiple democratically organised units which may possibly come into conflict with each 
other (ibid., 33). For critics such as Bohman, then, the implementation of a Cosmopolitan 
Democracy through the engendering of an overarching Democratic Public Law can only take 
place through submitting all demoi into a self-determining singular demos. However, whilst 
such a proposal creates a continuity between democracy within the nation state and 
beyond the nation state, any form of deliberation about the nature and practise of global 
democracy itself ultimately becomes null and void (Bohman 2007: 40-42). Put simply, 
Cosmopolitan Democrats take Cosmopolitan Democracy as the only possible expression of 
global democracy. 
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This point is best captured by Dryzek who contends that Cosmopolitan Democracy's focus 
on recreating a singular demos and its inability to deal with plural peoples actually 
contradicts the goals of its own take on democracy. For if democracy consists of the capacity 
of all those affected by public decisions to have an equal opportunity to directly or indirectly 
influence or regulate those public decisions, then it is within the democratic mandate for 
citizens to call into question the very legitimacy of the Cosmopolitan Democratic order. 
Through essentialising the identity of democracy with cosmopolitan law, Cosmopolitan 
Democrats are seemingly unprepared to deal with very normative questioning that 
democracy brings to the fore and is unable to comprehend the fact that the two facets of 
their project, Cosmopolitan law and Global Democracy, may ultimately 'pull in different 
directions'(Dryzek 2006: 144). 
Although differing in how they perceive details of the very concept in the first place, both 
Dryzek and Bohman believe that the best way to achieve a robust global democracy is a 
transnational form of deliberative democracy. Unlike the classic liberal model of democracy, 
where the political process becomes the aggregation of voting preferences, deliberative 
democracy attempts to inaugurate a more dialogical politics (Flyn 2004: 437). Deliberation 
in this context is taken to mean the process of 'social learning' by which participants hold 
the potential for a transformation of their preferences as a consequence of exchanging 
views with others via non-coercive communication. The process of democratic deliberation 
facilitates the participation of all those affected by political decisions in the deliberation of 
such political decisions (Dryzek: 27-28). A deliberative approach to a transnational form of 
democracy should therefore be taken to mean the facilitating of transnational ' ... public 
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reasoning geared toward generating political decisions or public opinion about how to 
resolve shared problems' (Smith and Brassett 2008: 72). 
The best way to secure such transnational deliberation and in turn, transnational 
democracy, is therefore through a transnational public sphere. This conception of a 
deliberative transnational democracy via a transnational public sphere stems from a critical 
engagement with Jurgen Habermas' model of deliberative democracy and its conception of 
the national public sphere (Dryzek 2006: 61, Bohman 2007: 60-61, Chochran 2002). In 
Habermas' (1998) model of deliberative democracy the national public sphere, which 
emerges from the associations of civil society and is perpetuated by modern communication 
technology, functions as a deliberative space for all citizens to form public opinion. Such 
deliberative space is created by and for communication, characterised by both formal 
(public debates, citizen forums) and informal (neighbourhood associations, letters to the 
editor, radio phone-ins) deliberative arenas (Habermas, 1998: 229). In principle, within the 
public sphere all speakers should be able to articulate opinions and have others respond 
and articulate their own opinions in response on equal terms. At the same time, rather than 
simply being face to face, such deliberation addresses a potentially indefinite audience. 
Taken as a whole, the public sphere is an arena where citizens can passively consume or 
actively deliberate with an array of discourses and form public opinion about how to best 
solve shared problems (Bohman 2007: 61-62). 
The 'communicative freedom' of the public sphere is key for Habermas' (1996: 442) 
conception of deliberative democracy because it hands citizens 'communicative power' 
when it is able to influence the administrative power contained within formal decisions 
44 
making arenas such as the nation state legislatures. As Dryzek (2006: 61-62) points out, this 
communicative power largely translates into the process where the formation of public 
opinion affects democratic elections and in turn the legislation that emerges from such 
national legislatures. For both Dryzek (2006: 104) and Bohman (2007: 61-63) the time-space 
compression associated with the increase of new telecommunications technology (TV, 
intern et) and the emergence of global civil society now make it possible to create a 
transnational public sphere which can influence the networks of global governance and help 
inaugurate a form of transnational deliberative democracy.21 Indeed both Dryzek and 
Bohman take Habermas to task for essentialising the relationship between the public 
sphere and the nation state and failing to see how the public sphere could be expanded to 
promote a form of transnational deliberative democracy {Dryzek 2006: 24, 98-99; Bohman 
2007: 39-40).22 However, as we shall see below, whilst united in their belief in the potential 
for a transnational deliberative democracy via a transnational public sphere, both writers 
disagree with one another about the best modus operandi of this global democracy from 
below. 
21 Just as Bohman and Dryzek, I am making the distinction, not always done by others (See Kaldor 2003 for 
example), between global civil society and a transnational public sphere. The former should be seen as a Space 
of action and dissemination by activists and NGO's, whilst the latter is, as stated above, an arena where 
citizens can passively consume or actively deliberate with an array of discourses and form public opinion about 
how to best solve shared problems. And whilst the two are not mutually exclusive and indeed interactive, they 
are not the same thing. For instance, I point out below and hope to flag up throughout the study, that one 
could have very active global civil society actors and still not have a very active transnational public sphere. 
22 More recently Habermas (2001; 2006) has used his work to outline a form of global democracy and largely 
replicates elements of Cosmopolitan Democracy in its exposition of a three tier system of the national 
transnational (regional) and supranational (global) of institutions. In many ways its replicates many of t h ~ ~
failings I narrate afflict GOT in general in next chapter. For a more detailed examination of Habermas' work on 
these issues see Scheuerman (2008). 
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2.3 Dryzek - Transnational Discursive Democracy 
For Dryzek (2006) the current conflicts within the international system are best described as 
'clashes of discourses'. In Dryzek's parlance, a discourse is taken to mean: 
'a shared set of concepts, categories, and ideas that provides its adherents with a 
framework for making sense of situations, embodying judgments, assumptions, 
capabilities, dispositions, and intentions. It provides basic terms for analysis, 
debates, agreements and disagreements. Its language enables individuals who 
subscribe to it to compile the bits of information they receive into coherent accounts 
organised around storylines that can be shared in intersubjectively meaningful 
ways' (Dryzek 2006: 1). 
Following the lead of his Cosmopolitan Democrat counterparts, Dryzek (2006: 101- 103 cf. 
2008), locates Neo-Liberal globalisation as the hegemonic discourse of national and global 
policy agendas, which is governed by a decentralised and undemocratic network of global 
governance. However, the current international system, whilst under the hegemony of Neo-
Liberal globalisation and its mantra ofTINA, is now being increasingly called into question by 
the process of reflexive modernisation and the proliferation of alternative discourses. 
Reflexive modernisation is best seen as a process whereby the traditions and discourses of 
socialisation are increasingly likely to be questioned by individuals who have an increased 
access and awareness of alternative discourses and identities. 
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Under reflexive modernisation, which itself is perpetuated by the effects of the underlying 
drivers of globalisation (such as increased telecommunications), the privileged hegemony of 
Neo-liberal globalisation is now increasingly challenged by alternative discourses of anti-
corporate globalisation and human rights and regressive discourses of xenophobic 
nationalism or religious fundamentalism. The world as we know it under the hegemony of 
Neo-Liberal globalisation is therefore not a static one, but one where ever increasing 
amounts of individuals are thinking reflexively about the present and about international 
affairs (Dryzek, 2006: 20-21, 126). 
In a context of such discursive difference and conflict, Dryzek argues that the multilateralism 
associated with Cosmopolitan Democracy is both infeasible and possibly undemocratic. On 
one hand, Dryzek argues the current decentralised and undemocratic network of global 
governance is an eclectic mix of mechanisms ranging from the formal (nation states, IGO's 
, 
international law) to the informal (Global Civil Society, national public spheres). In light of 
the complexity of global governance mechanisms and the sheer proliferation of different 
discourses under reflexive modernisation, the idea of institutions relinquishing their power 
and individuals across the world subsuming their national, regional, tribal, religious and 
civilizational interests and identities under the project of Cosmopolitan Democracy, is simply 
not realistic. For example, normative divisions can be found about global policy not only 
between the US and Islamic fundamentalism but also between US and their supposed allies 
in Europe over the meaning of the ideals of democracy and freedom. Moreover, Dryzek 
points out that even if such multilateral negotiations were to take place, as history shows , 
they would inherently be slow and vulnerable to perpetual breakdown (Dryzek 2006: 153-
54, 160-61). 
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With this critique of multilateralism and Cosmopolitan Democracy in mind, Dryzek (2006: 
158) suggests that whilst one recognises the continued importance of formal international 
and state organisations as sites of authoritative power, the limits of directly democratising 
such formal organisations may have been reached. An alternative strategy would rather 
seek the democratisation of the global governance mechanisms as they currently exist. As a 
result, Dryzek contends that the extension of democracy across borders would be better 
served by the expansion of a Habermasian style deliberative democracy to international 
politics, via a global public sphere (Dryzek 2006: 27). However, contra Habermas' 
conception of the national public sphere, Dryzek envisions the transnational public sphere 
as an informal and decentralised deliberative space, which rather than simply being linked 
to the influenCing of elections, would function towards the: 
' ... effective inclusion of different values, bringing an increasing range of questions to 
the public agenda and rendering communication and deliberation more open and 
less prone to symbolic distortion' (Dryzek 2006: 160-61). 
Although Dryzek's conception of the transnational public sphere encompasses actors 
beyond civil society, such as corporations and members of governments and 
intergovernmental organisations deliberating and acting in non-authoritarian ways, the key 
actors within his conception of transnational public sphere are the NGO's and social 
movements within global civil society (Dryzek 2006: 24, 112). For whilst the agents of global 
civil society lack the formal political power of states and the economic power of 
multinational corporations, Dryzek believes that they have the greatest scope to think 
'reflexively' and hence disseminate discourses which challenge the hegemony of Neo-Liberal 
globalisation's global policy agenda (Dryzek 2006: 123). 
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In this way, the agents of global civil society are key to creating a transnational public 
sphere. However, unlike Cosmopolitan Democracy and the arguments of Mary Kaldor, the 
mission of Dryzek's conception of global civil society is structured around discursive 
contestation rather than an ancillary role of helping to found Cosmopolitan law or 
Cosmopolitan institutions. This is because Dryzek believes that a more authentic 
deliberation takes place over longer periods of time and within informal arenas of 
deliberation where the costs of changing one's mind or position are not as likely to be 
structurally blocked or deemed too costly (Dryzek 2006: 52-57). 
Ultimately, Dryzek contends that the goals of such discursive deliberation via the 
transnational public sphere and the vibrancy of global civil society are the education and 
dissemination of counter hegemonic discourses to broader transnational publics. The 
creation of transnational public opinion is therefore taken by Dryzek (2006: 154) to be able 
to influence not only the institutions of global governance institutions but also the actions of 
corporations and the policy of nation states with the capacity to make decisions within their 
jurisdictions. Indeed, as Dryzek notes, looking at the history of transnational movements 
against apartheid, corporate globalisation, the discrimination of indigenous people and 
environmental pollution, it is this dual contestation of the actions of international 
institutions and the actions of states and corporations that has been most successful 
(Dryzek 2006: 157-58). 
2.4 Bohman -Republican Cosmopolitanism 
Upon scrutinising Dryzek's work, Bohman acknowledges how one could be drawn to a 
transnational public sphere which, spurred on by social movements and NGO's, would 
engender transnational forms of communication and contestation. Indeed, in the midst of 
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the deterritorialization and reterritorialization of political authority and sovereignty away 
from the nation state to network forms of governance and the subsequent lack of 
regularised political influence (elections) over such network forms of governance, informal 
networks of contestation appear the only way to influence decision making at the global 
level (Bohman 2007: 65-66). However, in the eyes of Bohman (2007: 42-44), Dryzek's work 
is unsatisfactory because it reduces transnational deliberative democracy to being 
'contestatory' rather than actually democratic. This charge centres on Bohman's belief that 
Dryzek's conception of transnational democracy does not itself live up to the ideals of 
deliberative democracy. 
As we saw above, deliberative democracy, when conceptualised in terms of the nation 
state, conceives citizenship as engendering communicative freedom which is then 
transferred into communicative power when it influences the outcomes of democratic 
elections and the formation of state law and policy. Bohman contends, however, that 
Dryzek's valorisation of an informal global public sphere, which forgoes attempting to 
democratise or found new democratic transnational institutions in favour of contesting 
hegemonic discourses, engenders communicative freedom but not communicative power. 
Without the ability of a global public sphere to directly influence the institutions of 
administrative power associated with global politics, Bohman argues that the 
communicative freedom of citizens is not guaranteed to become communicative power and 
hence is not sufficient for the democratisation of global politics (Bohman 2010: 445-446). 
The 'institutional minimalism' of Dryzek's conception of transnational democracy, through 
denying the need for the formal links between the global public sphere and sites of 
transnational administrative power, thus removes the active powers of citizenship 
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associated with deliberative democracy and reduces global politics to simply activism and 
protest (Bohman 2007: 42-44). 
A more robust form of transnational democracy must therefore avoid both the pitfalls of 
Cosmopolitan Democracy's inflexible legal framework and the impotency of Dryzek's 
transnational discursive democracy (Bohman 2007: 44). In light of what he takes to be the 
new circumstances of politics (Neo-liberal globalisation) Bohman looks to follow the 
example of John Dewey and see such new social facts as 'demanding a normative and 
conceptual understanding of democracy and its geography' (Bohman 2007: 3-4). To 
accomplish this he looks to normatively ground his conception of Transnational Deliberative 
Democracy in the republican value of freedom as non-domination. In this scenario 
, 
domination is not taken to mean simply tyranny or arbitrary interference but rather the 
arbitrary use of normative power to impose duties and obligations. To conceive freedom as 
non-domination is thus to imbue citizenship with 'a particular normative status, a status 
allowing one to create and regulate obligations with others.' (Bohman 2007: 9). This 
republican value of freedom as non-domination is best realised through democracy, which 
Bohman understands as a: 
'set of institutions by which individuals are empowered as free and equal citizens to form 
and change the terms of their common life together including democracy. In this sense 
, 
democracy is reflexive and consists of procedures by which rules and practises are subject 
to the deliberation of citizens themselves' (Bohman 2007: 45). 
Taken together, the republican value of freedom and its democratic expression contrast 
with other conceptions of democracy such as Held's principle of all-inclusiveness. Rather 
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than seeing democracy as the achievement of a form of popular sovereignty where all those 
affected ought to be able to participate in the decisions that affect them, Bohman's position 
argues for 'a minimum set of powers and conditions that would make it possible for citizens 
not be dominated and thus to be free to make claims of justice in unjust circumstances' 
(Bohman 2007: 35 cf. 173). 
This conception of the 'democratic minimum' can be understood as the capacity of all 
citizens to initiate deliberation in order to amend the normative framework of democracy 
and practises of social life in regards to their claims of justice and the capacity to set an item 
on the open agenda and initiate joint public deliberation (Bohman 2007: 28, 55). The 
democratic minimum thus serves to provide both communicative freedom and 
communicative power associated with deliberative democracy's conception of citizenship 
by designating 'just those necessary conditions of nomination necessary for 
democratisation- that is for citizens to be able to form and change the terms of their 
common life' (Bohman 2007: 45-46). How exactly the democratic minimum is engendered 
through constitutionalised rights and institutions is open to debate and ultimately a 
reflexive exercise based on the upholding of the democratic minimum in the first place. 
In holding the value of freedom as non-domination, Bohman also contests the dominant 
interpretation of republicanism found in civic republicanism which perceives freedom as 
being equivalent to membership of the demos. Moreover, just as Held does with his 
principle of all-inclusiveness, Bohman argues that the value of freedom as non-domination 
issues its own warrant for the need for Cosmopolitan and transnational forms of democracy 
(Bohman 2007: 102). This transpires because, as we have seen, the practises of Neo-Liberal 
globalisations, such as the flows of global financial markets or global division of labour, 
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create asymmetric transnational relations which can affect an indefinite number of 
people.23 The actions of large multinationals, financial markets and powerful states, 
whether they intend to or not, can affect an indefinite number of people whose interests 
were never facto red into the decision process or who have no effective stake or control 
over the institutions that affect their life chances. These transnational relations are thus 
asymmetric and potentially lead to domination through the 'non-voluntary inclusion' of 
others (Bohman 2007: 24-25). The republican value of freedom as non-domination thus 
presupposes that within the context of Neo-Liberal globalisation the upholding of 
democratic minimum and hence democracy must go beyond the nation state to fulfil the 
very tenets of non-domination. 
To achieve such transnational democratisation, upholding the value of freedom as non-
domination and the democratic minimum across the transnational relations engendered by 
Neo-Liberal globalisation, Bohman returns to the idea of a transnational public sphere. 
Unlike the national public spheres, which can be defined by an encompassing mass media 
and cultural unity and spatial congruence, Bohman envisions the transnational public 
sphere as being formed through a network of media communications and to be 
'distributive': a culturally hybrid public of publics rather than a unified public sphere in 
which all communicators participate (Bohman 2007: 76-77). Up to this point Bohman largely 
mirrors Dryzek's conception of transnational public sphere which, spurred on by social 
movements and NGO's, engenders distributive transnational forms of communication and 
contestation over claims of justice. 
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However, as shown above, on their own, such transnational publics do not fulfil the 
democratic minimum because of their sole dependence on contestation to affect political 
decisions. To become 'strong' rather than 'weak' publics and uphold the democratic 
minimum, Bohman argues that such a distributive transnational public sphere must also be 
embedded into a larger institutional and political context in which citizens can transfer such 
communicative freedom into communicative power and achieve the democratic minimum 
(Bohman 2007: 81-83). 
Bohman labels his approach to achieving such transnational deliberative democracy 
'Cosmopolitan Republicanism' because it firstly presupposes the need for at least some 
global institutions such as the International Criminal Court and robust human rights that 
secure the democratic minimum for individuals who sufferer domination. Contra the tenets 
of Cosmopolitan Democracy, however, Bohman does not take the establishment of a 
Cosmopolis to be the central plank of such a Cosmopolitanism because of its tendency to 
lead toward a rigid constitutionalism that may possibly become undemocratic. Furthermore 
Bohman suggests there are limitations of such institutions in the enforcing and protecting 
of such rights and statuses (Bohman 2007: 132). To counter this, Bohman sees the global 
institutions as part of over lapping and polyarchical structure which facilitate the upholding 
of the democratic minimum. The centrepiece of Bohman's Cosmopolitan Republicanism' 
and its over lapping and polyarchical structure are democratic states (demoi) who choose to 
pool their sovereignty in the pursuit of federalist and regional projects of political 
integration such as the EU (ibid., 189).24 
24 • 
Bohman IS less clear on the detail of the relationship between such global institutions and rights and 
regional, national and local institutions than Cosmopolitan Democracy. However, it is clear that the 
relationship between the global institutions and the regional federalisms is itself a form of federal decentring, 
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Taking the EU as the only, if insufficiently deliberative, example of a transnational polity 'in 
the making', Bohman examines how the EU could become a fuller transnational democracy 
in the sense of Republican Cosmopolitanism. Just as representative institutions did for the 
nation states, Bohman contends that the EU must democratise the transnational policy via 
making its political agents more diverse and accountable (ibid., 154). This could be achieved 
through two complementary procedures. Firstly, a written constitution which would give 
European citizens the normative powers of the democratic minimum, 'the right to have 
rights', which includes the power to change the very nature of those of rights and duties. 
And secondly, the provision of sites and locations, locally, nationally and transnationally, 
where such citizenship can be utilized in direct deliberation with the institutional powers 
and authorities of EU (Bohman 2007: 128-29). In essence, this would see the EU become a 
site of multilevel interlocking and interactive sites that institutionally empower citizens in 
the transnational public spheres. And to accomplish this, Bohman not only stresses the need 
for reform of European institutions such as the European Parliament and its deliberative 
practises with the public spheres of various EU nations but also the extension of direct 
designed to avoid the pitfalls he sees in Cosmopolitan Democracy. In this sense, Bohman takes that regional 
formations will not only themselves deliberate with others within other regional formations to create global 
institutions and rights but also refract global institutions and rights into their own politics and hence create the 
foundations of a wider Cosmopolitan order. For instance, his conception of human rights translates into a 
situation where the very normative and intuitional frameworks of such human rights would be open to the 
perpetual deliberation of the citizens under the jurisdiction of regional formations. Bohman (2007: 145-151) 
points towards the EU's 2000 Charter of Fundamental Human Rights of the EU and accOmpanying 
supra national European Court of Human Rights as an example of such a process. In this scenario, citizens of 
the EU can utilize such rights across local, national and transnationallocations within the EU and through the 
use of the democratic minimum may even change the nature of how such rights are implemented. However 
, 
the Charter on Human Rights also provides normative powers to non-EU citizens (political rights) who reside in 
the EU and who must also have their human rights respected. Thus, even though human rights are refracted 
into the politics of the EU, for Bohman, such global institutions and rights are used to create a Cosmopolitan 
'human community' that regional formations are a key part. 
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forms of deliberation which would create and institutionalise a transnational public sphere 
of EU citizens within the everyday politics of the EU (2007: 147-150). 
It is Bohman's opinion that such an institutionalisation of the influence of an EU 
transnational public sphere would not require unimaginable changes but rather, the 
democratic opening and extension of transnational forms of deliberation which are already 
utilised within the EU. For instance, he pOints at the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) 
and National Action Plans (NAPS) of the EU on issues such as unemployment, regional 
development, education and poverty reduction, which are processes where administrative 
agencies and policy experts within the various EU states transnationally deliberate with 
other agencies and experts in other EU states at various locations and institutions of the EU. 
Although the deliberation is structured by initial goals (reduction in unemployment/ poverty 
reduction) from the EU Commission, it is not designed to create a uniform policy for all 
states but rather to draw on the range of local knowledge of problems and to draw out the 
best solutions for conditions within respective member states. In the very process, which 
can take place at various levels within the EU (local, national, transnational), deliberation 
may reveal that such goals/ends lead to the revision and redefinition of such goals and 
ends. In the case of the NAPS for example, the European Commission creates sets broad 
targets (e.g. literacy levels) for member states however these ends are not fixed but rather 
themselves informed by the process of deliberation. This form of shared deliberation 
introduces for Bohman what Cohen and Sabel (2003) call 'learning by monitoring', which via 
shared deliberation institutionalises a perpetual process of reform within everyday politics 
(Bohman 2007: 86-88, 158-159). 
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Nonetheless, the problem with these deliberative practises such as the OMC and NAPS, is 
that they still remain semi-public, as contributions to such deliberation is open to other 
administrative agencies and experts rather than the general populaces of the EU. To this 
end, such deliberative mechanisms lack the ability to gain popular legitimacy across the 
populaces of the EU and run the risk of juridification (Bohman 2007: 159). To counter this , 
Bohman suggests that such deliberative mechanisms should be opened to the general 
public through the use of 'mini-publics' and pOints to the example of how a Citizen's 
Assembly on Electoral Reform was empowered by the Premier of British Columbia to make 
proposals for electoral reform within the province. Using randomly chosen 'ordinary 
citizens,' the Assembly became a forum of deliberation between 'citizen-representatives' on 
, 
the behalf of the wider public, managing to gain popular legitimacy and informing wider 
public deliberation about the reforms. The proposals of the Assembly were then voted upon 
by all citizens to secure the popular legitimacy. 
The utilization of such mini-publics, Bohman argues, in tandem with deliberation with 
experts within regional formations would effectively remove the legitimacy problems 
encountered by deliberative mechanisms such as the OMC and NAPS. This is because the 
inclusion of ordinary citizens, who are stakeholders or a representative body of citizens 
, 
bypasses the semi-public nature of expert forums and hands citizens normative powers to 
deliberate, form opinion and make recommendations and decisions (Bohman 2007: 140-
141). On this basis, Bohman contends that the implementation of mini-publics could and 
should go beyond the use of OMC and NAPS and be used to enable 'a more open-ended 
process of participation and the empowerment of those affected by policy' (Bohman 2007: 
88). For example, mini publics could be constructed by agenda-setting EU bodies other than 
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the EU Commission and also in reaction to events that demand the convening of such 
publics such as economic crises. Rather than simply offering consultation or contestation 
then, the use of mini-publics effectively decentres power through providing citizens with 
institutionalised normative powers which shorten the feedback loop between publics and 
institutions of government. And as various publics within various demoi interact with each 
other and make normative decisions Bohman argues that a process begins whereby there is 
a 'deepening of democracy' over which the delegating institution hasno real direct control 
(Bohman 2007: 87-89). 
In sum, then, rather than believing that one should bring about a total reorganisation of the 
international institutions under Cosmopolitan Law, or that a directly transnational 
deliberative process can just count on the contestation of movements of (global) civil 
society, Bohman looks to provide foundations for citizens to resist domination and enact the 
democratic minimum. And Bohman sees the implementation of mini-publics and 
institutionalisation of the normative power of transnational public spheres, across regional 
federal blocs under a system of Republican Cosmopolitanism, as the best way to achieving 
such a semblance of transnational democracy. Taking note of the above and his belief in the 
nation state and the actors of global civil society one can see that Bohman takes 
transnational deliberative democracy to be a system where both political institutions and 
actors ' ... ongoingly and iteratively construct the public or publics with which it interacts and 
which it empowers to make decisions and to change its procedures' (Bohman 2007: 88, 
189). 
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Chapter 3: An acute case of an Ontological Paradox 
How then are we to assess the merits of GOT? It should be said that both conceptions of 
GOT are not without their critiques. Dani Rodrik (2011: 207-232), echoing the earlier 
critiques of Dhal (1999, 2001) and Kymlicka (1999), argues that large-scale global 
governance solutions such as Cosmopolitan Democracy run up against fundamental limits. 
These include the facts that political identities and loyalties still revolve around the nation 
state; that political communities are still largely organised on a national rather than global 
basis; and that there are only a narrow set of global norms and, otherwise, large scale 
differences on desirable institutional arrangements. The reality of a divided world polity, 
argues Rodrik, means that transnational institutions and mechanisms are never likely to be 
ever significantly supported enough at a national level to be sufficiently able to govern 
globalisation. 25 
Equally, Brassett and Smith (2010: 414) question whether authors such as Bohman and 
Dryzek, who espouse the virtues of Global Civil Society and a potential transnational public 
sphere overplay the capacity of such arenas to effect political change. Specifically the co-
authors, echoing the earlier critiques of global civil society by Chandler (2005, 2007) and 
Chandhoke (2005), point to a lack of analysis of the stratified relations between different 
groups within Global Civil Society (e.g. North Vs South, NGO's and social movements) and 
the plural and often conflicting positions such groups hold concerning the governance of 
globalisation, the legitimacy and role of global institutions and the political strategies that 
citizens should adopt. 
25 Rodrik (2011: 228) does not just, however, object to the concept of global governance such as that 
envisioned by Cosmopolitan Democracy on feasibility grounds alone. As an economist and an advocate of a 
renewed and redesigned 21st century Bretton Woods regime he believes that overarching global rules may 
actually not be desirable for economic growth or actual management of the global economy. 
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This is to say nothing of Neo-Marxists, such as Hardt and Negri (2004, 2010), who see the 
strands of GOT as offering an 'illusionary' critique of Neo-Liberal globalisation and inherently 
missing the key problematic of democracy and globalisation. This is because such theories of 
GOT never call into question the basic elements of capitalist society and its 'republic of 
property' - where the power of private property lays in a few hands, where the majority are 
forced to sell their labour to maintain their existence and a large section of the world's 
population are excluded from even partaking in this cycle of capitalist exploitation. Such 
'socially democratic' politics, which propose reforms that seek to achieve the goals of 
equality, freedom and democracy, are thus always impotent because they fails to see how 
questioning the function of capital, private property and the practises of elites is integral to 
achieving such goals in the first place. And in a typical Marxist cadence, Hardt and Negri 
conclude that advocates of GOT in fact propose self-defeating reforms where ' ... all elements 
of the existing social order stay firmly in place' (Hardt and Negri 2010: 20 cf. Bello 2004, 
2008). 
Taken at face value, the above critiques sound as if they point to flaws and omissions within 
the ontological narrations of globalisation offered by authors who champion the politics of 
global democracy. In so doing, such critiques appear to expose the limits and obstacles to 
the feasibility of achieving global democracy which proponents of GOT failed to take into 
consideration. This is true to some extent; GOT functions with an incomplete or under 
researched ontological narration of globalisation that has glaring omissions about the 
nature of the politiCS of globalisation. However, this is only half the story and fails to expose 
the 'ontology of paradox' that underpins both GOT from above and below and consequently 
lays the foundations for such an incomplete ontology of globalisation and its politics. 
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As such, in the first section below I shall show, somewhat bewilderingly, that the limits and 
obstacles to the feasibility of achieving global democracy are in fact outlined and 
acknowledged by proponents of GOT and then all too conveniently forgotten when they 
propose the enactment of their normative political vision. Rather than simply failing to 
engage with the research of others about the limits and obstacles facing global democracy, 
proponents of GOT also fail to comprehend the very obstacles and limits that they 
themselves acknowledge do hinder the path to global democracy. GOT thus suffers from a 
form of ontological split personality whereby the present oscillates between both quashing 
and facilitating global democracy. As a consequence, such theories end up telling us very 
little about the potential of global democracy and the current state of the politics of 
globalisation whilst also failing to interact with research and theories which could open new 
avenues of insight about such issues. 
3.1 An Ontology of Paradox 
To get to grips with what I mean by the ontology paradox I want to return to the perceptive 
arguments made by Luke Marte" (2007) about positions taken in the debate about 
. 
globalisation. As Marte" outlines, since the mid 1990's there has been a debate about the 
ontological nature of Neo-Liberal globalisation, which can be summed up in 'three waves' or 
'three positions' of globalisation theory.26 The first wave can be said to be the 
aforementioned hyper-globalist perspective on the effects of Neo-Liberal globalisation. The 
second wave of globalisation theory, known as the sceptiC perspective, is essentially an 
empirical rebuttal of the hyper-globalist account of Neo-Liberal globalisation. The third 
26 The wave analogy was first made by Hay and Marsh (2000) and the three positions of globalisation theory 
were detailed by Held et al. (1999). I follow Martell (2007, 2010) in merging the two together by mapping the 
waves onto the three positions. 
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wave of globalisation theory, which is defined by the transformationalist perspective 
associated with GOT, can be seen as an attempt to walk a middle path between both hyper-
globalist and sceptic perspectives. What Martell stumbles upon is how the ontological 
assumptions of the sceptic perspective actually match the transformationalist perspective, 
but end up in divergent and contradictory politics. Below I narrate Martell's work and then 
extend the work by showing how the ontological split personality of GOT is exemplified in 
what I denote as the 'problem of the normative figure'. 
The most prominent sceptic perspective is to be found in the work of Hirst et al. (2009 cf. 
Mosely, 2005 and Hay 2007), who contend that Neo-Liberal globalisation has in fact created 
a highly internationalised rather than a truly globalised economy. The above claim is based 
on distinct ideal types, which Hirst et al. (2009: 18-21) use to characterise an 
internationalised vis-a-vis a globalised economy. Within the strictures of such ideal types, a 
globalised economy is a scenario where national economies and international transactions 
between national economies are 'subsumed' and 'rearticulated' by global (interregional and 
transcontinental) processes and transactions. 
As a result, private national economic actors and public governments face uncertainty about 
the adequacy of their actions as the national social space becomes subservient to global 
processes and transactions. In contrast, an internationalised economy is one where the 
principle participants are still national economies, but where trade and investment produce 
interconnection between national economies. This process integrates national economies 
and their actors into world market relationships; but based on national specialisation and an 
international division of labour. This form of economic interdependence, however, does not 
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make the national space subservient to global processes and transactions but rather, sees 
the refraction of international economic relations through national polices and processes. 
Utilising their ideal types and diachronic quantitative economic data Hirst et al. (2009: 3-4) 
go on to show that Neo-Liberal globalisation has in fact created a highly internationalised 
rather than truly globalised economy. Moreover, the authors contend that the highly 
internationalised economy of the present is not even unprecedented. Today's highly 
internationalised economy is one of a number of distinct conjunctures of the international 
economy, which have been constructed since 1860's when modern industrial technology 
became the generalised basis of Western economies. And in terms of openness Hirst et al. 
contend that the current international economy has only recently become as open and as 
integrated as the gold standard era 1870-1914.27 This is based on evidence that there is a 
lack of genuine transnational corporations, with most companies still based nationally and 
only trading regionally or multi-nationally; the fact that capital mobility has only recently 
started to shift investment and employment from advanced economic countries to a select 
few developing countries (China, India, Brazil); the concentration of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) amongst advanced and again a select few newly developing countries; and 
the marginalisation of the Third World in both investment and trade. 
For Hirst et al. (2009: 3) the nature of the flow of trade, investment and finance reveal that 
the world economy is not global but rather a highly internationalised economy separated 
into a triad of trade blocs (Europe, Japan East Asia and North America). Rather than 
globalisation, Hirst et al. argue that it is the process of supranational regionalisation, where 
nation states combine in an integrative economic or monetary union and then conduct intra 
27 I will return in more depth to what has become known as The First Great Globalisation in chapter S. 
63 
and inter-regional trade, which best characterises our present. And on the basis of the 
evidence of supranational regionalisation Hirst et al. argue that the major economic powers 
of the G8, China and India have the capacity, if they were to coordinate multilaterally, to 
bring to bear greater governance over financial and other international economic practises. 
However, whilst such world markets are in fact not beyond the scope of regulation, the 
current scope of such governance is constrained by the interests of the major economic 
powers and the economic beliefs of their political and economic elites. 
The third wave of globalisation theory, which is defined by the Transformationalist 
perspective, can be seen as an attempting to walk a middle path between both hyper-
globalist and sceptic perspectives. The archetypal example of the Transformationalist 
perspective is to be found in David Held's aforementioned appreciation of globalisation and 
Neo-Liberal globalisation (see Held at al 1999 cf. Held 2010 and Held and McGrew 2007). As 
outlined in chapter 1, Held's account of globalisation and the implementation of Neo-Liberal 
globalisation is largely similar to other writers associated with theories of GDT.28 
To recap, contra the sceptic perspective, such an appreciation of globalisation largely 
embraces hyper-globalism's narrative that the deep underlying drivers of the post- 1945 
multilateral order and the consequent implementation of Neo-Liberal globalisation have 
created a distinct and historically unprecedented form of globalisation. However, where 
transformationalist perspectives depart from hyper-globalism, especially the hyper-
globalism of the economic liberal variety, is in the belief that such a form of globalisation is 
not teleological or necessarily favourable to the interests of all nations. Moreover, 
28 
Although it is only Held who labels himself a Transformationalist, as stated in chapter 1, writers such as 
Beck, Kaldor, Bohman and Dryzek's account of the effects of Neo-liberal globalisation largely mirror the 
Transformationalist account of Held's. Where they disagree is in the details of the normative vision they 
believe would solve the global problems engendered by globalisation and implantation of Neo-liberalism. 
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transformationalist perspectives follow others in pointing to the fact that empirical data 
reveals Neo-Liberal globalisation to have been economically unsuccessful in creating greater 
global equality and use such facts to justify their arguments for the extension of a form of 
global democracy. 
Martell (2007: 187-190) notes that on the surface there are undoubted differences between 
transformationalists and sceptics on issues such as defining a globalised versus an 
internationalised economy, the historical periodization of globalisation and the normative 
proposals to deal with the effects of Neo-Liberal globalisation. Yet, Martell goes on to 
suggest that when one looks beyond these surface differences the transformationalist and 
sceptic ontological appreciations of Neo-Liberal globalisation actually converge on many 
issues such as the economic and political hegemony of Neo-Liberalism within the Western 
economies; the changing nature of modern sovereignty with the deterritorialisation of 
capital flows and the move towards supra-regionalisation; global economic and political 
stratification between developing and developed countries; and the potential for the nation 
states to reassert themselves in regional or multilateral blocs. 
What comes to separate the transformationalist and sceptic perspectives for Martell is not 
so much their ontological descriptions of Neo-Liberal globalisation, but the normative 
proposal of global democracy and ideas about its feasibility. Whilst sceptics put forward the 
idea of nation states acting in regional or multilateral blocs to temper Neo-Liberal 
globalisation, they make it clear that their own normative vision is probably unlikely or to be 
made politically difficult, by obstacles contained within the present. Moreover, for sceptics, 
obstacles contained within the present such as the economic and political hegemony of 
Neo-Liberalism and the stratification between developing and developed nation states 
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make global decisions such as that proposed by Cosmopolitan Democracy even more 
unlikely. What Martell perceptively flags up is that whilst transformationalists largely 
follow the sceptic analysis in recognising the political obstacles facing the reform of Neo-
liberal globalisation they fail to consider such obstacles when expounding the possibility of 
global democracy: 
'The differences between sceptics and transformationalists' normative political 
conclusions seem to stem, more from the trasnformationalists' globalists conclusions 
than from the substance of their arguments; in practise, these often share similar 
ground with the more sceptical approach ... .focusing as they do on inequality, 
stratification and power; nation states (albeit reconstituted ones) for whom there 
are different possible activists strategies; and the re-territorilisation and regional 
blocs ... The more appropriate political conclusion from such a picture of the current 
world order would seem to be one that recognises inequality and conflict, nation-
states, and regional or multilateral like-minded blocs, as indentified by the sceptics, 
as the more likely structures in future politics (Martell 2007: 191). 
Whilst Martell provides a valuable general insight into the ontology of paradox of 
transformationalists and those who use such an ontology to found arguments for global 
democracy, his argument can be further developed by examining just how such an 
ontological split personality is exemplified in what I denote as the 'problem of the 
normative figure'. This is where radical agents, such as those within global civil society, or 
the leaders and populaces of nation states, are presented by proponents of GOT as being 
unhindered by the very ontological obstacles that their own theories acknowledge to 
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perpetuate the hegemony of Neo-Liberal globalisation or hinder the progress towards 
global democracy. 
Take for instance the conception of global civil society or transnational public sphere 
invoked by GOT. As we have previously seen, for advocates of Cosmopolitan Democracy 
global civil society is to play a key role in raising the awareness about global problems and 
help spur on nation states to form a coalition of the willing, which could bring about 
Cosmopolitan Democracy. Concomitantly, writers such as Dryzek see global civil society 
actors as being pivotal to establishing and securing a global public sphere and transnational 
discursive democracy. Again, the role Dryzek envisions for groups within global civil society 
is one of raising awareness for the wider publics contained within democracies. And as 
highlighted above, critics of such a valorised conception of global civil society point to a lack 
of appreciation of issues such as the stratified nature of Global Civil Society and the 
overplaying of the capacity of such arenas to effect political change. The problem, however , 
is the belief that those who hold such a valorised conception of global civil society fail to 
appreciate issues such as the stratified nature of Global Civil Society and the overplaying of 
the capacity of such arenas to effect political change is not actually all together true. 
On the issue of the stratified nature of Global Civil Society, for instance, Mary Kaldor (2003: 
92), notes the 'NGOization' of global civil society where Northern NGO's have greater access 
to the centres of political power and funding, as Western states have come to see NGO's as 
possible vehicles for their own interests, dominating the agenda at the expense of their 
counterparts and social movements in developing Southern states. Moreover, proponents 
of global democracy acknowledge that some NGO's and current transnational networks 
contained with global civil society are not to be seen as being favourable to the project of 
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extending global democracy but rather the perpetuation of Neo-Liberal globalisation (Kaldor 
2003: 107; Dryzek 2006: lOS).This is to say nothing of the transnational unity to be found 
amongst religious extremists and xenophobic nationalists (Dryzek 2006: 59-60, 123). Contra 
their critics, then, global civil society is actually taken by proponents of GOT to be a stratified 
arena of contestation and inequality between various NGO's and social movements. 
What the above exposition on the stratified nature of global civil society should have 
indicated is that theories of global democracy actually include within their analysis the very 
obstacles that others believe limit the potential of global civil society. My point, however, is 
that such obstacles and limits, rather than being unacknowledged, seemingly disappear 
when the proponents of global democracy are extolling the virtues of global civil society or 
the transnational public sphere with regard to their normative vision for global democracy. 
Take for example, Mary Kaldor's statement that: 
'The array of organisations and groups through which individuals have a voice at 
global levels of decision making represents a new form of global politics that 
parallels and supplements formal democracy at the national level. These actors do 
not take decisions. Nor should they have a formal role in decision making since they 
are voluntarily constituted and represent nobody but their own opinions. The point 
is rather through access, openness and debate policy makers are more likely to act 
as a Hegelian universal class, in the interests of the human community' (2003: 107-
8). 
This paragraph is typical of the paradoxical ontology that leads GOT to suffer the problem of 
the normative figure. On one hand, Kaldor, in a similar way to the way Beck (2005: 75-76) 
and Dryzek (2006: 123) and in a nod to her own critics such as Chandler (2007), admits that 
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such an arena lacks the ability to grasp formal political power. And at one point, Kaldor 
(2003: 100) even admits that the current new social movements and NGO's are largely 
composed of a cosmopolitan, educated minority who, unlike the old social movements, lack 
the ability to instigate popular mobilisation. On the other hand, and equally discounting her 
previous talk about the stratification of global civil society, Kaldor still articulates global civil 
society as a new form of global politics that may deliver greater global democracy via 
influencing policy makers. 
The problem here is not that the two narrations of the current state and potential role of 
global civil society conflict with one another, but rather the fact that there is never an 
explanation for how the current state of global civil society could be reformed or 
empowered to overcome the acknowledged obstacles that hamper it and by default the 
goal of global democracy. Quite remarkably, it is as if by magic the problems of 
stratification and the lack of influence over formal decision making which advocates of 
global democracy acknowledge do hinder global civil society suddenly disappear or are 
deemed unimportant when the project of global democracy is being valorised. 
One can find the same discounting of previously acknowledged obstacles towards global 
democracy in Dryzek's valorisation of global civil society and its role in his vision of 
Transnational Discursive Democracy. As I noted earlier, Dryzek is very much aware that the 
transnational public sphere is a divided and stratified arena. However, his narration of the 
1999 Seattle protests at the WTO Ministerial Meeting, for example, appears to gloss OVer 
the previously acknowledged fissures and differences of opinion found in the groups that 
made up the protests. The goals of anarchists, the labour movement and opinions of public 
intellectuals like Joseph Stiglitz are quite plainly not going to totally match up. As Brassett 
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and Smith point out the 'irony is that Dryzek establishes a powerful and avowedly 
multiperspectival conception of global civil society - a decentralised network with no 
common agenda - only to value it for having a singular 'impact' on the singular global 
discourse of market liberalism' (2010: 420). 
There are also fundamental questions to be asked about Dryzek's paradoxical take on the 
effectiveness of such transnational discursive democracy. More specifically, how such 
transnational discursive democracy is able to influence change within a context of Neo-
Liberal globalisation=. Although Dryzek (2010: 186) is right to point out that the anti-
globalisation movement took issues of global political economy out of technical authority 
and into the public realm. As Frieden (2006: 470 cf. Halliday 2000) notes, whilst the protests 
at Seattle did bring into light institutions such as the then G7, WTO and IMF, the protests 
had very little impact on the actual meeting of WTO. And as narrated in chapter 1, Neo-
Liberal globalisation, even after the 'battle of Seattle', has seen levels of domestic and 
international inequality actually rise rather than fall. This would seem to reflect Dryzek's 
(2006: 123) position that global civil society actors possess discursive power rather than 
formal political power. However, rather than seeing such an empirical observation as being 
a disadvantage to the cause of global democracy it is simply repackaged as an apparent 
advantage with no real evidence offered as to why such a conclusion should be derived. 
The same paradoxical take on the effectiveness of such transnational discursive democracy 
can be found in Dryzek's (2010: chapter 10) more recent work on global environmentalism. 
Once more Dryzek goes on to suggest that, whilst 'NGO's, scientists, and other activists' 
have gotten this issue of climate change onto the top of global and national policy agendas, 
transnational discursive democracy may be limited to such deliberative transmission. And 
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Dryzek (2010: 188-89) expounds on the virtues of contestation of climate activists within a 
transnational public space via discourses that espouse 'climate justice' or the earth's 
'ecological limits'. 
Again Dryzek (2010:188) is correct to highlight how such transnational activism and 
discursive contestation has been somewhat effective through challenging sceptical accounts 
of climate change and exposing the funding of climate change scepticism by large energy 
corporations. However, as Dryzek himself admits the discursive power of the environmental 
movements has its limits and the problem resides within the state structures that underpin 
global governance. Thus, whilst there is deliberation in the transnational public sphere on 
issues of climate change within the formal arenas of political power, within and between 
states and international organisations, it is 'less easy to discern much in the way of 
deliberative authenticity'. And when Dryzek talks about international negotiations on 
climate change from Kyoto (1997) onwards under he United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) he paints an even grimmer picture: 
'In the case of the Kyoto protocol (covering only developed states), most of them 
chose not to adopt such police, even if they ratified the protocol. Many of these 
states cam no where near meeting the targets they agreed in Kyoto, and much do 
not feature enough in the way of internal deliberation to make this shortfall. There is 
no mechanism at all to punish them for their lack of compliance ... This illustrates the 
more general point: governments may be held to account by their own publics, but 
accountability that crosses national boundaries is very weak and so in terms of the 
global deliberative system accountability is highly problematic.' (Dryzek, 2010: 189) 
Dryzek then continues on that the failure of 'meta-deliberation' between states, the most 
powerful actors in the global governance systems, means that there is 'failure in 
'decisiveness' in matters of global democracy. This failure in turn creates avenues for the 
discourse of market liberalism and the economic lobbying of large corporations to short-
circuit the advances made by the actors within global civil society and the discourses such as 
climate justice within the transnational public sphere: 
'Agreements that are negotiated reply on the voluntary actions of states for their 
implementation, which (as the Kyoto experience illustrates) is frequently not 
forthcoming. And the policy actions taken by states often respond in large measure 
to the weight of lobbying by powerful economic interests. The emissions trading 
schemes are generally well stocked with exemptions or free permits for the biggest 
and most powerful emitters of greenhouse gases. Deliberative advances in public 
space may actually displace failure into empowered space. So energy corporations 
that have failed when it comes to sponsorship of a discourse of scepticism may 
Simply turn to twisting the arms of governments, meaning the deliberative system as 
a whole loses decisiveness.' (Dryzek 2010: 190-191) 
The question that arises here is whether the evidence being uncovered here substantiates 
Dryzek's (2010: 196) conclusion that transnational discursive democracy ' ... is well placed to 
go global, though the terms in which it does so mean leaving behind many of the taken-for 
granted.' Indeed, I would suggest that the evidence presented by Dryzek himself, where 
global civil society is limited to discursive contestation and nation states ride roughshod 
over international agreements, seems to contradict his own conclusion that transnational 
deliberative democracy is well placed to go global. 
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Moreover, such a paradoxical account of transnational discursive democracy provides very 
little consideration as to how such conditions within global civil society may in fact call for 
the reconsideration or reformulation of what we take 'global democracy' to mean and stand 
for in both theory and practise. Now, one does not have to disagree with Dryzek's (2012) 
recent claim that proponents of global democracy are asking too much of the concept by 
evaluating it by hallmarks of national democracy such as electoral ballots. However, does 
the inability of global civil society and the transnational public sphere to hold states and 
their governments to account really constitute democracy beyond borders? Or moreover , 
are we satisfied that global democracy can be accomplished if the actions of global civil 
society and the transnational publics sphere are confined to mere contestation or 
transmission of discourse? In this sense, the concepts of 'global civil society', 'transnational 
public sphere' and 'transnational discursive democracy' ultimately remain untouched by the 
very empirical realities their research uncovers and as a result appear rather unworldly. 
This ontology of paradox embraced by GOT is even more apparent when one comes to 
examine the role of the nation state and international institutions. Both strands of global 
democracy locate the nation state as the key agent in the formation of their respective take 
on global democracy. As we have seen, for Cosmopolitan Democrats, nation state leaders 
(via forming multilateral coalitions) are the key agents capable of bringing about the 
international institutions and practises of Cosmopolitan Democracy. Equally, for those who 
valorise the global public sphere, the nation state and its influence over international 
institutions and practises is key to either informally (Dryzek) or formally (Bohman) securing 
the legitimate normative influence of transnational activism and a transnational public 
sphere. On the other hand, as we have seen, both strands of GOT believe that Neo-liberal 
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globalisation's policy objectives have become the 'internal compass' for Western nation 
states and the international institutions and policy agendas their governments provide 
support towards and confer legitimacy upon (IMF, World Bank, WTO). 
The problem with this juxtaposition of the current and potential politics of the nation state 
and international institutions is that they fundamentally contradict and conflict with one 
another. And there is very little empirical evidence offered as to exactly how the hegemonic 
status of Neo-liberal globalisation within national and global policy agendas is changing, or 
how the actions of Global Civil Society or transnational public sphere are changing the mind-
sets of the politicians and elites within the institutions of global governance. In fact, as we 
encountered in Dryzek's narration of state action in the policy area of climate change, the 
evidence provided by proponents of GOT often appears to counterintuitive. Bohman's 
work, for example, paradoxically suggests the possibility of a democracy of the demoi 
through states who appear non-too preoccupied with such a project. Take for instance his 
suggestion that the EU could reform to include the use of transnational mini-publics. That is 
once transnational agents, such as those within global civil society, emerge ' ... it is a matter 
for formal institutionalisation, just as sustaining the conditions for the national public 
sphere is a central concern for the citizens of democratic nation states' (Bohman 2007: 81). 
However, despite these claims, Bohman provides no sustained evidence that such a process 
is indeed happening or that the national governments or their publics are seeking to 
organise on such a transnational basis. On contrary, Bohman actually acknowledges that the 
2005 rejection of the referenda to ratify the European Constitution by the Dutch and French 
seems to suggest that such transitional organisation is unlikely and disfavoured amongst 
national publics within the EU. And it is ultimately the current lack of 'strong' transnational 
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publics, a situation akin to what Bohman call's Dryzek's version of transnational democracy, 
which compels Bohman to argue for the institutionalisation and consequent bequeathing of 
normative (political) power to transnational publics. 
More recently, in response to criticisms (Hogan, 2010; Gilbert, 2010 and Warren, 2010) of 
using the EU as a model for his conception of Republican Cosmopolitanism Bohman has 
suggested that whilst the EU has the potential to further democratisation to create a demoi 
it is ultimately not forthcoming: 
'The EU presents one sort of feedback model for enabling democratization, in which 
primarily the transnational-Ievel institutions that enhance democracy at the lower 
levels. Certainly, even in the EU the interaction can go the other way: democracy 
exercised at the lower levels (in cities, regions, and states) can enhance the 
democracy of higher levels, especially as these suffer from the potentially 
dominating effects of juridification that often make transnational institutions so 
distant and alien. With such mutual interaction across levels and locations, a highly 
differentiated polity works not merely creating various policies, but also in creating a 
regime of human rights that can multiply realize the powers of citizenship and make 
them more rather than less robust. For the lower levels to begin to democratize the 
higher level institutions, a commitment to an increased role for publics and citizen 
representatives is necessary, which so far the EU has not made.' (Bohman, 2010: 82) 
Bohman goes on to defend his use of the EU as an example of the possibility of Republican 
Cosmopolitan ism by arguing that ' ... the role of real examples is to develop realistic 
extensions of the possibilities of the present, which have a specificity that mere 
philosophical reflection cannot achieve.' This in itself is not a problem, one could argue that 
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philosophy and politics in general would be much helped by attaching its analysis and 
formation of ideals to real world practices. However, Bohman's paradoxical take that the 
non-furthering of democracy within the EU is tantamount to suggesting a democracy of the 
demoi is realizable or forthcoming is both bizarre and analytically unhelpful. 
Quite simply, Bohman's work appears to suggest a normative possibility through a real 
world example but seldom delves into the empirical limits of reconciling such a normative 
possibility with such an empirical reality. Such a position seems to remove issues such as the 
political power of national elites and nation state public perception of the regional 
formations such as EU from the debate transnational democracy and the (non)-emergence 
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of a democratic demoi within the EU. As a result, Bohman's apparent use of 'real examples' 
seems to lapse into the form of detached 'philosophical reflection' he wishes to transcend. 
This paradoxical take on the actions of the nation state is even more pronounced by 
proponents of Cosmopolitan Democracy. Take for instance, Held and McGrew's comments 
in 2007 reflecting on 9/11, the subsequent 'War on Terror' and the changing contours of the 
global economy: 
'Surprisingly, it is an opportune moment for cosmopolitanism social democracy. 
With the resurgence of nationalism and unilateralism in US foreign policy, 
uncertainty over the future of Europe after the 'no' votes in France and Holland, the 
crisis of global trade talks, the growing confidence of China, India and Brazil in world 
economic fora (especially in relation to world trade negotiations), and the unsettled 
relations between Islam and the West, the political tectonic plates appear to be 
shifting.' (Held and McGrew, 2007: 230- 231) 
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From the above it appears that the 'political tectonic plates' appear to be shifting towards 
creating upheavals, such as the vibrancy of US unilateralism, the rejection of EU integration 
and the emergence of new geo-political and economic rivalries, which actually bequeath 
anti-cosmopolitan rather than cosmopolitan outcomes. Yet, Held and McGrew seemingly 
find that such a context, where there is an absence of international multilateralism provides 
the perfect grounds for Cosmopolitan Democracy. Using the existence of post-War 
institutions such as the UN and the apparent growing realisation the 'public good' requires 
'long term 'co-ordinated multilateralism' they go to argue: 
'The present world order combines both elements of paradise and power: of power 
politics and cosmopolitan values. A coalition of political groupings could emerge to 
push these achievement further, comprising European countries with strong liberal 
and social democratic traditions; liberal groups in the US polity in support 
multilateralism and the rule of law in international affairs; developing countries 
struggling for freer and fairer trade rules in the world economic order; NGO's, from 
Amnesty International to Oxfam, campaigning for a more just, democratic and 
equitable world order; transnational social movements contesting the nature and 
form of contemporary globalisation; and those economic forces that desire a more 
stable and managed global economic order.' (Held and McGrew, 2007: 233-34 cf. 
Held, 2004) 
With the absence of such a collation emerging between 2007 and 2010, David Held repeats 
that same paradoxical take on the chances of nation states bringing forth reforms that may 
produce Cosmopolitan Democracy. For instance, once more we are told that despite an 
apparent increasing recognition that global problems cannot be solved unilaterally and that 
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the lack of progress on global poverty, climate change and nuclear disarmament points to 
the fact that such global problems require: 
t ... collective and collaborative action - something that the nations of the world have 
not been good at, and which they need to be better at if these pressing issues are to 
be adequately tackled. Yet, the evidence is wanting that we are getting better at 
building appropriate governance capacity' (Held: 2010: 146 cf. 13-14). 
This admission by Held that present conditions within the politics of nation states appears 
unfavourable to global democracy adds to the fact that he and his Cosmopolitan Democrat 
cohorts provide no sustained evidence, other than pointing at the formation of the post 
World War Two order, that the Cosmopolitan Democracy they espouse is backed by the 
leaders or populaces of nation states, or those in charge of the global institutions they wish 
to redesign. 29 Moreover, Held's own work actually appears to suggest that the current 
state of national and inter state politics actually disfavours global democracy. To suggest 
otherwise from such evidence appears nothing but paradoxical. After all, a present marked 
by the stratified and limited power of global civil society, where political elites appear punch 
drunk on the tenets of Neo-Liberal globalisation, appears to be less rather than more likely 
to embrace global democracy. Yet, despite this Held (2010: 246-47) goes on to literally 
repeat his earlier 2007 claim that a 'coalition of political groupings could emerge to push 
these achievements further ... ,3o 
29 
For a similar and all too bizarre acknowledgment about the slim chances of Cosmopolitan Democracy 
becoming a political reality and then the use of such evidence to argue for the growing realisation of the need 
for Cosmopolitan Democracy see Beck (2005: 83-85). 
30 
More recently, Held and Archibugi (2011) have admitted that they have often failed to provide an adequate 
account of the agent who could bring Cosmopolitan Democracy. They then go on to list possible agents such as 
dispossessed, global civil society and state actors without providing any real evidence that such actors are 
actually driven by the goal of Cosmopolitan Democracy. 
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What should now be clear is that views about nation state politics, their elites and the 
prospects of global democracy are indicative of the way in which theorists of global 
democracy, both from above and below, make paradoxical claims that flounce the very 
evidence their own analysis seems to throw up time and time again. This is essentially the 
ontology of paradox at the foundation of GOT, which, as shown above, provides a non-too 
sturdy support for the normative edifices and figures of political action set upon. For GOT 
writers to then claim that the actions of those within global civil society could create a 
transnational public sphere or that a coalition of willing nation states could bring into 
existence new forms of governance such as Cosmopolitan Democracy or Republican 
Cosmopolitanism is rather akin to saying the sun will not rise tomorrow: it is possible, but 
the evidence suggests that is very unlikely. 
3.2 On the Failed Relationships of Global Democracy Theory 
With that said, one must be careful of what one draws from the above analysis. The flagging 
up of GDT's paradoxical ontology is not an endorsement of a form of political fatalism. The 
problem here is not that writers of global democracy have normative visions that appear 
farfetched or improbable. Most normative visions appear presently incompatible Or 
unsuited to the present as they reveal our displeasure with our current state of affairs and 
outline what we think the present ought to be. And just as the case would be 
epistemologically, to be normatively caged within what is currently perceived to be Possible 
or likely would not only be a deathly blow to social science and democratic politics, but also 
to human ingenuity and advancement in general. Rather, much like the alcoholic or chain 
smoker who claims they can quit whenever they choose to do so, GOT appears to be in 
permanent denial about the actual nature of the present. 
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The result is that proponents of GOT fail to come to terms with the obstacles that their own 
analysis shows to face their own normative visions and through neglecting the ramifications 
of such obstacles, end up revealing very little about the status of global democracy or the 
politics of globalisation. We are told nothing, for example, of how or why the acknowledged 
obstacles facing global democracy, such as the current limitations of global civil society, or 
the hegemonic influence of Neo-Liberal globalisation, are perpetuated or how they could be 
countered politically? And apart from the brief hints to its actual precarious state we are 
told nothing concrete about what the actual state and chances for global democracy in 
present day politics are? Moreover, the lack of answers to these questions also highlights a 
refusal by proponents of GOT to go beyond their paradoxical ontology and actually interact 
with competing or complementary research which could shed light on or open up new 
avenues of research about the nature of the current politics of globalisation. Below I 
highlight areas of research where GOT's failure to engage leaves more questions than 
answers about the past, present and future of global democracy. 
Figure 1: Rodrik's Political Trilemma 
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The aforementioned work of Rodrik (2011: 184-206) sees him conclude that the historical 
record shows the 'political trilemma' of the world economy, since the advent of global 
capitalism in the 19th century, has been characterised by deep economic integration of 
Hyper-Globalisation, the Nation-State and Democratic politics (see Figure lone above). The 
dilemma introduced by this trilemma, as Rodrik sees it, is that we cannot have 
hyperglobalisation, democracy and national self-determination at the same time and can 
only have two out of three at the most. This is due to the fact that national democracy and 
the deep integration of hyper-globalisation are inherently incompatible.31 Hyper-
globalisation, such as the form of it found in Neo-Liberal globalisation, does not aim to 
improve the functioning of nation state democracy but rather looks to secure the lowest 
market costs for commercial and financial interests. And in doing so, as noted in chapter 1 
, 
such a policy regime not only prioritises the interest of multinational enterprise, banks and 
investment houses over the demands of domestic politics, but in fact moulds national 
polices around the interests of global capital. 
With global democracy unlikely, due to a fractured world polity, Rodrik (2011: 205) 
advocates a move towards a 'thin globalisation' that would reinvent embedded liberalism 
for the 21st century and give up on the deep integration of hyperglobalisation. One of the 
fundamental pieces of evidence for this endorsement of a 'thin globalisation' rather than 
global democracy is that national identities and attachments to the nation state trump 
global identities and conceptions of global citizenship. Quite simply, Rodrik believes that 
'people see themselves as citizens of their nations, next as members of their local 
31 Rodrik points to the fact that the hyperglobalisation of the gold standard era was underpinned by a lack of 
democracy and faltered as more modern forms of democratic practise (wider suffrage, social insurance) rose 
to prominence across Europe. 
81 
community and only last as global citizens' (2011: 231). Moreover, he suggests that a strong 
sense of global citizenship exists for the wealthy and those with the highest standards of 
education and that conversely, attachment to the nation state is much stronger amongst 
individuals from lower social classes. The result is that the movement towards the 
construction of a transnational polity is to be seen as the project of a globalised elite rather 
than the world's majority. 
The reason global democrats should take such issues seriously is that Rodrik forms his 
arguments not only from survey data taken from The World Values Survey, but also from 
the historical record. For example, Rodrik (2011: 184-187) examines how Argentina's 
embracement of the Neo-Liberal globalisation and its 'Golden Straight Jacket' facilitated a 
sovereign debt crisis in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial crisis and the loss of export of 
markets due to Brazil's devaluation in early 1999. The result was that by 2001 the Argentine 
government, in an economy already suffering from economic recession and mass 
unemployment, embarked upon austerity policies and fiscal cuts to maintain the tenets of 
Neo-Liberal globalisation and maintain investor confidence. Rather than economic recovery, 
however, such polices lead to domestic bank runs and the shrinking of incomes for 
Argentine citizens. This in turn, sparked mass protests, nationwide strikes, and rioting and 
looting across Argentina's major cities. By Christmas 2001 the government had resigned and 
Argentina had been forced to freeze bank accounts, reinstall capital controls, devalue the 
peso and default on its foreign debt. 
What the Argentine case and others, such as Britain's leaving of the Gold Standard in 1931 
and the very founding of the Bretton Woods agreement, highlight for Rodrik (2011: 189) is 
how the incompatibility of hyper globalisation and domestic politics and the lack of global 
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identities translate into a situation where 'domestic politics wins out eventually' and that 
when push comes to shove 'democracy shrugs over the Golden-Straight jacket'. Moreover, 
cases like Argentina reveal for Rodrik how when deep integration is pushed too far, the 
consequences of hyper globalisation see domestic constituencies primarily turn towards 
the nation state and not global civil society or institutions of global governance for help or 
as a site to vent their anger. Although domestic governments may then turn to such global 
governance institutions and constituencies may in turn unite with transnational activists or 
turn their anger on global governance institutions (as they did in Argentina when the 
government turned towards the IMF for loans and the rioters railed against IMF 
conditionality built into such loans), the primary source of political action and protest takes 
place around the nation state and national governments. 
Whilst it may appear that Rodrik's research debunks arguments for global democracy, any 
proponent of GOT should take such issues seriously and as grounds for future research. For 
instance, if Rodrik is right about the primacy of nation state politics in the politics of 
globalisation and in the moments where the consequences of hyperglobalisation go too far 
, 
one can still enquire as to what happens to ideals of global democracy and the movement 
towards the democratic reform of the institutions of global governance both in day to day 
politics and in moments of crisis? Do such ideals become merely empty ether or do they 
appear in discourse and practise as logical alternatives or complementary polices when 
domestic constituencies resist hyperglobalisation? How are such ideals narrated by the 
domestic constituency suffering the consequences of hyperglobalisation? How do other 
nation states view the domestic constituency and its government when 'democracy shrugs 
over the Golden-Straight jacket'? And what is the role, if any, of global civil society and the 
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institutions of global governance in such moments? These questions, some of which are 
potentially answered by others below, bring home that rather than simply embracing a 
paradoxical ontology, which recognises the significant limitations and stratification within 
global civil society or the priority of nation state politics but then forgets such issues when 
valorising the project of global democracy, proponents of GOT would be better suited to 
explore what actually transpires within the politics of globalisation. 
3.3 Elites, Capital and Politics: Why everyone needs some Neo-Marxist friends 
This trend of GOT's embrace of a paradoxical ontology stifling engagement with potentially 
enlightening or competing research on the polities of globalisation is also reflected on the 
issues of elites and their adherence to the tenets of Neo-Liberal globalisation. As pOinted 
out above, both strands of GOT highlight the nation state as a key vehicle for the enactment 
of global democracy whilst simultaneously claiming that the elites of nation sates and the 
international institutors engendered by nation states have internalised Neo-Liberal 
globalisation's policy objectives. However, as also outlined above, advocates of GOT 
ultimately fail to provide any real evidence that the present it narrates is in the process of 
becoming the future it wishes to come to fruition. Moreover, other than pointing to its 
results (priority of economy over environment, poverty, income inequality), such writers fail 
to shed light on why Neo-Liberal globalisation is hegemonic and how this then impacts on 
the cause of global democracy. 
In contrast, Neo-Marxists, such as Oavid Harvey (2005: 152), argue that Neo-Liberal 
globalisations and its implementation by political elites was not simply an uptake of an 
erroneous economic theory or the pursuit of a false utopia of economic growth but actually 
a 'class project' of restoring or reconstituting ruling class power and profit. We have already 
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seen how the advent of Neo-liberalism has seen an increase in income for the top 1% and in 
income inequality, but this leaves out the fact that embedded liberalism resulted in a (Great 
Compression' of the share of the top few percentiles of the US and UK income distributions. 
As Wade outlines, in the US for example: 
' ... the income share of the top 1% fell from a peak of 23% in 1929 to about 8% in 
1970, and stayed at around 9-10% through the 19705, while the middle three 
quintiles experienced the biggest income growth. The hidden agenda of the 
Reagan/Thatcher revolution was to reverse this 'Great Compression' and allow 
income and wealth to be restored to their rightful owners at the top-combining 
market liberalisation with an array of state measures which had the effect, intended 
and unintended, of intensifying redistribution upwards' (2009b: 541). 
From a Neo-Marxist point of view, Neo-Liberal globalisation is essentially a class project 
which restored the share of income of the top 1% in capitalist countries but also remoulded 
this class by shifting power from manufacturing to finance and information technology 
capital. In the UK, for example, Harvey points out that the Thatcher government faCilitated 
an attack on the aristocratic traditions that dominated The City, military, and the judiciary 
and replaced them with the 'brash entrepreneurs and the nouveaux riches' such as Branson 
, 
Soros, and lord Hanson. And, as similar processes have taken place in various Countries 
around the world, Harvey believes there has been a consequent formation of a 
transnational set of elites, within business and politics and within and outside the West 
, 
who share similar economic worldviews (Harvey 2005: 31-38). 
Hardt and Negri push the Neo-Marxist argument further by suggesting transnational elites 
, 
who occupy positions as leaders of 'major corporations' negotiate with elites within 
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'dominant nation states' and the elite bureaucrats of supra national institutions (IMF, WB, 
WTO) to maintain and perpetuate such a project. The institutional relationships of the 
nation state and global levels of political and economic control do not conflict but form the 
institutional relationships of an 'Empire' of global capital. In this sense, the nation-state now 
finds its jurisdiction and authority is undermined and transformed by both a process of 
'denationalisation', where state policy looks to enforce the Neo-Liberal globalisation and 
the transnational corporations and supranational bodies open the nation state up to flows 
of global capital (Hardt and Negri 2004: 162-68). This can be seen for example at places such 
as the World Economic Forum in Davos, which brings home the fact that 'business, 
bureaucratic, and political elites are certainly no strangers' and that the 'same few 
individuals so often pass effortlessly from the highest government offices to corporate 
boardrooms and back in the course of their careers.' (Hardt and Negri 2004: 168). 
The Neo-Marxist account of political elites and their role in perpetuation of Neo-Liberal 
globalisation may look quite similar to the narration of political elites offered by writers such 
as David Held. Both sets of writers argue that political elites have internalised the policy 
objectives of Neo-liberal globalisation. And both sets of writers also argue that modern 
state sovereignty has been usurped as the underlying drivers of globalisation and Neo-
liberalism bring about the deterritorialization of political authority and sovereignty away 
from the nation state and subsequent reterritorialization of such power beyond the nation 
state to include global market forces and undemocratic networks of global governance 
(Hardt and Negri 2000: xi, 307). 
However, the claim of the Neo-Marxists goes beyond the account of writers such as David 
Held because it offers a reason and narrative for exactly why Neo-Liberal globalisation has 
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assumed hegemony and the impact of such a process on any future politics. Rather than 
simply suggesting that Neo-Liberal globalisation is problematic because it has been 
internalised by elites, suggesting the problem is the hegemony of an erroneous economic 
theory, Neo-Marxists suggest that Neo-Liberalism is part of a class project of national and 
transnational elites to maintain and perpetuate unequal class relationships and to 
redistribute wealth and income. 
One does not need to buy fully into the narrative of Neo-Marxism to consider how even a 
hint of truth to such claims would open up more questions and avenues for research 
concerning global democracy and the hegemony of Neo-Liberalism. In light of such claims 
about elites we can ask how political and business elites within nation states interpret the 
ideal of extending democracy globally? Does the link between politics and big business, for 
example, mean that global democracy is seen as a friend or foe to the priority of capital? 
And how are practises associated with GOT (e.g. Tobin tax) articulated by political and 
business elites? Are they narrated in a positive or negative light? And does the perception of 
global democracy differ amongst elites across the developed/developing world divide? As 
Peter Evans (2008: 294-95) contends, for example, the ' ... elites that command state 
apparatuses, even in the poorest countries of the Global South, are also likely to be material 
beneficiaries of the global neo-liberal regime.' 
In relation, we must also ask whether the deterritorialization of political authority and 
sovereignty away from the nation state and subsequent reterritorialization of such power 
beyond the nation state to include global market forces and undemocratic networks of 
global governance is simply an effect of Neo-Liberal globalisation or actually a new form of 
global form of 'sovereignty' which has been created ad hoc to manage the global market 
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and circuits of production in its interests of global capital (Hardt and Negri 2000: xi, 307 cf. 
Gill 2008). If the latter has an element of truth to it, for instance, the absence of global 
democracy in the present, which so bemuses proponents of global democracy, becomes far 
easier to explain and the chances of global democracy in the future becomes a far less 
tangible reality. Again, proponents of GOT would be better suited to explore what actually 
animates the polities of globalisation in the first place rather than simply pontificating about 
some of its machinations. 
3.4 Plutocracy 
The reflection above on the nature of elites both within and beyond the nation state also 
reveals the lack of attention paid by advocates of global democracy towards the interplay 
between national and international spheres of polities. As pointed out in the last chapter 
and above, the method by which GOT gets around the issue of the so called collapse of 
modern sovereignty is for nation states to consolidate their losses together. Nation states 
and their political elites pooling their resources and collaborating with another, with some 
cajoling by global civil society, are said to be key to remoulding (Cosmopolitan Democracy/ 
Cosmopolitan Republicanism) or regulating (Transnational Discursive Democracy) the 
international system of polities and the global economy in far more just and democratic 
ways. Advocates of GOT, however, seem to simply infer that the remit of global civil society 
or the deliberation of a transnational public sphere would supersede the priority of the 
national public sphere or conceptions of the national interest. Yet, as highlighted above, the 
very evidence such writers uncover, reveals that global civil society is stratified and that 
collaboration and cooperation is failing to take place amongst nation states. Due to their 
embrace of ontology of paradox, writers associated with GDT therefore pay little heed to 
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how the relationship between national and international arenas of politics affects such a 
process. 
As highlighted above, the Neo-Marxist response to how the relationships between national 
or international arenas of politics affects global democracy would simply centre on the role 
of elites and the class project of redistributing wealth and income upwards. What this 
presupposes is that the political institutions of the nation state and the international 
institutions are not only under the hegemony of Neo-Liberalism but that such hegemonic 
influence is constantly being perpetuated. Again, one does not have to buy into the Neo-
Marxist belief of a ruling class to believe that certain income groups would favour certain 
policies over others and then use their resources to gain influences over government policy. 
For instance, financial journalist Robert Peston, who is far from being any kind of Marxist , 
argues that democracy has essentially been put up for 'sale' and whether through the direct 
sponsorship of politicians and parties or through the acquisition of media businesses 'the 
voices of the super-wealthy are heard by politicians well above the babble of the crOwd .. .' 
(2009: 346). 
American Political Scientist Martin Gilens (2012a, 2012b) takes this argument further by 
suggesting that if democracy is the ability of all citizens, taking into account disparities such 
as time, knowledge or interest, to have a relatively equal influence over the polices their 
government adopts, then current American democracy is skewed by economic inequality. 
Departing, however, from simply looking at the influence of 99th or 99.9th income percentile 
of the super-wealthy, Gilens turns towards examining the influence of the 90th income 
percentile and the group he denotes as the 'affluent' vis-a-vis the middle class (50th income 
percentile) and poor (10th income percentile) (Gilens, 2012a: Ch. 8). On the whole, Gilens 
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suggest that Americans, both rich and poor, often agree on government policy such as 
foreign military campaigns, The War on Drugs and across the board federal income tax 
increases. However, as he points out: 
'When preferences diverge, the views of the affluent make a big difference, while 
support among the middle class and the poor has almost no relationship to policy 
outcomes. Policies favoured by 20 percent of affluent Americans, for example, have 
about a one-in-five chance of being adopted, while policies favoured by 80 percent 
of affluent Americans are adopted about half the time. In contrast, the support or 
opposition of the poor or the middle class has no impact on a policy's prospects of 
being adopted ... These patterns play out across numerous policy issues. American 
trade policy, for example, has become far less protectionist since the 1970s, in line 
with the positions of the affluent but in opposition to those of the poor. Similarly, 
income taxes have become less progressive over the past decades and corporate 
regulations have been loosened in a wide range of industries.' (2012b) 
Gilens goes on to suggest that the most straight-forward explanation for such a 
representational inequality in terms of policy outcomes is the fact that the affluent are 
more likely to vote, volunteer in political campaigns and to make large political donations 
than their less well off counterparts. low-income citizens are less likely to vote, have lower 
rates of voting and volunteering, whilst the middle class have modest differences with the 
exception of being unable to replicate the large political donations of the affluent. The 
underlying argument here being that the ability to make large political donations in tandem 
with the greater political engagement of the affluent, although sometimes tempered by the 
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ability of low income groups (labour organisations) or religious groups to mobilize large 
numbers of volunteers, gives the affluent more sway over policy outcomes. Indeed, Gilens 
suggest that cross-alliances do not dent the influence of the affluent, as even when middle 
class policy preferences align with the poor, the influence of the affluent remains strong 
(Gilens 2012a: 239 cf. 2012b). 
The work cited above is useful to an exploration of the current state and future potential of 
global democracy because the influence of the affluent and poor on domestic politics has a 
knock on effect on international polities. For example, Gilens (2012b) highlights how, in 
contrast to the affluent, the poor and middle classes have been united in opposing free 
trade agreements such as NAFTA and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade but that 
the reality is that ' ... the affluent few have gotten what they want.' In turn, whilst affluent 
Americans largely support free-trade policies such as NAFTA and the GAIT, they are also 
supportive of non-military aid to developing countries. On the other hand, the American 
poor are constantly opposed to all these aspects of foreign policy (Gillen 2012: 107-08). 
Contra Neo-Marxism and in answer to some of questions outlaid by Rodrik's political trilema 
of the world economy, Gilens' findings suggest that it is not just political and business elites 
but also the nature of nation state politiCS and hegemony of many of the facets of Neo-
Liberalism (e.g. free trade) amongst the affluent, which makes Neo-Liberal globalisation 
policy's regime hegemonic. The question, then becomes, how does the dominance of the 
affluent in policy formation affect international politics and the ideals of global democracy? 
Surely the favouring of policies such as NAFTA, lower corporate tax and deregulation by the 
affluent would conflict with the extension of global democracy akin to say Cosmopolitan 
Democracy. 
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Nonetheless, this should not be confused with simply class politics where the affluent are 
demonised and other groups valorised. As Gillen's work reveals, the poor, as sections of the 
nation state who have benefited the least under Neo-Liberal globalisation at a national level 
and who you might take to be predisposed to change, actually oppose policies (foreign aid) 
associated with global democracy. This buttresses Rodrik's point about domestic politics 
'wining out eventually' and highlights an economic and political nationalism that can arise in 
response to the effects of Neo-Liberal globalisation. For instance, a BBC World Service Poll 
(2008) revealed that citizens within highly developed countries, such as France, Germany 
Spain, South Korea and Japan and to a lesser extent the US and UK, found economic 
globalisation to be occurring too quickly and that the national economy was unfair as a 
consequence. The obvious point to ask is whether such backlashes against economic 
globalisation are prone to eliciting anti-internationalism amongst some citizens of nation 
states? If so, how does this then impact on the ideals and potential of global democracy? 
Do national elites, for example, play on such ideals of economic and political nationalism to 
maintain the status quo within the nation state? And if so how does this translate on an 
international stage? 
Such evidence and the unanswered questions they evoke bring home the fact that 
advocates of global democracy have only scratched the surface as to how national politics 
affects the international dimensions of politics and the cause of global democracy. Gillen's 
work for example highlights that economic inequality, which has widened during the era of 
Neo-liberal globalisation, fundamentally weakens the ability of nation state democracy to 
actually live up to the tenets of democratic representation. And by looking at such issues in 
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tandem with the reflections of Rodrik, we can see that such a state of representational 
inequality can actually lead to an anti-internationalist nationalism. 
This is to say nothing of the divide that exists between developed and developing worlds 
and their polities when it comes to the issue of economic globalisation. In the same BBC 
World Service Poll (2008), citizens within countries such as the Philippines, Brazil, Kenya, 
Mexico and Indonesia, whilst recognising the structural inequality of their economy, actually 
took economic globalisation to be growing too slowly and argued that it should be sped up. 
Again this seems to buttress Rodrik's point that the world's polity is largely fractured on 
such issues and opens up questions about the fate of global democracy within such an 
environment. 
3.5 Depoliticalisation 
Finally, such discourse on the interrelation of nation state and international politics must 
take into consideration political disenchantment and apathy within nation state politics. As 
pointed out above, in the American context, low income citizens are less likely to be 
involved with formal political engagement. Pushing this argument further, work by writers 
such as Hay (2007: 14-15), reveals that across the board in advanced capitalist countries 
political engagement via electoral turnout has fallen. However, Hay points to the fact that it 
is within those countries that have embraced Neo-Liberal Globalisation, such as the US, UK 
and New Zealand, where the decline in voter turnout has been most prominent. Rejecting 
the wholesale explanation of such a political disenchantment and apathy by 'demand side' 
explanations such as Putnam (2000), which argue that a decline in social capital and the 
breakdown of community explains such political disengagement, Hay (2007: SS) argues for a 
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greater look at the 'supply side' of the process and the changes in the political 'goods' being 
offered to 'consumers' within the electorate. 
The crux of Hay's argument, much like those embraced by advocates of global democracy, is 
that national political elites have internalised the logic of Neo-Liberalism. Moreover, as 
pointed out in chapter 1, the hegemony of Neo-Liberalism amongst both its traditional 
home of the Right and its new home of Third Way governments has seen national elites 
embrace the idea that they must earn global market confidence and trade and capital flows 
through actually removing the state's role in economic policy-making bodies (central banks, 
fiscal authorities, regulators), what we would normally dub public services (energy, railways, 
social insurance) and allowing the market to determine issues such as corporate tax levels. 
Hay argues that this process has seen the 'depoliticisation' of previously highly political 
areas of policy {interest rates, pay settlements, labour law, tax regimes)and led to national 
politicians not only doubting their ability to govern in the face of Neo-liberal globalisation 
but also facilitated the shift of political power to other non-democratic sites of power 
(central banks, supranational institutions). 
The knock on effect, argues Hay, is that citizens have come to see the political goods being 
supplied to them by formal polities as being incapable of actually providing democratic 
representation. As Hay sums up, the hegemony of Neo-liberal globalisation amongst elites: 
' ... has served to unleash a tide of depoliticising dynamics as policy-makers have, 
effectively, questioned their integrity, their professional competence and their 
capacity to make policy - and have off-loaded their responsibilities to others in the 
process. When our political elites seem to hold such pessimistic assumption about 
their competence, credibility and autonomy, is it any wonder that as citizens of the 
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polities they serve we have come to share in their crisis of political confidence and 
competence? Is it any wonder that we participate in formal political processes 
increasingly reluctantly and, in ever smaller numbers?' (Hay 2007: 151). 
Hay's narrative of political disenchantment and apathy fills in the blanks as to the political 
effects of the hegemony of Neo-Liberalism amongst political elites and politics of the nation 
state. But Hay's narration of political disengagement also has implications for any aspiration 
of global democracy. In terms of reflecting on how political disenchantment and apathy 
within nation state politics impacts on the cause of global democracy we must return to the 
point that advocates of global democracy seem to pay little heed to how the relationship 
between national and international arenas of politics affect global democracy. In the 
paradoxical world of global democracy the main thrust of global democracy will be delivered 
by national politicians and global civil society but this seems to underplay that the 'nation' 
state is the unit being asked to carry out most of the work. However, we need to conSider 
that nation state politicians are still national politicians and if their domestic constituenCies 
are unable to hold them to account or push for more global democratic reform then it is 
unlikely to be a policy priority. And we have already seen above that groups within the 
nation state can actually embrace policy platforms that appear hostile to global democracy. 
This also leads to further questions. What are the tangible consequences for nation state 
elites that global civil society can hold over national elites vis-a-vis a politically disenchanted 
national polity? And how does one interpret the rise of global civil society in the light of 
accounts of political disenchantment and apathy within nation state polities? In simple 
terms, the two accounts appear to contradict one another with a narrative of hyper political 
activity being contrasted with one of political disengagement. Writers such as Chandler 
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(2009 cf. 2010) push this contrast further by taking the rise of global civil society and global 
issues to be linked to the hegemonic ascent of Neo-Liberal globalisation on the right and 
centre left and the breakdown of democratic politics within the nation state. 
The 'globalisation of politics' is taken by Chandler to be the ' ... reflection of a general 
disengagement from political struggle and a historically low level of political contestation' 
within the nation state. This has had a double effect, with the first being the ascendance of 
consumer style politics where the ' ... wearing of a pin or ribbon as an expression of solidarity 
or 'making one's voice heard' at demonstrations, often reflects how ethical gestures' have 
replaced political engagement with formal politics. The activists of global civil society who 
move from struggle to struggle are in Chandler's eyes indicative of ' ... the decline of 
representational forms of politics - which involved winning people to ideas or political 
platforms rather than just expressing one's own awareness' and highlight how when 
political practice becomes 'globalised' it becomes 'much more immediate and unmediated' 
(2009: 541). 
The second effect, Chandler argues, is that elites within national governments have 
welcomed the emergence of global issues, global social movements and the narration of the 
collapse of modern sovereignty because it allows the states to 'portray themselves to be 
activists at the global level and at the domestic level merely administrators or managers' 
(ibid., 542). This consequently allows elites an alibi about the enactment of Neo-Liberalism 
and the lack of representational polities at the global level: 
'Through globalising their political engagement, governments evade the 
accountabilities which come with representational politics, and radical critics can 
similarly evade the need for representational legitimacy. A global problem cannot, 
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by definition, be solved by a particular government: it is held to be beyond sovereign 
power, political responsibility and accountability. There is no global government, no 
institutionalised political authority, that claims responsibility for formulating policy 
or for its implementation, or which can become a strategic object of global 
resistance' (ibid., 541). 
The globalisation of politics and the clamour for global democracy is therefore 
counterintuitive because it serves as an 'ideological' mask for the very reason why such 
global democracy is not forthcoming. Chandler suggests that it is therefore no surprise that 
without a revitalised national democracy, global politics is based on weak foundations of 
accountability, where underneath the rhetoric of global values and global struggles we 
uncover a lack of policy clarity and political engagement. Once more, one does not accept 
all of this narrative to point to avenues of research opened up by such claims. Quite simply, 
there is a perpetual question of how the apparent political disenchantment and apathy 
within nation state polities affects the cause of global democracy? 
3.6 What to do next? Two Roads 
Ultimately, it is the bizarre ontological split personality of theories of global democracy, 
rather than their omissions, which prevents them from interacting with such research and 
also providing a more accurate picture of the chances of greater global democracy and the 
current state of the politics of globalisation. To make advances we must not fall into the 
same trap of embracing an ontology of paradox; regardless of our conviction about the need 
of global democracy. I thus believe there are two options open to us. 
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As a first step toward resolving these problems, we can attempt to do what the proponents 
of global democracy do not do and empirically explore, both synchronically and 
diachronically, the relationship between arenas such as global civil society, the transnational 
public sphere and nation state politics, to provide a richer understanding of the status of 
global democracy and the current politics of globalisation. One can find valuable additions 
to such empirical knowledge in the work of Brassett (2009), Della Porta et al. (2009), Smith 
(2008), Tarrow (200S, 2011) and Tilly and Wood (2009) who examine the interplay between 
global civil society, transnational social movements and the polities of nation states. Whilst 
this work is incredibly valuable and this study is indebted to it, as a second step on the road I 
believe best to travel I suggest we should not only attempt the analysis of the present but 
also attempt to gain greater historical and theoretical insight into the nature of the politics 
of globalisation. To this end in the next three chapters I shall examine the work of John 
Dewey and his neglected insights about the nature of democracy, publics and globalisation. 
The aim of such exposition being the very uncovering of a more refined historical and 
theoretical framework from which we can empirically explore the politics of globalisation. 
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Part Two: Dewey and Globalisation: The Problem of Global Publics 
Within this part of the study I aim to highlight how the central contention of John Dewey's 
work within The Public and its Problems (1927), which revolves around an evolutionary form 
of democracy in response to a rapidly globalising economy, has not been fully appreciated 
by contemporary scholars. Moreover, I shall argue that the central contention of Dewey's 
The Public and its Problems, serves not only as a timely rejoinder - avant la lettre - to GOT 
but also offers important insights into the future examination of globalisation. To 
accomplish this, this part of the study will consist of three chapters. In chapter 4, I shall 
highlight the context of The Public and its Problems, returning to the 1920's debate about 
the utility of democracy as a form of governance. This will include an examination of 
Dewey's response to Democratic Realism's challenge towards democracy within America 
and his outlining of his own conception of 'creative democracy'. 
Following on, chapter 5 will examine how Dewey's narration of the impacts of the Great 
Society on democratic praxis, which are initially sketched out in The Public and its Problems 
and subsequently reflected and elaborated upon in his work until his death, centre on issues 
of globalisation and the possibility of a global community and political praxis. Here, I shall 
argue that Dewey's arguments concerning the nature of publics and their relationship to 
democracy, too often narrated around nation-state politics, actually raise issues that not 
only force us to revise the debates about the politics of globalisation but also the very 
possibility of global politics in the first place. In chapter 6, I shall reflect on the Deweyan 
lessons handed down for 21st observers and advocates of global democracy. Ultimately, the 
chapter will contend that the nature, political efficacy or viability of any conception of global 
democracy can only be adequately gauged by firstly revisiting and confronting Deweyan 
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concerns about the nature, political efficacy and viability of publics and their relation to the 
practice of democracy both nationally and internationally. 
Chapter 4: Creative Democracy 
4.1 Unfashionable Democracy 
Fashion! Turn to the Left 
Fashion! Turn to Right 
We are the goon squad 
And we're coming to town 
Beep, Beep - David Bowie, Fashion 
When Dewey published The Public and its Problems in 1927 the lyrics of David Bowie's 
Fashion would have served as an excellent soundtrack to the political climate. 32 Democracy 
had become an unfashionable aspiration, with populations in Europe beginning to turn to 
the extreme Left and Right for their political settlements. In Russia the October Revolution 
was nearly ten years old, in Italy Mussolini had been in power for 3 years and in Germany 
both volumes of Mein Kampf had been published. At home in the USA, even the merits of 
pretence of a democracy in the country had come under attack.33 The catalyst for this attack 
on America's democracy revolved around the dissipation of the post World War One 
optimism for reconstructing America in fairer and more just terms. As James Kloppenberg 
points out, whilst Progressives put forward reforms for economic justice and fairness, such 
32 
In case there is another pedantic Bowie fan, other than myself, reading this I am quite aware that the theme 
of Fashion's lyrics was not the re-emergence of political fascism in the UK in the 1980's but rather the 'style 
fascism' that dominated that era. Dare I say it, however, the misinterpretation of the lyrics probably makes for 
a better interpretation of the song! 
33 
I say pretence because America in 1927 cannot be deemed a full democracy in the normal liberal sense-
because most of its African American population did not possess the ability to participate fully in civil or 
political life. America only becomes a full liberal democracy in 1965 with the passing of the Voting Rights Act, 
which built on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to stop racist inspired literacy tests and poll taxes preventing 
African American citizens from taking up their right to vote. 
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reforms were 'strangled' by older patterns of thought and behaviour that re-emerged in the 
climate of revolution (Kloppenberg, 1986). The breakdown of this optimism amongst 
American progressives in turn gave way to the rise of trenchant intellectual critiques of the 
suitability of democratic government for 1920's America. These critiques of the suitability of 
democratic government, conducted by American political scientists and commentators , 
formed what became known as 'democratic realism'. And by the 1930's the paradigm had 
become near hegemonic in American Social Science (Westbrook, 1991: 281-86). 
The main charge of democratic realism against democracy was that democracy in its then 
current form was unable to provide a stable or efficient government for advanced industrial 
societies. For democratic realism the institutions of democratic government, which were 
based on democracy's core beliefs in the capacity of all people for rational political action 
and the belief in the maximising of civic participation in public life, were in fact 
counterproductive to good government in industrial societies (Westbrook, 1991: 281-82). 
The main articulation of this position was to be found in the work of Waiter Lippmann and 
his two treatises against standard liberal thought - Public Opinion (1922) and The Phantom 
Public (1925). Within these works, Lippmann puts forward the idea that 1920's America had 
entered into The Great Society, which made the core beliefs of democracy unrealisable. 
The concept of The Great Society, adapted by both Lippmann and latterly Dewey from 
Graham Wallas' (1914) book of the same name, was essentially shorthand for the complex 
industrial and mass consumer society America had become post World War One. The end of 
the American Civil War had signalled that America would use its vast reserves of raw 
materials and land to become a continental nation state with an industrial economy rather 
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than being a decentralised federation of states with an agrarian economy.34 This process 
had seen America not only master the steam, coal and railway based technologies and 
industries of the First Industrial Revolution, but also become the leader of the Second 
Industrial Revolution of the late 19th century and early 20th century. This process saw the 
systematic application of science to the industrial process in the new oil, electricity and 
chemical based industries of automobiles, synthetic material production and the onset of 
consumer durables (Morris, 2011: 510; Friden 2006: 152; Lind, 2012: 5-10). The result was 
that, as early as 1914, the US economy, both in absolute figures and per capita terms, had 
overtaken Britain as the biggest economy in the world. And by 1919, due in part to the 
economic consequences of World War One, the US possessed more economic output than 
all of Europe combined (Kennedy, 1987: 242-244). 
The Great Society, Dewey outlined, through its improvements in industrial production, 
travel and transportation (railways, cars),media (radio, newspapers) and communication 
(telegraph, telephone) not only eliminated distance as an economic and social factor but 
also created 'interaction and interdependence' on an unprecedented complex and wide 
scale (lW2: 307). In industry, for example, the new corporations of 1920's America such as 
GM, Ford and General Electric did not just produce oligopolistic industries but had become 
vertically integrated entities. Such vertically integrated corporations and the widespread use 
of electricity, cheaper steel production, chemical industry and the advent of the assembly 
line thus delivered mass industrial production. 
34 Th' 
IS process was largely achieved through direct state intervention and the 'infant industry' protection 
devised by Alexander Hamilton and the use of high industrial tariffs. A practise that saw America enforce the 
highest industrial tariffs of any developed nation right up until 1945. See Chang (2003, 2007) and Lind (2012). 
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As a result, where as prior to 1890 manufacturing could be completed in small factories 
after 1890 the average plant size in industries such as automobiles increased immensely. 
For example, the average car plant in 1909 had around 200 workers and produced 10 cars 
per week; by 1929 this figure had turned into 1000 workers and more than 400 cars per 
week. This meant that although in 1929 there were fewer car plants than there had been in 
1909 car production in 1929 (5.4 million) far outstripped the 1909 figure of 126,000 and the 
average American worker now produced ten times as many cars as in 1909 (Friden 2006: 61-
63, 161). 
The changes brought about by the move from an agrarian to an advanced capitalist society 
had essentially brought about massive changes in the day-to-day life of Americans. The 
revolution in corporate structure and industrial production, which saw consumer durables 
such as cars, radios and refrigerators become the driving force of economic growth, had 
seen the concomitant revolution of mass consumption. And as productivity soared the 
prices of consumer durables dropped. Ford's Model T, for example, reduced in price from 
$700 in 1910 to $350 in 1916 and by 1916 it took only six months for the average American 
to earn enough money to buy one. By 1929, Americans were driving some 26 million cars or 
trucks. And this is to say nothing of the 20 million phones installed by 1930, new public 
highways and railway lines, the advent of chain stores and modern adverting, radio set 
sales, electric stoves and heaters, consumer credit and the fact that by 1924 you could even 
buy sliced bread (Friden 2006: 62-63 155-72, leuchtenburg 1993: 178-202). 
For writers such as lippmann the emergence of The Great Society created a far too complex 
industrial and corporate environment for a normal citizen to exercise rational political 
judgement about how such a society should be governed. The common citizen for lippmann 
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was being driven along by industrial innovation and expertise that he could not grasp and 
was also distracted by mass consumption. As a result, modern citizens were incapable of 
grasping their immediate present, their own interests and essentially living in a world they 
'cannot see, [do] not understand and [are] unable to direct' (Lippmann, 1925:4). The 
democratic goal of maximising all citizens civic participation in public life was thus simply 
'bad only in the sense that it is bad for a fat man to try to be a ballet dancer' (Lippmann, 
1925: 29). The only solution, argued Lippmann, was for normal citizens to give up the 
concept of self rule and move towards a system of elitism, whereby experts who are in a 
position to grasp the complexities of The Great Society would create and enact social policy. 
In this context, citizens would only play the role of siding with or against different elites, 
playing no role in policy formation and simply voting for the 'Ins when things are going well 
and the Outs when things are going badly' (Lippman, 1925: 126). 
In Dewey's eyes the attacks upon democracy by Communism, Fascism and Democratic 
Realism were bound to fail miserably or end up in violence and bloodshed. Quite simply, 
democratic realism's quasi-Platonism3s and Communism's and Fascism's authoritarianism, 
which held experts or rulers as the only ones capable to enact polices that would be wise 
and beneficial to the common good of society, contradicted the historical record. The 
emergence and practise of democracy itself had shown that it is only through wide 
consultation and discussion that wider social needs and common goods are uncovered. As 
Dewey colourfully put it, the man ' ... who wears the shoe knows best that it pinches and 
3S 
For Dewey democratic realism represented a revival of the Platonic notion of Philosopher Kings, substituting 
the expert for the philosopher because 'philosophy has become something of a joke, while the image of the 
specialist, the expert in operation, is rendered familiar and congenial by the rise of the physical sciences and 
the conduct of industry' (LW2: 363). 
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where it pinches, even if the expert shoe maker is the best judge of how the trouble is to be 
remedied' (LW2:364). 
To subsequently remove the input of the masses and leave government policy to an elite 
was to create an oligarchy closed off from knowledge of the needs which they were 
supposed to serve. Dewey therefore feared that rule by an elite group in which the masses 
could not express their needs would resemble an oligarchy managed in the interests of the 
few rather than the many. And as Dewey reminded his readers, such fears were not mere 
abstractions when history patently highlighted how the ' ... world has suffered more from 
leaders and authorities than from the so-called folly of masses (LW2: 365). 
The Public and its Problems36 is best seen as attempting to walk along the path that Dewey 
believed the far left and Right in Europe and democratic realism shed light upon but 
refused to travel: the contemporary problem of democracy within the Great Society. 
Moreover, Dewey sets himself the goal of answering the question that he believed 
Lippmann and others hastily skimmed over by rendering the masses innately incapable of 
civic organisation: Why is the contemporary Public seemingly unable to intelligently perform 
the tasks that democracy requires of them? To accomplish this, Dewey embarks upon two 
interrelated tasks within The Public and it's Problems. The first task involves Dewey 
reconstructing the concept of democracy as a form of 'Creative Democracy" which 
36 Please note that although I shall primarily focus here on Dewey's The Public and its Problems (LW2), when 
necessary I shall also utilize work that precedes and succeeds the aforementioned title. The reason for doing 
this, as noted by others such as Kadlec (2007:100) and Campbell (1995:147), revolves around the incremental 
appreciation of economics and politics that Dewey's social philosophy exhibits from the roaring Twenties 
onward through the Great Depression in works such Individualism Old and New (LW5), Liberalism and Social 
Action (LWll), and the onset of World War Two Freedom and Culture (lW13). Indeed, Alex Honneth (1998) 
believes that The Public and its Problems marks a wholesale shift, whereby Dewey throws off his previous 
Hegelian shackles and finds a more coherent argument to justify democracy. Thus, despite his earlier political 
radicalism, The Public and its Problems, Dewey's only work of formal political philosophy, marks a focal point 
to read both the past and future works of Dewey's social philosophy back into. 
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redefines the political concepts of the 'state', 'public', 'government' and ultimately 
'democracy' itself. The second task, which we will examine in the next chapter, involves the 
examination of why the democracy of Dewey's present within The Great Society bore a poor 
resemblance to his own vision of democracy as a way of life. 
4.2 Problematic States and their problematic Publics: The futility of State Theory 
The commencement of Dewey's first task sees him return to the perennial question of what 
exactly democracy means as a concept? It was Dewey's belief that the meaning of 
democracy and the justification for its practise had seemingly become lost in the hubris of 
democratic realism. In the journey to reconstruct and redefine the concept of democracy, 
Dewey initially returns to another, if not the most, perennial question of political 
philosophy: What is the origin and nature of the state? In reference to what he believed 
were prior flawed theories of the state, from the works of Aristotle through to and beyond 
Hegel, Dewey cautions his readers that the 'moment we utter the words "The State" a score 
of intellectual ghosts rise to obscure of our vision' (Dewey, lW2: 240). 
This obfuscation, Dewey contended, arose because theories of the state resorted to 
mythological 'state forming forces' or 'political instincts' to explain the state and its 
functions. For example, Aristotle's claim that man by nature is an animal that lives in a state, 
or Social Contract theorists' claims that the state emerges after a pre-deposited fictional 
state of nature, tell us nothing about how actual states come into being or why states take 
on different forms at different points in history. Such theories merely re packaged the 
outcome of a given social process (Greek City State/ Liberal democracy) as its cause and 
reduplicated in ' ... a so called causal force the effects to be accounted for.' Ultimately, 
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Dewey charged, such theories hold no more explanatory value than the statement that 
opium had sleep inducing effects because of its 'dormative powers' (Dewey, LW2: 240-41). 
Following his dismissal of the explanatory value of prior theories of the state, Dewey begins 
his own analysis of politics - its institutional forms and practices - from the very empirical 
starting point he believes the aforementioned theories neglect: the history of human 
activity and its consequences {Dewey, LW2: 243}. Building upon his prior engagement with 
Darwin's theory of evolution and the psychology of William James, Dewey puts forward an 
argument for the social nature of both the self and morality. The foundation of this 
argument is that like all objects within nature, human beings exist in an environment where 
'conjoint, combined, associated action is a universal trait of the behaviour of things' (Dewey, 
LW2: 257). What we take to be human nature or what we take to be the human 'self is said 
by Dewey not to be an immutable property or instinct which individuals then utilize to 
interact with their environment, but rather an entity which is produced as the outcome of 
the interaction ofthe human organism with its environment.37 
This interaction of human organism with its environment takes place through what Dewey 
denotes as habits, which 'bind us to orderly and established ways of action' {Dewey, 
LW2:335}.38 In this sense, habits are not simply recurrent or routine ways of behaving but 
37 Oewey's conception of individuality as not being originally given but constructed under the influences of 
associated living is evident from his earliest writings (EW1:48-49), but finds its most sustained expression in his 
most sustained work on social psychology Human Nature and Conduct (MW14). For Oewey's own take on 
Darwin's influence on his philosophy see the essays in (MW4) and for an example of his take on the influence 
of William James see the essay 'The Vanishing Subject in the Psychology of James' (LW14: 155-167). 
38 It should also be noted that Native biological instincts or impulses are not deemed by Oewey to be non-
existent but rather dynamically interpreted and structured into ways of behaving with the environment 
through habits. For instance, the impulse of hunger does not ordinarily, except in situations of starvation 
define the means of its pacification. Rather, the pacification of the impulse is determined through the w a y ~ ~
(habits) humans have formed or found access to food in their environment (See MW14: Chapter 12). 
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rather acquired predispositions or modes of response, which generate ease, skill and 
interest when individuals interact with their environment: 
'For we are given to thinking of a habit as simply a recurrent external mode of 
action, like smoking or swearing, being neat or negligent in clothes and person, 
taking exercise or playing games. But habit reaches even more significantly down 
into the very structure of the self; it signifies a building up of and solidifying of 
certain desires; an increased sensitiveness and responsiveness to certain stimuli, a 
confirmed or impaired capacity to attend to and think about certain things. Habit 
covers in other words the very make up of desire, intent, choice, disposition which 
gives an act its voluntary quality' (Dewey, lW7:170-71). 
The important point to consider here, however, is that we do not simply create our habits 
out of thin air, but rather acquire and learn our habits from what Dewey calls 'social 
customs'. Much like the language we speak, individuals inherit and form their personal 
moral habits from the uniformities, habits, or set ways of conduct of the respective social 
groups they are born into or are associated with throughout their lives. From birth onwards 
individuals find that established social customs, which saturate such habits with meaning, 
are taught and transmitted to them through the associated life they have with other 
humans (Dewey, MW14: 43-52). As Dewey points out, the sailor, miner, fisherman and 
farmer think about their actions, but their thoughts fall within the framework of 
accustomed occupations and social relations. In Dewey's eyes, then, what an individual 
actually is as a self, that is, how an individual thinks and acts, is ultimately dependent upon 
the nature and movement of their associated life (Dewey, lW5: 275). 
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It may be tempting to think from the above that Dewey assigns priority of society over the 
individual; that the individual is only an expression of society. However, Dewey's point is 
that the human self is produced through pre-existent associations and the social customs of 
other humans not society on large (Dewey, M14:44 cf. Gouinlock 1972:105-106). This does 
not discount that social customs can stretch across society but such a subtle distinction 
highlights how societies are not uniform but rather pluralistic entities structured through 
what Dewey calls a 'Cultural Matrix.' 39 This is fleshed out in Dewey's statement that: 
'SOCiety is one word, but many things. Men associate together is all kinds of ways 
and for all kinds of purposes. One man is concerned in a multitude of diverse groups, 
in which his associates may be quite different. It often seems as if they had nothing 
in common except that they are modes of associated life. Within every larger social 
organisation there are numerous minor groups; not only political subdiVisions but 
industrial, scientific, religiOUS, associations. There are political parties with differing 
aims, social sets, cliques, gangs, corporations, partnerships, groups bound closely 
together by ties of blood, and so in endless variety. In many modern states, and in 
some ancient, there is great diversity of populations, of varying languages, religions, 
moral codes and traditions. From this standpoint, many a modern political units one 
of large cities for example, is a congeries of loosely associated societies rather than 
an inclusive and permeating community of action and thought.' 
The idea of a 'cultural matrix' corresponds to a society's socio-economic, technological and 
intellectual (religion/science/philosophy/politics) practices, which determine the associative 
39 The conception of cultural matrix being utilised here originates from Experience and Nature (LW1) and not 
The Public and its Problems but is assumptions are easily found throughout it and Oewey's work in general. 
relations (occupations, family structures, and geographical links) and the meanings 
(habits/customs) attached to those associated relations by various social groups. Thus, at 
any given synchronic moment within a cultural matrix there exist individuals and groups 
who share different associated relations and different habits and different social customs. 
Indeed, Dewey suggests, that the more complex a cultural matrix of a society, the more 
likely it is to include individuals who possess habits, which are informed by differing or even 
conflicting patterns of social customs (Dewey, MW14: 90). 
The ability of a society's cultural matrix to produce groups with different or even conflicting 
habits and social customs revealed for Dewey that morality, when taken as defining 
acceptable parameters of both individual behaviour and behaviour between individuals and 
groups within society, is also a socially determined activity. Whilst all humans form 
associations with and are formed by associations (habits/social customs) with natural 
objects and other humans beings within a cultural matrix; it is also the case that all human 
action has possible consequences for other natural objects and other human beings who 
share in association or who inhabit the same society: 
'Some activity proceeds from a man; then it sets up reaction in the surroundings. 
Others approve, disapprove, protest, encourage, share and resist ... Conduct is always 
shared; this is the difference between it and physiological process. It is not an ethical 
"ought" that conduct should be social. It is social, whether good or bad' (Dewey, 
MW14:16). 
Importantly, however, Dewey contends that what separates human associations from that 
of natural objects such as assemblies of electrons, unions of trees, swarm of insects, herds 
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of sheep or constellations of stars, is the ability of humanity to intelligently perceive, reflect 
upon and subsequently plan to secure certain consequences and avoid others (Dewey, lW2: 
243 cf., 250, 257). This ability of humans to intelligently perceive the consequences of 
associated action is structured around two kinds of consequences: those which affect 
individuals directly engaged in a transaction of associated behaviour and those that 
indirectly affect individuals beyond those immediately concerned in the transaction. 
Within this distinction, Dewey finds the germ of the distinction between conceptions of 
private and public transactions. Transactions where the consequences of action were 
confined, or thought to be predominantly confined, to those directly engaged in such 
associative behaviour were said to be private. Transactions where the consequences are 
perceived to be extensive, enduring and serious for persons beyond those immediately 
engaged in such transactions were said to be of a public disposition. However, Dewey 
refines his position further by stating that this distinction was ultimately drawn on the scope 
and extent to which consequences were deemed important by a society to warrant control 
, 
whether through inhibition or promotion. In essence, all private transactions of associative 
behaviour have the propensity to become public when they are perceived to have 
extensive, enduring and serious consequences for others beyond those directly engaged in 
them. As such, there is no domain of activities that is intrinsically private (Dewey, lW2: 243-
45 c.t. 252-53).40 
40 There are many private associations, such as those within the family, which as a society we deem necessary 
for public bodies to intervene in (e.g. social/child services). Commentators such as Gouinlock (LW2: xxv) 
therefore argue that Dewey would have been better off speaking of the problem of regulating the adverse 
consequences of social behaviour per se. However, as outlined above Dewey does this and more by 
acknowledging that the very definition of public and private is historically relative, open to contestation and 
ultimately defined by those within a society. In short, Dewey's position leads us to constantly question the 
presentation of the Public and Private; especially any presentation of the Public and Private as historically 
static and mutually exclusive spheres. 
111 
It is within the distinction between private and public transactions that Dewey finds the key 
to the origins of the 'nature and office of the state', arguing that the perception of public 
transactions leads to emergence of what he calls a 'Public' and subsequently the founding of 
a state. In Dewey's sense of the term, a public comes into existence when persons, having 
become conscious of and sufficiently affected by the consequences of associative behaviour 
(habits) to deem it unacceptable, form a collective group or movement with a common 
interest in having such consequences systematically controlled or cared for (Dewey, lW2: 
245, cf., 52-53, 260). However, such a public faces a dilemma due to the fact that the very 
consequences that call forth a public expand beyond those directly engaged in such 
associative behaviour. 
The regulation of such consequences cannot be conducted by the primary groupings 
involved in the respective associative behaviour in the first place (although self-organisation 
by a group to regulate its activities is also an important phenomenon). Consequently, in 
organising themselves to deal with such indirect consequences such a public creates special 
agencies and appoints officials such as legislators, judges and executives (which might 
include members of a public acting as citizens) to regulate behaviour and protect (through 
laws, rights and establishment of practises) their interests. These officials and special 
agencies, argues Dewey, are what we nominally call government and help bring forth a 
state. However, as Dewey is at pains to point out, the state does not solely consist of the 
inaugurating of government or the rise of a public but rather the state is the political 
organisation of the public through government: 
'The lasting, extensive and serious consequences of associated activity bring into 
existence a public. In Itself it is unorganised and formless. By means of officials and 
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their special powers it becomes a state. A public articulated and operating through 
representative officers is a state; there is no state without a government but also 
there is none without a public' (Dewey, LW2: 277 cf. 245-57, 260). 
The central premise of Dewey's conception of the state is its foregoing of any philosophical 
attempt to find the true nature or essence of the state in order to embrace an anti-
essentialist view of the state. In this sense, Dewey argues that after the formation of a state 
through the political organisation of a public, its functions (governmental practises 
, 
parameters and composition) are themselves prone to changing in character and tone due 
to the changing historical conditions of associative behaviour and the rise of new publics. In 
simple terms, Dewey argues that the state possesses a historical relativity of form and 
function rather than a static and enduring nature41• 
The reason for this historical relativity of state form and function, Dewey stressed, involved 
the fact that the consequences of associative behaviour are linked to a society's cultural 
matrix and the historical propensity for the properties of a society's cultural matrix to 
change (Dewey, LW2: 263). A cultural matrix, Dewey contends, is itself always open and 
prone to change due to socio-economic and technological transformation, migration 
, 
exploration or wars that modify pre-existing associations or create new aSSOCiations 
(habits/customs) and consequences altogether. At the same time, the very perception or 
meaning attached to the consequences of associated behaviour and the best methods to 
41 Although Dewey's uses the terms publics, state and government he points out that these terms do not then 
necessarily shackle these terms to modern conceptions of the nation state. As Dewey (LW2: 276n7) pOints out 
'the text is concerned with modern conditions, but the hypothesis propounded is meant to hold good 
generally.' The terms state, government and officer are therefore freely used by Dewey to denote functions 
rather than elements distinct to the modern state and could feasibly used in other contexts. As I shall show in 
character 6, however, this did not mean that Dewey did not see the historically shackles the nation state 
seemed to place on publics and how they went about reforming government and the state. 
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deal with such consequences can itself shift in terms of a change in intellectual habits. For 
instance, scientific discoveries or the emergence of a new political paradigm may radically 
alter how people approach the consequences of associated behaviour (Dewey, lW2: 263-65 
cf. 254-55, 278-29). On the back of this, Dewey stresses that changes in a cultural matrix, 
what we can also call societal change, is a historical fact, which injects perpetual and 
potentially revolutionary change in multifarious and different marks of intensities across the 
various relations of associative behaviour within a SOCiety (Dewey, lWll: 41).42 
Concurrently, Dewey's concept of a public does not denote a static and homogenous body 
of people but rather plural and ever-changing publics brought into existence in reaction to 
changes in a society's cultural matrix and the consequences of associated behaviour.43 On a 
synchronic level, publics are plural, ranging in size, strength and interests due the variety of 
associations, habits and social customs a cultural matrix puts into practise and the 
perceptions of consequences a cultural matrix provides (Dewey, lW2:254-55). For instance, 
if one considers issues such as animal rights, immigration, homosexuality, women's equality 
or welfare provision, it is clear that at anyone moment in time there are potentially 
multiple publics with their own agendas and interests, who mayor may not support another 
public's cause. 
42 
As we shall see, Dewey believes that the rate of change in cultural matrix in industrial/capitalist based 
societies is far more pronounced than prior the agrarian societies that preceded it. However, the important 
point here is that Dewey highlights how social change is often differentiated, in its form and intensity, across 
different relations of associative behaviour (family, school, church, the school, science, art, and economic and 
political relations) rather than mono-causally across the whole of society. 
43 
As Westbrook (1991: 305) notes, Dewey's use of the ' ... definite and indefinite articles tended to obscure his 
contention that in any given society the Public was, at most, a collective noun designating plural publics that 
concerned themselves with the indirect consequences of particular forms of associated activity.' 
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A person may belong to many different publics, based on how they are subjected to or 
perceive the consequences of associative behaviour. No two publics are therefore likely to 
ever have the exact same membership but a public may possibly possess members from 
other publics (Goiunlock in Dewey, LW2: xxvi-xxvii). In turn, because publics are 
differentiated by the associative behaviour invoked by the contours of material culture , 
publics may even be constructed in response to other publics. It is quite often the case, for 
example, that some publics hold interests and ideas of how the state could ~ a n a g e e such 
interests, which other publics may find inherently unreasonable or even dangerous because 
they conflict with their own interests and values. Consequently, there is, Dewey stresses 
, 
often room for dispute or conflict between the interests of differing publics (Dewey, LW2: 
275, 354 cf. LW11: 56). 
On a diachronic level, publics also come into existence and pass out of existence in response 
to the variety of associations a cultural matrix puts into practise and the perceptions of 
consequences a material culture provides. Publics may not only continue on from and 
modify the interests from where previous publics left off (e.g. religious/socialist/feminist 
movements) but may be entirely original movements whose values and interests differ 
markedly from publics that precede them. All publics, however, emerge within a strategic 
context where the state and its institutions of government bear the hallmarks of the 
interests of previous publics. For example, new publics engendered by new conditions in 
material culture have often found that their inherited institutions, beliefs and traditions of 
government, which reflect the interest of older publics, suffer from a cultural 'Iag' and are 
unfit to meet their needs (Dewey, LW2: 255 cf. LW13: 97, lWll: 54, LW12: 82-83). 
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New publics will therefore often seek to modify the institutions and officials of government 
to suit their present interests and consequently modify the nature and functions of the state 
(Dewey, lW2: 255).44 This may itself include fundamentally changing the nature and 
functions of a state as it has been laid down by previous publics, such as those that founded 
the state in the first place. In turn, the modification of the state's institutions of 
government, through changing the nature of associative behaviour and creating new forms 
of cultural norms and values, will affect and modify a society's cultural matrix and 
subsequently provide a new cultural matrix (consequences/perceptions of associative 
behaviour) for the possible emergence of future publics. 
In light of the perpetual propensity of a cultural matrix to change and call forth 
synchronically and diachronically differentiated publics, then, Dewey declares that the state 
is a historically relative entity whose functions were 'ever something to be scrutinized, 
investigated, and searched for' and hence remade and reorganised in reaction to the 
conditions of culture (Dewey, lW2: 255). Dewey sums up his historicist view of the state by 
propounding that: 
'The consequences vary with concrete conditions; hence at one time and place a 
large measure of state action may be indicated and at another time a policy of 
quiescence and laissez-faire. Just as publics and states vary with conditions of time 
and place, so do the concrete functions which should be carried on by states. There 
is no antecedent universal proposition which can be laid down because of which the 
44 
It should be noted here that 'new' public in this context does not necessarily mean that the consequences of 
associated behaviour in question here are newly created by changes in material aspects of a cultural matrix. It 
is quite possible for a new public to emerge in response to a change in the cultural foundations, which 
facilitate a new perception of long established relations of associative behaviour. It also possible that a new 
public may newly reflect the interests of previous older publics who were themselves marginalised or whose 
grievances were deemed unworthy for public control via government. 
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functions of the state should be limited or should be expanded. Their scope is 
something to be critically and experimentally determined.' (LW2: 281) 
Concluding his examination of the state, Dewey argues that the philosophical preoccupation 
with an all encompassing theory of the state's nature had always been a mirage of a goal in 
the first place. In provisional terms, whilst one could declare rudimentarily that the state 
was the political organisation of the public via government and that such arrangements had 
certain historical traits of function, ultimately ' ... what the public may be, what the officials 
are, how adequately they perform their function, are things we have to go to history to 
discover' (Dewey, LW2: 253- 256).45 
4.3 The history of publics and the spectre of violence 
The qualification that publics, government and consequently the state are historically 
relative properties, based on the movements of a society's cultural matrix, is inherently the 
cornerstone of Dewey's recasting of the meaning of democracy and the justification for its 
practise vis-a-vis other forms of political settlement. This gambit involves Dewey initially 
reminding his readers that historical relativity of the state meant examining the formation 
45 As Westbrook (1991: 303-305) points out, although Dewey seems to follow pluralism in regarding the state 
as secondary and functional in response to the interests publics it should be noted that he did not see the 
state as simply balancing the interests of publics. Moreover, Dewey backs the role states could take 
independent of direct public formation but on the basis that the government and their officers could take 
actions in the wider interest: 'It is quite true that most states, after they have been brought into being, react 
upon the primary groupings. When a state is a good state, when the officers of the publics genuinely serve the 
public interests, the reflex effect is of great importance ... A measure of a good state is the degree to which it 
relieves individuals from the waste and negative struggle and needless conflict and confesses upon him 
positive assurance and reinforcement in what he undertakes.' (LW2: 280). Moreover, as we shall see below 
and in the next chapter, this form of state activism only becomes problematic for Dewey when it does not 
facilitate the ability of publics to democratically challenge or remodel the governments and state. 
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of statehood and its evolution in the messy reality of human history. Detached from an 
appreciation of history, it is quite easy to read Dewey's theory of a state being based on a 
functional logic of publics emerging and progressively altering the institutions and practises 
of government in response to the changing conditions of culture. 
In this schema, the state's evolution would resemble the progressive role set out for it in 
Pluralist philosophy, whereby the state neutrally arbitrated and included the interests of 
differing publics, who have similar potential and resources for accessing and modifying the 
formation of government and state functions. Contra Pluralism's vision of state, however, 
Dewey pOinted out that the very history that highlighted that states evolved via changes in 
the cultural matrix and the rise of publics, also brought home the fact that such an evolution 
did not necessarily guarantee the 'propriety or reasonableness' of the publics or the political 
acts, measures or systems which emerged from such a process (Dewey, LW2: 254). 
For instance, Dewey highlights that the intellectual foundations (science/political ideologies) 
of a cultural matrix do not necessarily provide publics or governments with correct or just 
perceptions about associative behaviour. One has only to think about certain ideologies and 
subsequent government policies towards women, immigrants, non-whites, or homosexuals 
over the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries to see that the observation of the consequences of 
associated human behaviour is open to the same error and illusion as the perception of 
natural objects. The emergence of a public can also not be equated with an a priori 
expression of correctness or justness. As highlighted above, publics can emerge in response 
to other publics or often come into conflict with another due to incompatible interests. This 
process itself can lead to the emergence of illiberal or unreasonable publics. Again, one has 
118 
only to look to history to find how illiberal publics have shaped unjust state formations or 
even how what we today would call progressive publics, such as the ones that emerged to 
demand the abolition of New World Slavery and women's enfranchisement, were opposed 
by publics that demanded the status quo or even a heightening of illiberal practises. As a 
consequence, Dewey contends that mistaken prescriptions, based off such false 
observations or stemming from the wishes of illiberal publics, can consolidate themselves in 
laws and administrative policies of government creating retrogressive rather than 
progressive consequences (Dewey, lW2: 254). 
The historical evidence that culture could facilitate incorrect perceptions of associative 
behaviour or even invoke illiberal publics served to underline for Dewey that publics have 
rarely been of equal standing in a society. The historical relativity of the state's form 
revealed not only that other social groups precede the state, but that the state always exists 
as a 'distinctive and restricted social interest'; an agency whose form and functions is set-up 
to meet the demands and protect the interests of specific publics within specific cultures at 
specific junctures in history (Dewey, lW2: 253-54). Historically not all publics, whether 
progressive or retrogressive, have been able gain access to the government and modify the 
nature and function of the state. 
For example, although states are brought into existence via the emergence of a public there 
are often other publics that are excluded from forming government in the very act of 
founding a state. This process itself normally reflects socially stratified relations between 
groups within society at that juncture in history. And whilst the parameters of such SOcial 
stratification may shift over time due to shifts in power, from say heredity lineage to 
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economic class, the power and prestige of government is nearly always held in esteem by 
dominant groups. The ability to gain access to the privileges of government has therefore 
often been distributed through birth into a dominant class, caste, race or gender rather than 
an ability to govern (Dewey, LW2: 254, 283-84).46 This has created circumstances 
throughout history, where various publics and their interests have found themselves 
excluded, often unjustly and to their detriment, from the very process of the state being 
rediscovered and remade over again in reaction to the conditions of culture. 
Indeed, Dewey suggests that the primary task for any public is to achieve such recognition 
of itself across wider society to give weight to its attempts to modify government and 
associative behaviour in it interests (Dewey, LW2: 283). Yet, Dewey points out that any 
cursory examination of history reveals that this process has been fraught with social conflict 
and political upheaval. Such conflict centres on how new publics, whether reflecting new 
interests or newly reflecting old ones, often find that their interests are in direct conflict 
with those previous publics who hold and regulate political power. For example, as stated 
above, new publics have often found that their inherited political institutions, beliefs and 
traditions, suffer from a cultural 'Iag' and are unfit to meet their interests. However, due to 
the culturallag of the institutions and social stratification that often underpins the state and 
its government, new publics have commonly been unable to access or utilize their inherited 
state and its government to institute change. 
4s,-here is of Course an obvious link between the power of dominant groups and the ability to control the 
cultural foundations of a material culture. For instance, it would be very helpful to the interests of dominant 
groups to have cultural foundations that deem the causes of subordinate groups and their publics as irrational 
or incorrect and hence unsuited for remaking the state. Dewey is, however, very careful not to fall into a 
Marxist style conspiracy narrative that simply equates knowledge as ideology and thus a simple expression of 
power. Nevertheless, as we shall see, although Dewey never uses the terms hegemony or ideological control, 
he was quite aware of how the interests of dominant groups within society was ultimately refracted through 
ideas and conceptions of common sense within material culture (LW7: 326). 
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Moreover, Dewey suggests that well institutionalised states and their incumbent 
governments, which reflect the interests and often contain members of previous publics, 
have historically hindered the process of the remaking of the state. This transpires because 
the needs of newly formed publics often challenge the moral values or interests of the 
previous public(s) which have shaped the present state and its government. Subsequently, 
well institutionalised incumbent states and their governments have historically used the 
institutions and practise of government to counteract, discredit or suppress the rival 
interests of new publics. This expulsion of new publics from partaking in the remaking the 
state and government has, Dewey contends, often been the catalyst for violent revolution: 
'The new public which is generated remains inchoate, unorganised, because it 
cannot use inherited political agencies. The latter, if elaborate and well 
institutionalised, obstruct the organisation of the new public. They prevent the 
development of new forms of state which might grow rapidly were social life more 
fluid, less precipitated into political and legal moulds. To form itself, the public has to 
break with existing political forms. This is hard to do because these forms are 
themselves the regular means of instituting change. The public which generated 
political forms is passing away, but the power and the lust of possession remains in 
the hands of the officers and agencies which the dying publics instituted. This is why 
change of the form of states is only effected only by revolution' (Dewey, LW2: 255). 
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What is of pertinence here is Dewey's belief that the historical relativity of culture and the 
emergence of new publics translates into a situation where a society is always in a process 
of transition and hence potential moral conflict. This conflict between the needs of old 
experience and of new experience, what we often refer to as social problems, is inherently a 
moral conflict because it concerns what should be within a society. Such conflicts, brought 
about by the events of a shifting cultural matrix, inherently question the values, principles 
and ends and corresponding social institutions (practices and institutions of government) 
that should exist at that specific historical juncture (Dewey, lW13: 151, 184 cf. lWll: 36-
37). 
This does not so much amount to a belief in the inevitability of moral conflict, but rather, 
through an appreciation of history, to the warranted assertion about the inevitability of 
social change and the potential for moral conflict between old and new experience. All 
societies are dependent and based upon the experience accumulated in the past (interests 
and government of old publics/old habits and customs) but are also subjected to conflicting 
new forces and new needs (interests of new publics/ new habits and customs), which 
demand that patterns of experience and institutions are shaped towards their interests. And 
whilst the rate and extent of the pull between the old and new may vary across time and 
space, Dewey argues that such change is always forthcoming. 
All SOcieties, in some form, thus have to come face to face with the dilemma of integrating 
potentially conflicting moralities of old experience and new experience (Dewey, lWll: 36). 
However, as the prior notation of the historic propensity of violent revolution makes clear, 
striking the balance between (or even contemplating integrating the old and the new) has 
typically been beyond the political wit of humanity. Moreover, Dewey believed that the 
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dilemma of integrating potentially conflicting moralities of old experience and new 
experience had led some into a belief in the necessity of violent coercive revolution (Dewey, 
LWll: 41, 56-61 cf. LW 14: 113). And on this basis, Dewey concludes that the fundamental 
problem of political settlement in any society seemingly revolves around the question of 
how to manage social change and mediate potential moral conflict between the old and 
new experience without the necessity of coercive or violent politics.47 
4.4 Making the case for Democracy as a Way of Life 
Rallying against democratic realism's caricature of democracy as merely being a set of 
defunct institutions, whose failings are only outweighed by the erroneous belief in their 
ability to succeed in the first place, Dewey puts forward democracy as the answer to the 
problem of how to manage societal change and mediate its potential moral conflicts. In 
making such a statement, Dewey begins his attempt at deepening, clarifying and ultimately 
reconstructing the idea of democracy. Although acknowledging the embodiment of the 
concept in popular suffrage and elected officials, what we commonly call 'political 
democracy', Dewey contends that the idea of democracy must be separated from its 
external organs and structure. To reduce democracy to specific institutions or practices is 
47 There will be some that argue that violence is a legitimate form of polities and in fact is the only way to brin 
about change within society where there are strongly resistant organised pUblics. Dewey's reaction to s u c ~ ~
claims would be to agree with the first statement under certain conditions but to totally dismiss the seCond 
statement. Dewey's take on revolutionary violence is driven by a reaction to the argument for violence's 
historical necessity and an historical appreciation of violence's limits. On one hand, Dewey's aversion to 
violence was driven by what he saw in theories such as Marxism which deposited the historical inevitability of 
violence between two polar classes. This for Dewey seemed illogical because such a dogmatic view of history 
limits the use of non-violent means a priori. Moreover, Dewey saw revolutionary violence as an option that 
had become historically discredited and limited. On one hand, Dewey saw history as Showing that violence 
between two groups had produced pyrrhic victories where much that was done had to be done over to restore 
democracy (LW9: 110-11). On the other hand, the advancement of military technologies meant that the ciVil 
or international wars that would see the changeover of power would have the potentiality to ruin all parties 
and indeed civilisation itself. This point itself made it doubly important that violence was seen as means that 
should be only employed as a last resort (LW11: 55-58). Despite this, and interpretations that paint him as a 
card carrying paCifist, Dewey did not rule out the use of violence all together. In certain circumstances and 
having come via the use of collective and collaborative intelligence rather than sheer dogmatism Dewey 
believed that the positive use of force could be pursued (LW14: 75-76). 
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quite simply to miss the fact that democracy is inherently something 'broader and deeper' 
than such institutions (Dewey, LW2: 325, cf. LWll: 217 and LW7: 349). This broader and 
deeper meaning revolves around viewing democracy as the best method for establishing 
and maintaining a society's sense of community. And as we shall see, Dewey sees the 
establishment of community through democracy as paramount to peacefully managing 
moral conflict as it emerges throughout history (LWll: 56, 182 c.f. LW7: 329). 48 
Dewey's reconstructed meaning of democracy is principally exemplified in his demarcation 
between democracy as a 'way of life' and 'political democracy' as a system of government 
(Dewey, LWll: 217 cf. LW2: 325 and LW14: 226). The key to understanding Dewey's 
conception of democracy as a method for dealing with social change and moral conflict 
centres around viewing the former as providing the ethical mandate for the constant 
renewal of the institutions and practices of the latter (Dewey, LW2: 325 cf. LW 11: 182, 
218). In its simplest expression, democracy as a way of life represents for Dewey the 
expression of the democratic ideal or idea (Dewey, LW7: 348-49 cf. LW2: 327).49 
Underpinned by the Lincolnesque belief that no human is wise enough to rule others 
without their consent, democracy as a 'way of life' is premised on the necessity for the 
equal 'participation of every mature being in the formation of the values that regulate the 
living of men together' (Dewey, LWll: 217-218 cf. LW13: 294). 
48 
The most sustained narration of Oewey's democracy as a form of 'conflict resolution' is to be found in 
William R. Caspary's Dewey on Democracy (2000). However, Caspary's account, although very good on 
highlighting Oewey's similarities to contemporary positions of conflict resolution, fails to really get to grips 
both with the evolutionary nature of Oewey's conception of democracy in response to changes in material 
culture and the global political connotations this view holds in light of 19th, 20th and 21 st century forms of 
economic globalisation. 
49 Confusingly, across different texts and sometimes within the same text interchangeably, Oewey also uses 
the terms 'democracy as a social idea', 'method of social intelligence', 'intelligence', 'experimentalist method', 
'collective intelligence', 'co-operative intelligence', 'liberalism' as well 'democracy as a way life' to describe his 
take on the democracy as the best method for dealing with social change. 
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The values in question here are the moral values (principles, ends) that justify and inform 
the social institutions (habits/customs/institutions of the cultural matrix) that influence both 
how individuals act and relate towards both themselves and one another. Within these 
parameters, democracy as a way of life is best seen as an ethical commitment to the 
principle that those who are affected by social institutions should have a certain share in the 
production and management of those institutions through contributing to the formation of 
social policy (proposed reforms of social institutions). Dewey describes this ethical 
commitment as: 
'the opportunity, the right and the duty of every individual to form some conviction 
and to express some conviction regarding his own place in the social order, and the 
relations of that social order to his own welfare; second, the fact that each individual 
counts as one and one only on an equality of others, so that the final social will 
comes about as cooperative expression of the ideas of many people' (Dewey, lW13: 
295-96). 
What is worth noting here is that such an ethical commitment operates on a balanced set of 
equality of participation and communication in the formation of social policy. On one hand 
, 
each individual or group of like-minded individuals who have grouped together (publics) is 
taken to be equally affected in quality, if not in quantity, by the social institutions under 
which they live. All individual or groups of like minded individuals, regardless of any native 
(race, sex) or artificial (class, intelligence, political beliefs) endowments, should 
subsequently have the chance and opportunity to communicate their own conception of 
moral value. 
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This fundamentally entails an equality of opportunity to express their own needs and 
desires, their conceptions of how social life should go on and how the social problems they 
perceive to exist can be solved via reforming social policy. In short, all individuals or groups 
should have an equality of opportunity to have their moral values solicited and potentially 
registered in social policy; so as to secure the social institutions that they believe will bring 
about the full development of their capacities as individuals (Dewey, LWll: 219-220 cf. 
LW7: 349-350). 
On the other hand, however, this equality of opportunity to contribute to the formation of 
social policy is balanced by the recognition of the aforementioned social nature of morality. 
As Dewey points out, ' ... capacity to endure publicity and communication is the test by which 
it is decided whether a pretended good is spurious or genuine. Communication, sharing, 
joint participation are the only actual ways of universalizing the moral law and end' (Dewey, 
MW12: 197). The drive for the solicitation and registration of individual or group morality in 
social policy must always be refracted through the knowledge that such policy will affect 
and have consequences for 'other' individuals or groups within society; who in all likelihood, 
due to stratification and different interests engendered by the contours of culture, may 
share different or competing moral standpoints. The equality of opportunity to express 
moral value is therefore always used to facilitate the 'mutual conference and consultation' 
between those groups or individuals who hold differing or competing conceptions of moral 
value. The overall aim of such mutual conference and consultation being a form of 
collective problem solving; where members of society co-operatively collaborate in the 
appraisal and forming of new social policy in regards to mediating moral conflicts. 
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In essence, then, the balanced equality of democracy as a way of life and its focus on 
collective problem solving, highlights Oewey's faith in a deliberative (conference, 
consultation, negotiation and persuasion) form of political settlement. A process which, 
Oewey believed, would allow moral conflicts and the resultant social policy decisions to be 
settled in the 'widest possible contribution of all- or at least the great majority' (Oewey, 
LW:S6). However, this deliberative form of political settlement is only able to deal 
competently with moral conflict both synchronically and diachronically, argues Dewey, 
because democracy as a way of life facilitates the establishment and maintenance of a 
society's community. As detailed earlier, just as atoms, stellar masses and cells in nature, 
Dewey states that humans within a society directly and unconsciously combine in associated 
behaviour. Such associated behaviour needs no explanation or meaning; it is simply the way 
things are structured by culture. 
The attempt to provide explanation or meaning to associative behaviour and its 
consequences is for Oewey based on communication, whereby symbols or signs are 
produced about such associative behaviour and its consequences. The creation of symbols 
and signs or what we can call a common language is thus exactly what publics do when they 
offer their narrations of associated behaviour and its consequences to wider society. The 
pivotal point here is that such a process, whereby explanation or meaning is given to 
associative behaviour and its consequences and then communicated to others, is for Dewey 
the move towards the establishment of community (LW13: 176). 
'A community thus presents an order of energies transmuted into one of meanings 
which are appreciated and mutually referred by each to every other on the part of 
those engaged in combined action. "Force" is not eliminated but is transformed in 
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uses and direction by ideas and sentiments made possible by means and symbols' 
(Dewey, LW2: 331). 
On this basis, Dewey takes the form of community invoked by democracy as a way of life to 
be the best means to deal with moral conflict and social problems both on synchronic and 
diachronic levels. This is quite simply because the ethical commitment of democracy as a 
way of life translates into the perpetual maintenance of a community, whereby everyone is 
afforded an equal opportunity to express moral value and potentially, through deliberation, 
have that moral value embodied in social policy. 
On a synchronic level, as we have seen, changes in culture often produce new publics who 
desire to change what they believe are illegitimate or unsuitable social institutions. Due to 
stratification and the clash of interests that regularly occur between old and new publics, 
historically new publics have often been cut out of the process of remaking the state and 
have had to resort to violent revolution to achieve their objectives. Within the remit of the 
ethical commitment of democracy as a way of life, however, all individuals and groups 
possess the right to express their moral value. Dewey subsequently believed that the 
movement towards the necessity of violence to facilitate the changing of the state is largely 
eradicated under the democracy as a way of life because such an ethical commitment 
aimed: 
' ... to bring these conflicts out into the open where their special claims can be seen 
and appraised, and where they can be discussed and judged in the light of more 
inclusive interests than are represented by either of them separately ... The more the 
respective claims of the two are publicly and scientifically weighed, the more likely it 
is that the public interest will be disclosed and made effective' (Dewey, LWll:56). 
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In this sense, Oewey's democratic community does not so much do away with moral 
conflict, which itself is an impossibility, but looks to mediate conflict and avoid violence 
through facilitating the communicative inclusion of all publics. Indeed, to borrow the words 
of Oewey's friend and intellectual collaborator George Herbert Mead, this conception of 
democratic community is nothing short ofthe institutionalising of revolution. For not only is 
democracy as a way of life and the democratic community it gives rise to, geared towards 
facilitating the potential reform of all social institutions, including the institutions and 
practises of political democracy, but the reform of social institutions through co-operative 
deliberation and problem solving. Such an approach is not only potentially radical and 
revolutionary, but also socially cohesive because of its refusal to ground violence and 
bloodshed as first principles in the act of being radical and revolutionary. 
The democratic way of life and its democratic community sheds light upon Dewey's hopes 
for a diachronically flexible and self-corrective form of deliberative and co-operative 
problem solving to mediate the moral conflicts which are 'bound to arise' in society (Dewey, 
LW14: 227-228). For under the tenets of democracy as a way of life the problematic of 
facilitating the participation of every mature being, in the formation of the values that 
inform a society's social institutions, is never deemed to be permanently solvable, but 
rather as a challenge whose demands change across time and space. This is because of the 
ethical commitment that all members of a society will have the chance to voice their moral 
value and have the potential to inform social policy functions with recognition of the 
historical relativity of both culture and the interests of the individuals within that culture. 
The pursuit of democracy as a way of life and a democratic community is therefore 
premised on the idea that such an endeavour can only be achieved by a constant solicitation 
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and registration of the desires, needs and wants (moral values) of groups or individuals as 
they emerge or change in relation to changes in culture. A process where all forms of moral 
value espoused by new publics, across time and space, would always possess the right to be 
heard and be deliberated and, if sufficient evidence of its merit emerged, the chance of 
ultimately changing social policy (Dewey, LW7: 350). At the heart of the democratic way of 
life and its sense of community, thus beats an educative rhythm, which looks to ensure a 
perpetual equality of communication and cooperative problem solving as social conditions 
and conceptions of moral value shift throughout history.so 
4.5 Democracy as a Way of Life + Political Democracy = Creative Democracy 
The question which now remains, however, is how does Dewey's conception of democracy 
as a way of life relate to what we commonly call political democracy as a system of 
government? What should be clear from the preceding exposition is Dewey's belief that 
democracy as a way of life and its sense of community provides the respective ethical and 
deliberative foundations for the mediation of conflict via facilitating the co-operative reform 
and remaking of social institutions in response to changing contours of culture and the rise 
and fall of publics. The interesting point here is that Dewey conceives that democracy as a 
way of life is not just about political democracy but about the perpetual participation of 
every mature being in the formation of the values of the social institutions under which they 
live. As such, Dewey takes that the justification and purpose of the institutions and practise 
of political democracy are both bound to the democratic way of life. 
50 As this and the earlier narration of the Oewey's conception of the state and publics should make clear, 
contra James livingston's (2001: 51-56) otherwise excellent reading of The Public and it's Problems as the 
valorisation of cultural politics via an active civil society, Oewey's concept of creative democracy makes distinct 
claims about the ability of publics to gain access to and modify the state and the political representations of 
government (LW2: 245-54, 327). In short, Oewey makes the point that only having an active civil society of 
publics is not an ultimate guarantee of having a successful democracy. 
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On one hand, Dewey asserts that the institutions and practises of political democracy 
should always endeavour to further the pursuit of democracy as a way of life. This means 
that the institutions and practises of political democracy should endeavour to facilitate the 
evolution of other social institutions to mediate the changes in culture and conflict between 
old and new experience. And to this end, Dewey contends that the institutions and practise 
that we commonly associate with political democracy such as universal suffrage, recurring 
elections, responsibility of those who are in political power to the voters and the freedom of 
speech, inquiry and assembly are the means which have been most expedient at various 
historical junctures towards the pursuit of the ethical commitment of democracy as a way of 
life and the upholding of a democratic community (Dewev, LW11: 218). This is because 
such institutions and practises of political democracy, through their commitment to equality 
of discussion, consultation and publicity, are premised on the uncovering and 
communicating of social needs and troubles and hence facilitate both the ethical mandate 
of democracy as way of life and the collective solving of such problems (Dewey, lW2: 364). 
On the other hand, however, the institutions and practises of political democracy are 
themselves simply social institutions. They are not the final ends or values of democracy as 
a way of life but rather the mechanisms towards the 'effective operation' of the ideal 
(Dewey, lW2: 325). Against the trend of what he saw as the quasi-religious idealisation of 
political democracy's institutions and practises and other social institutions in general 
, 
Dewey argues we must not see democracy as being 'fixed in its outwards manifestation' 
(Dewey, lW11l 182). The institutions and practises of political democracy are not beyond 
criticism or innovation themselves and are to be appraised on how such means and the 
consequences they produce contribute to the effective operation of the democratic ideal 
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{Dewey, LWll: 218}. For instance, the emergence of moral conflict and the pursuit of 
deliberatively solving such a problem may uncover that an institution or practise of political 
democracy is unfit or unsuited to meet the demands of facilitating the democratic way of 
life in the current contours of culture. Consequently, such defunct institutions and practises 
of political democracy, just like other social institutions, must be adapted or updated, 
through deliberative problem solving, to meet the needs, problems and the conditions of 
the contemporary configuration of culture (Dewey, LWll: 182 cf. LWl3: 299). 
The linkage between democracy as a way of life and political democracy brings home 
Dewey's conception of 'Creative Democracy,.51 Creative democracy is simply shorthand for 
the working link between the democratic ideal and its outward manifestation in social 
institutions. For democracy as a way of life is not so much to be statically handed down 
across generations, argues Dewey, but rather to be creatively interpreted and enacted anew 
by each generation and its various publics in regards to their present: 
'The very idea of democracy, the meaning of democracy must be explored afresh; it 
has to be constantly discovered, and rediscovered remade and reorganised; while 
the political and economic institutions and social institutions of government in which 
it is embodied have to be remade and reorganised to meet the changes that are 
going on in the development of new needs on the part of human beings and the new 
resources for satisfying these needs' {Dewey, LW11: 182}. 
Creative democracy, where the democratic ideal is used to structure the evolution of social 
institutions through mediating the conflict of publics, is, Dewey concludes, the only way to 
51 
I use the term 'Creative Democracy' not only because it best sums up the evolutionary nature of Dewey's 
idea democracy but because Dewey himself uses the term to sum up his position in his 80th birthday celebration 
address: 'Creative Democracy - The Task Before Us' (LW14: 224-230). 
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master both the changes in social reality that are already here and destined to come forth. 
This is the sense in which Dewey suggests, contra its critics, that the 'only cure for ills of 
democracy is more democracy' (Dewey, LW2: 319). However, this was no mere empty 
slogan for Dewey. Taking in his immediate context he warned that any attempt to merely 
standstill and not deal with an ever shifting social reality and ever changing publics, whether 
this be an uncreative and static democracy, a 3rd Reich, Communist Utopia or reincarnation 
of Philosopher Kings as experts, would likely place humanity on the backward road to 
extinction. Moreover, as we shall encounter in the next chapter, Dewey believed that 
creative democracy was needed not just within the nation state but beyond and between 
the nation states of the globe. For the violence of revolution had itself been revolutionised 
and without a form of global creative democracy humanity now possessed the 
unprecedented ability to be the authors of its own collective destruction. 
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Chapter 5: John Dewey • The Global Democrat 
'The present state of the world is more than a reminder that we have now to put 
forth the energy of our own to prove worthy of our heritage. It is a challenge to do 
for the critical and complex conditions of today what the men of an earlier day did 
for simple conditions' (LW14: 225). 
As the last chapter made clear, John Oewey's conception of creative democracy points 
towards the perpetual adaption of social institutions, including democratic institutions and 
practises themselves, as new publics are engendered by social change. Within this chapter, 
I aim to highlight how Dewey's conception of creative democracy was fundamentally 
informed by what he took to be global interdependence of The Great Society. This centres 
on how Oewey believed that creative democracy needed to be exercised not only within 
America but also outside and between nation states and the various publics engendered 
and scattered across the globe, by what we have come to call the first age of modern 
globalisation. However, I also want to highlight that whilst Oewey was all too well aware 
that The Great Society required global forms of democratic governance, he was also all too 
aware of the lack of a political culture open to such change, both within and beyond the 
USA. 
To achieve this, the chapter will have three movements to its argument. The first section 
will highlight the globalised nature of The Great Society by showing how such a time period 
has today become known as the 'First Great Globalisation'. The second part of the chapter 
will focus on how Dewey's ideas about creative democracy not only acknowledged the 
global dimensions of The Great Society but compelled him to propound the need for global 
democracy. The third section will focus on Oewey's consequent problematization of his own 
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solutions of a global Great Community and global democratic governance. This shall focus 
on his arguments about the eclipse of the public and stalling of creative of democracy within 
modern liberal democracies and how aspirations towards global democracy were harmed 
by such a process. 
5.1 The Great Society as the First Great Globalisation 
Upon a cursory glance it may seem bizarre, or rather some 100 years too late, to return to 
the work of John Dewey in order to gain a greater appreciation of globalisation and 
possibilities of global democracy at the start of the 21st century. After a", Dewey appears to 
be a creature of a wholly different epoch, born some 18 months before the Battle of Fort 
Sumter and dying only some 6 years after George Orwe" had coined the term 'Cold War'. 
To read his body of work is thus to enter a world that does not even include bearing witness 
to the potential mutual destruction of the Hydrogen Bomb nor The American Civil Rights 
Movement, the Vietnam War and the winds of change that flattened European Imperialism. 
And this is to say nothing of events, such as the fa" of the Bretton Woods regime, the 
hegemonic ascent of Neo-Liberalism, the end of the Cold War and the rise of 
communication technology such as the internet, which have been the catalysts for 
contemporary debates around global democracy. 
However, just as it is in the practise of law and its definition of what counts as a credible eye 
witness, when looking at the historical record a fleeting glance at events is not within the 
bounds of credible evidence. Not only was the American Civil War (1861-65), to which 
Dewey was born into, fought just as much due to the diametric views on international trade 
policy between Southern and Northern States, as it was fought over the immorality of 
chattel slavery. But at the end of his life he also saw the global ramifications of the atomic 
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bomb and the emergence of the Truman Doctrine which effectively committed the United 
States to a global struggle against the Soviet Union and her allies. When one adds to this 
that Dewey lived through World War One, the aforementioned rise of Communism and 
Fascism, the Great Depression and the fait acompli that was the Second World War, the 
'global' nature of his age becomes slightly clearer. This issue, however, needs further 
unpacking because it becomes clear that what Dewey took to be 'The Great Society' was not 
just the radical transformation of the American nation state from an agrarian to a corporate 
capitalist society but also the radical transformation that happened to the global economy 
during 'The Long 19th Century' (1815 to 1914). 
Prior to the 19th there existed a well-defined intercontinental trade system that linked 
Europe, Asia and the Atlantic colonies of European empires (Findlay and O'Rourke 2007: 
365). This had seen world trade grow at 1 percent per year during the 17th and 18th 
centuries. However, as writers such as Frieden (2006), Findlay and O'Rourke (2007), Morris 
(2011) and Rodrik (2011) point out, The Long 19th century saw the radical transformation of 
global trade and finance. We can call this radical transformation of the global economy 
during the long 19th Century as the process of 'The First Great Globalisation,.52 
This process was inherently driven by historical factors such as industrial revolution and its 
insudtrial (steamships, railways) and communication technology (wireless telegraphs and 
telephones) reducing inefficiency and transaction costs of world trade; the hegemonic 
S2 I follow Dani Rodrik (2011) in calling this the First Great Globalisation but it should be pointed out that the 
actual dating of globalisation and when it began is extensive. Janet Abu-lughod (1989) for instance traces 
networks of global connections back to before the 1500s and writers such as Findlay and O'Rourke (2007) and 
Hopkins (2002) acknowledge earlier forms of globalisation. However, as my use of the term the First Great 
Globalisation suggests the form globalisation initiated by the industrial revolution and its technologies is 
distinct in the way it connected various parts of the world vis-a-vis earlier forms of globalisation. 
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ascent of Free Trade ideas a ~ ~ espoused by Smith and Ricardo; the subjection of national 
macroeconomics to the priorities of the international monetary system of the Gold 
Standard; the economic hegemon's (Britain) embrace and upholding of the Gold Standard; 
Free Trade and the consequent export of investment capital by the City of London; the 
global migration from the Old World to the New; and the practise of European Imperialism 
and opening up of Asia to practises of Free Trade, combined to create the first genuine 
integrated world economy. As Jeffery Frieden outlines, The First Great Globalisation 
translated into a scenario where: 
' ... the world economy was essentially open to the movement of people, money, 
capital and goods. The leading businessmen, politicians, and thinkers of the day 
regarded an open world economy as the normal state of affairs. They assumed that 
people and money would flow around the world with few or no restrictions. Trade 
protection, although common, was seen as acceptable departure from the norm, 
driven by the exigencies of short term domestic or international politics. Capitalism 
was global, and the globe was capitalist. (2006: 29). 
By the mid 19th century the onset of The First Great Globalisation saw world trade grow at a 
fate c, 6,. ?efc.e"t ?ef 'leaf ~ C f f the rest of the century (Rodrik 2011: 24-25). And by 1913 
every country in Western Europe, bar Spain and Portugal, had industrialised and such 
developments also took in places such as Argentina and Japan. Moreover, a global economic 
regime emerged across what we today call asymmetric global North and South relations. In 
this global division of labour the rich and industrial North exported industrial products in 
exchange for the primary commodity exports of the poor and largely agricultural South. This 
caused not only intercontinental commodity price convergence but also the trebling of living 
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standards in Western Europe and more than a quadrupling of living standards in British 
offshoots (Findlay and O'Rourke 2007: 402-207, 412- 415). 
Writing in 1919, and over what he perceived as the burning embers of such an order, John 
Maynard Keynes provides a wonderfully colourful first hand account of what is meant by 
The First Great Globalisation: 
'What an extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man that age was which 
came to an end in August, 1914!... The inhabitant of London could order by 
telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, 
in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon 
his doorstep; he could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his 
wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world, and 
share, without exertion or even trouble, in their prospective fruits and advantages; 
or he could decide to couple the security of his fortunes with the good faith of the 
townspeople of any substantial municipality in any continent that fancy or 
information might recommend. He could secure forthwith, if he wished it, cheap and 
comfortable means of transit to any country or climate without passport or other 
formality ... ' (Keynes 1919: 6-7) 
As Keynes alludes to above, the Long 19th century was eventually brought to a shuddering 
halt by the outbreak of World War One and the rise of trade protectionism that arose from 
such a global conflict. The period after World War One is commonly held to be a period of 
'de-globalisation' with the onset of 1920's hyperinflation, The Great Depression, trade 
protectionism and xenophobic nationalism, seeing the world economy split into autarkic 
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blocs.53 However, the evocation of the term de-globalisation is slightly misleading as it 
misses the attempt, between 1925 and 1929, of the developed powers such as Great Britain 
and the US to foolishly attempt to restore the world economy through the reestablishment 
of the gold standard.54 As such, even after World War One, and in the midst of some trade 
protectionism and the project of rebuilding Europe, the world's industrial production grew 
by more than 1/5 between 1925 and 1929. And with the rise of American style mass 
production and mass consumption, exports swelled to double pre war levels and world 
trade became 42 percent greater in 1929 than in 1913 (Frieden 2006: 140). 
This boom was primarily created by the rise of American economic hegemony and Wall 
Street's taking over from the City of London as the world's financial centre. Although the US 
rejected Britain's political engagement and underpinning of the long 19th century, the rise of 
American investment capital, taking over from the role of European investment capital, saw 
over £1 billion a year in loans emanating from New York to foreign destinations between 
1919 and 1929.55 And between 1924 - 1928, Americans lent on average $500 million per 
year to Europe, $300 Million per year to Latin America, $200 million per year to Canada and 
$100 million per year to Asia. 
53 See Findlay and O'Rourke (2007), for example, who call their chapter on the global economy between 1918-
39 'De-globalisation' 
S4 This folly was at the heart of Keynes's works A Tract of Monetary Reform (1923) and A Treatise on Money 
(1930) where Keynes was attempting to point out to policy makers that the gold standard and the POlicies 
linked to its maintenance were unsuited to post-war conditions. This was because early 20th century 
capitalism's new structure of corporations, more organised labour markets and the advent of trade unions vis-
a-vis the independent farmers, small businesses and individual workers, now meant that the subordination of 
national economies to the priority of world conditions was now both economic and political dynamite (Frieden 
152-54). The details of this great political and economic folly during the inter war is covered remarkably well in 
Ahamed's Lord's of Finance (2009) 
ss Despite all of this global economic integration the reality was that US during this period embraced forms of 
political isolationism in comparison to international 'conductor' Great Britain had been when she was the 
world's preeminent economic power. 
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In tandem, American industrialists and corporations also scoured the globe for foreign direct 
investment in plants and other ventures. Over the 1920's American firms invested some $5 
billion dollars overseas and saw the rise of multinational corporations such Ford and 
General Motors (GM), who became well established in major and minor economies across 
the globe, and the internationalisation of the activities of American commercial banks 
(Frieden 2006: 140-141, 160-161). This of course was all to lead into the void of The Great 
Depression and the spread of autarky and ultra nationalism. However, the key point is that 
the ideals of the long 19th century and The First Great Globalisation, post 1914, still cast a 
large shadow over the activities of not only America but also the globe post 1914. The 
question, of course, is how did the casting of such a shadow appear to John Dewey? As I 
show below, Dewey fully understood that The Great Society was inherently a national and 
international creature. 
5.2 The Two threads of Creative Democracy 
By 1927, when Dewey wrote The Public and its Problems, he was all too aware that The First 
Great Globalisation was heavily linked to problems of publics and the practice within The 
Great Society. If perceived correctly, The Public and its Problems conception of The Great 
Society encompasses not only the great transformation of American life but also the global 
interdependence created by The First Great Globalisation. Unfortunately, the global 
dimensions of The Great Society are rarely taken seriously enough by Dewey scholars.56 As 
S6 I say this because if one reads major studies of Dewey such as Caspary (2000), Hickman (2007), Kadlec 
(2007), and Westbrook (1991, 2005), one finds a real dearth of exposition of the global nature of Dewey's 
political writings. For instance, Hickman (2007: 32) acknowledges that Dewey put forward an idea of global 
citizenship but simply locates this as an earlier account of Global Civil Society. As I show below, this is not what 
Dewey had in mind and its lack of detailed study on these issues lends itself little credibility. Caspary's study of 
Deweyan democracy (2000:3) acknowledges that Dewey wrote about issues of globalisation and democracy on 
a global scale but then suggests he will not talk about such issues because they can be detached from 
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a result, what is often missed, again even by proponents of Dewey's work, is how the global 
dimensions of The Great Society fundamentally informed Dewey's conception of the praxis 
of creative democracy.57 Moreover, if read with this understanding in mind, Dewey's 
political writings from the 1920's onwards can be seen as untangling two intertwined 
threads concerning the pursuit of Democracy as a Way of life and the practise of creative 
democracy within The Great Society. 
The first thread, which has been covered by some authors such as Westbrook (1991) and 
Kadlec (2007), but which has been largely marginalised in other appraisals of Dewey's work, 
concerns the effects of The Great Society within America. On this issue, Dewey sounded a 
warning to the American nation that the country needed to embrace Democracy as a way of 
life and enact creative democracy domestically to deal with the complexity and stratification 
he saw within American corporate capitalism and avoid the embrace of the authoritarian 
politics he associated with Fascism, Communism and the expert governance of Democratic 
Realism. Examples of this train of thought can be found throughout Dewey's work from the 
assessment of Dewey's take on democracy. My argument in this chapter, however, is that Deweyan 
democracy in relation to The Great Society cannot be understood properly without considering issues of 
globalisation and democracy on a global scale. Finally, Westbrook (1991:309n31) only devotes a footnote to 
international dimensions of The Public and its Problems and then only mentions the second preface written in 
1946 as the key element in this line of thought. However, as I show below, he misses that the fact that 
Dewey's conception of The Great Society was inherently shorthand for not only the domestic context but the 
First Great Globalisation that was in full effect at the turn of the 20th century. Moreover, Westbrook fails to see 
how Dewey's problematic in The Public and its Problems and many of his future political writings focuses on 
this relationship between the international and the domestic. 
57 There have been some writers such as Cochran (2002, 2010) and Bray (2009) who have attempted to deal 
with international ramifications of Dewey's thoughts. Molly Cochran's (2002, 2010) work is probably at the 
foremost of this endeavour and her work has made a valuable addition in highlighting that Dewey's theory of 
democracy provides a better approach to democracy at a global level than those mapped out by writers such 
as Habermas, Dryzek and Held. However, her approach is stifled by the fact that she views Dewey's Work as 
indirectly addressing the global and hence fails to the see how Dewey both espouses global democracy but 
then questions its feasibility and links this back to domestic politics. In her most recent work she has 
attempted to update this position but again fails to adequately see how Dewey believed the domestic and 
global forms of democracy were interlinked and interdependent. 
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1920's onwards where he puts forward ideas about a form of Democratic Socialism. This 
took the form of suggested reforms such as unemployment insurance, the minimum wage, 
the 30 hour week, more progressive taxation such as a land tax, worker democracy, media 
regulation, and the socialisation of banks, land and key industries. Such reforms, Dewey 
believed, would help towards alleviating the stratification and lack of democracy he 
associated with American corporate capitalism.58 
Nevertheless, Dewey was also aware that much of the complexity and stratification he 
associated with American corporate capitalism and what he took as The Great Society were 
also engendered by developments of the global economy and the relations between nation 
states. The second thread concerning the international pursuit of Democracy as a Way of 
Life and the practice of creative democracy, which is even more marginalised than the first 
in accounts of Dewey's work, thus recognises The Great Society as not only an American 
phenomena but also as essentially what we today call The First Great Globalisation. As 
Dewey makes very clear in The Public and its Problems: 
'The new era of human relationships in which we live is one marked by mass 
production for remote markets, by cable and telephone, by cheap printing, by 
railway and steam navigation. Only geographically did Columbus discover the new 
world. The actual new world has been generated in the last hundred years.' (LW2: 
323) 
Not only did Dewey recognise such unprecedented economic interdependence between 
nation states as the greatest change in human history, but that such change now created 
58 
Many of Dewey's reforms have come to be enshrined in Embedded liberalism and the rise of Welfare States 
of the mid 20
th 
century. However it should be pointed out that many also did not. Contemporary Issues such as 
the balance between works and leisure, industrial democracy, education provision and the socialisation of the 
economy would benefit from a return to some of the old Professors ideas. 
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forms of associated behaviour and consequences of associated behaviour which now 
spanned across national and continental boundaries. Hence Dewey's formulation that the 
irony of the 19th and early 20th century was that the ' ... consolation of peoples in enclosed, 
nominally independent, national states has its counterpart in the fact that their acts affect 
groups and individuals in other states all over the world.' (LW2: 315 cf. LW13: 190). 
In The Public and its Problems the most striking exemplar of the global nature of The Great 
Society provided by Dewey is World War One and its aftermath (LW2: 314-317). Dewey 
begins by highlighting how the war itself was truly global with the involvement of 'every 
continent upon the globe' and not only saw colonial possessions drawn in but self governing 
nations enter voluntarily and countries with racial and cultural differences, such as Great 
Britain and Japan and Germany and Turkey, form alliances. However, the global nature of 
the conflict aside, Dewey took World War One to reveal the interdependence of countries in 
The Great Society and that the consequences of associated behaviour often did not respect 
national borders. For instance, Dewey highlights how the breakdown of world trade during 
the war saw a consequent scramble by the belligerents to secure commodities such as raw 
materials, distant economic markets and foreign capital, which had previously been in 
abundance due to the economic interdependence prior to World War One. 
At the same time, Dewey saw that the breakdown of such global economic relations created 
consequences for the everyday life of people across the globe. For example, American 
farmers, who experienced temporary prosperity through the increase in demand for 
agricultural products during the war, saw their economic outlook become bleak When the 
consequences of the establishment of peace (war debts, the centralisation of gold reserves 
in the US, depreciations of foreign currencies) meant that wartime levels of export demand 
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declined and failed to even return to pre war levels. Dewey fully acknowledged that the 
misfortune of American farmers was relatively insignificant in comparison with the other 
economic consequences of peace, such as the hyperinflation in Germany (Weimar Republic) 
and stimulation of European nationalisms, but it revealed how day to day life in one region 
of the world was now fundamentally linked to, and affected by, the behaviour of others on 
the other side ofthe world (lW2: 316). 
In essence, World War One vividly brought home for Dewey how the interdependence of 
nation states in The Great Society meant the consequences of associated behaviour now 
spanned across borders. Rather than being a matter of sheer empirical description, 
however, Dewey found that the case of the American farmer illustrated how little 'prevision 
and regulation' of such transcontinental interdependence actually existed and how people 
had as much control over such events as they were, as they had over the vicissitudes of the 
climate (lW2: 316). In 1927, then, the political conclusion he drew from the global nature 
of The Great Society and the World War it had helped to facilitate, was how the existing 
political and legal institutions and practises were incapable of dealing with the current 
situation. Contrasting his present with that of Pax Romana, Dewey contended that: 
'There was a critical epoch in the history of the world when the Roman Empire 
assembled in it itself the lands of peoples of the Mediterranean basin. The World 
War stands out as indubitable proof that what then happened for a region has now 
happened for the world, only there is now no comprehensive political organisation 
to include the various divided yet interdependent countries. Anyone who even 
partially visualises the scene has a convincing reminder of the meaning of the Great 
Society: that it exists, and that is not integrated' (lW2: 315). 
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Dewey's subsequent plea for the 'non-political forces to organise themselves to transform 
existing political structures: that the divided and troubled publics integrate,' makes it 
perfectly clear that he acknowledged that due to globalised economic relations the pursuit 
of the democratic way of life and practise of creative democracy needed to also be a 
transnational endeavour: not only within America but outside; and between nation states 
and the various publics engendered and scattered across the globe. By 1927, then, Dewey 
was all too well aware that the globalisation of the early 20th century now required reform 
of government that would allow for transnational communication and collaboration and 
global forms of democratic government. Or to put in more of a Deweyan inflection: that 
The Great Society now needed to become a Great Community which could perfect ' ... the 
means and ways of communication of meanings so that genuinely shared interests in the 
consequences of interdependent activities may inform desire and effort and thereby direct 
action' (ibid., 332 cf. 314,327). 
One can find the same sustained, if not ever growing conviction, that The Great Society Was 
engendered by modern globalisation and lacked political regulation at the international 
level when one reads elements of Dewey's work through the Great Depression and the rise 
of trade protectionism, the build up to World War 11 and in the aftermath of the defeat of 
the Axis Powers.59 These intervening years (1928-46) had made it clear for Dewey that 
without a common rule of law and a machinery of government at the international level to 
manage the international effects of The Great Society, the only way nation states knew or 
59 For example, see the essays 'International Co-operation or International Chaos' (LWll: 261-265), 'World 
Anarchy or World Order?' (LW15: 204-209), 'Contribution to Democracy in a World of Tensions' (LW16), and 
What kind of World are we Fighting For?' (LW17). The international dimensions can also be heavily found in 
major works of the period of Dewey's career such as Freedom and Culture (LW13) and the preface of 
Liberalism and Social Action (LWll), which highlights Dewey's regret that space and time constraints stopped 
him putting forward ideas of liberalism in the context of international relations. 
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sought to deal with the effects of globalisation were economic (autarky, trade 
protectionism) or military forms of warfare (LWll: 261-262). And due to the economic 
interdependence of modern globalisation and the change in modern warfare technology 
(the Atom bomb) and tactics (total war) this now meant that the daily life of every human 
being on the planet could be affected by such forms of warfare (lW15: 204-205). 
After World War Two Dewey now stated more straightforwardly that not only were such 
practices undemocratic, but that the old traditions, customs, habits of belief and institutions 
of 'old-time diplomacy, power blocs, power politics and precepts of international law' were 
as 'outworn and impotent as the old-time muzzle-loading gun' in dealing with the 
transnational reality of The Great Society. As Dewey furthered: 
' ... until old traditions and habits are transformed, they make us powerless to cope 
with the problems which are indeed related to those traditions and habits. Our 
thinking, our moral and emotional conditioning, our entire way of life - all these still 
belong to that early period in history when the peoples of the earth were truly 
isolated, having but few points of contact and communication, and these only with 
nearby neighbours. Wars were correspondingly local' (ibid.,: 204-5). 
A world with such interdependence, lacking means to deal with the effects of such 
interdependence sans forms of warfare, was essentially a form of 'anarchy'. It was now the 
'tragedy of our time' that every person on the planet belonged to a 'world unit' without 
being a member of a 'world society' which possessed a common rule of law and a 
machinery of government at the international level to manage the international effects of 
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The Great Society (ibid., 204).60 And in far more literal terms than those found in The 
Publics and its Problems, Dewey spelt out that: 
'The peoples of the Earth, not just their governmental officials, must find effective 
answers to the following questions. Is a world government possible? How shall it be 
brought into being? By unilateral and coercive action of some or one nation, or by 
general cooperative action? What shall be its machinery? What responsibilities shall 
it possess in order that a common rule of law, expressing the needs of a world 
society, may substitute a system of peace and security for the present war system? 
These questions are urgent; it is imperative to face them at once, directly and with 
utmost seriousness. They are not matters of abstract theory but of utmost concern' 
(ibid., 206). 
Although Dewey was not as forthcoming about possible reforms that would produce 
creative democracy at the international level as he was concerning democratic socialism 
within the American nation state, changes after World War Two revealed to him that only 
an attitude of sheer cynicism and defeatism would deny that is was now possible to create a 
workable form of global democracy.61 And in the second preface to The Public and its 
Problems, written a year after the end of the Second World War, Dewey cites the formation 
of the United Nations and the opening of debate about the nature of the organisation as 
evidence that there was a growing sense ' ... that relations between nations are taking on 
60 In this essay Dewey seems to confuse matters by using the term world society to stand in for Great 
Community but his conception of World Society is inherently another term for Great Community and should 
not be seen as breaking the society/community distinction outlaid in the previous chapter. 
61 This is not to say that he had nothing to say on these issues, for example, Dewey railed against imperialism 
and was in full belief that the world's natural resources should be shared out for the benefits of citizens of the 
world. 
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properties that constitute a public, and hence call for some measure of political 
organisation.' 
This was, Dewey argued, the rightful extension of the debate within nation-states as to 
what was 'public' and what was 'private' in the context of relations between national units. 
The formation of the UN thus signalled an acceptance by nation states of the political 
responsibility, as opposed to weak moral responsibility that so easily broke down in the 
1930's, that each national unit had towards one another (LW2: 375-76). And in 
organisations such as UNESCO Dewey found more evidence that armed conflict was 
potentially being usurped as the primary method to deal with the effects of globalisation. 
For instance, he believed that UNESCO offered ' ... the peoples of the world a symbol of what 
is now desirable, and of what may become an actuality' (LW16: 400-401). The challenge of 
'discovering and implementing politically areas of common interest' of an interdependent 
world was thus what Dewey took to be the new political 'imperative' of the 20th century 
(LW2: 379). 
5.3 The obstacles to Global Creative Democracy: How to create problems to your own 
solutions?! 
From reading the above it would not be erroneous to conclude that Dewey, in much the 
same vein as some of his contemporaries, was a firm proponent of some form of global 
democracy. However, the point of differentiation between Dewey and contemporary 
advocates of global democracy is that he never countenanced embracing an ontology of 
paradox which neglected the obstacles facing the project of enacting global democracy. For 
instance, writing in 1946 and in the essay where he most vigorously puts forward the need 
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for the global extension of democracy, Dewey initially counters pessimistic accounts about 
the practical feasibility of global democracy with the point that earlier generations could 
never have foreseen democracy across a land area as big as the USA. However, this 
optimism towards the project of global democracy is tempered by Dewey's belief that it was 
just ' ... as necessary to appreciate the immense difficulty of the undertaking as it is to have 
the will to take unreserved part in it' (LW15: 206). 
The 'immense difficulty' in the enacting of global democracy was the fact that The Great 
Society had ' ... invaded and partially disintegrated the small communities of former times 
without generating a Great Community' (LW2: 314). As a result, Dewey concluded that the 
' ... new age has no symbols consonant with its activities' and provided no communication of 
signs and symbols between citizens who were involved in national and transnational 
associations and consequences engendered by The Great Society. The irony of this state of 
affairs, given The Great Society's technological advancement in communication (telephone, 
wireless telegraph), was not lost on Dewey: 
'The ties which hold men together in action are numerous, tough and subtle. But 
they are invisible and intangible. We have the physical tools of communication as 
never before. The thoughts and aspirations congruous with them are not 
communicated, and hence not common .... Our Babel is not one of tongues but of the 
signs and symbols without which shared experience is impossible.'(LW2: 323). 
This is why, within The Public and its Problems, Dewey pleas for 'divided and troubled 
publics' across not just America, but the world, to integrate in order to create a Great 
Community, which could bring forth democratic governance both at the national and 
International level. And this plea is reiterated again in Dewey's work during The Great 
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Depression and in the events that lead to World War Two. Why then did Dewey argue that 
the publics of The Great Society were divided and troubled publics? What was stopping the 
emergence of a Great Community? Somewhat expediently, and all too typically in the 
abstract, Dewey ends the 1946 essay with the answer to such questions when he warns that 
whilst it was imperative to 'begin' the path towards a form of global democracy: 
'".as has been only too proved by the two devastating world wars the movement 
toward production of more comprehensive social organisation, the very movement 
that brought national states into being has been widely arrested' (LW15: 209). 
When taken with Dewey's conception of democracy in mind, it becomes clear that the 
forestalling of the emergence of a Great Community was not due to spatial-temporal limits 
to the practise of democracy, but what Dewey saw as the arresting of creative democracy 
and the democratic community at the level of the nation state. The arresting of creative 
democracy and its ability to update the practices and institutions of democracy was 
forestalling the 'production of more comprehensive social organisation' not only within the 
nation state but also outside the nation state. Of course, this answer itself begs the 
question: What did Dewey take to be the reason for the arresting of creative democracy 
within the nation state? And how did this arresting of creative democracy within the nation 
state impact on the cause of global democracy? 
a. The Eclipse of the Public 
The answers Dewey provides to the questions above, found in his work from the The Public 
and its Problems onwards, see him initially outdo Democratic Realism at its own game. In 
superficial agreement with Democratic Realism, Dewey argued that it was the complexity of 
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The Great Society, which had led to the 'eclipse' of publics and a sense of community 
within nation states and the subsequent arresting of creative democracy. This had 
transpired because The Great Society's multiplication, intensification, complication and 
trans-nationalisation of associative behaviour now outstripped the comprehension and 
knowledge of average citizens (LW2: 314-317). The age when citizens could entrain a few 
general political principles, such as embracing states' rights vis-a-vis centralised federal 
government or free trade vis-a-vis protectionism, and apply them with confidence through 
supporting one political party over another, was now essentially over. Citing the example of 
the problem of industrial tariffs Dewey furthered: 
'For the average voter today the tariff question is a complicated medley of indefinite 
detail, schedules of rates specific and ad valorem on countless things, many of which 
he does not recognise by name, and with respect to which he can form no judgment. 
Probably not one voter in a thousand reads the scores of pages in which rates of toll 
are enumerated and he would not be much wiser if he did. The average man gives it 
up as a bad job.' (LW2: 317) 
Due to the fact that modern industry was 'too complex and intricate,' citizens were 
essentially 'bewildered' by the machinations of The Great Society. Unable to correctly locate 
where the indirect consequences that were affecting their daily lives came from, citizens 
could now not generate publics which could foster the reform of social institutions of the 
state to control and regulate such consequences: 
'An inchoate public is capable of organisation only when indirect consequences are 
felt rather than perceived; and when it is possible to project agencies which order 
their occurrence. At present many consequences are felt rather than perceived; they 
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are suffered, but they cannot be said to be known, for they are not, by those who 
experience them, referred to their origins. It goes, then, without saying that agencies 
are not established which canalize the streams of social action. Hence the publics are 
amorphous and unarticulated' (LW2: 316-317). 
At first glance one may find Dewey's account of what he took to be the eclipse of publics as 
not too dissimilar to the view of Democratic Realism. In fact Dewey appears to hold the 
same conviction as Waiter Lippmann when highlighting how the voting public struggled to 
intellectually cope with the complex manoeuvrings of The Great Society. However, whilst 
both Dewey and Democratic Realism locate the 'intelligence' of the masses as a key reason 
for the stuttering of democracy, they radically differ on what they believe were the reasons 
for such a state of affairs. Democratic Realism took it to be the case that the masses' were a 
priori incapable of ever grasping the contours of The Great Society because it was too 
complex and demanded expert rule. Dewey, on the other hand, saw the lost nature of the 
public and the collapse of democracy to be down to wholly contingent reasons that limited 
the intelligence of the masses. 
Primarily, Dewey identified the limiting of the public's intelligence and subsequent eclipse 
as being a result of the fact that modern liberal democracies within The Great Society had 
only achieved 'Bourgeois democracy' rather than actual creative democracy. The historic 
emergence of liberal democratic governments in the 19th century 'had been an 
accompaniment of the transfer of power from agrarian interests to industrial and 
commercial interests.' Whilst there had been a change in the social order, the rise of 
democratic government through handing industrial and commercial interests; the ability to 
' ... command the conditions under which the mass of people have access to the means of 
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production and to the products of their activity ... ' continued to give 'power to the few over 
the many.' The reality was that in liberal Bourgeois Democracies, power lay in the hands of 
'finance capitalism', no matter the claims of so called governments of, by and for all the 
people. And whilst Dewey freely admitted that it would be 'silly' to deny that there had 
been great gain for the masses within liberal democracies, such as qualified suffrage, 
freedom of speech, press and assembly, he also viewed it as intellectual hypocrisy to 'glorify 
these gains and give no attention to the brutalities and inequities, the regimentation and 
suppression' which plagued the system of economic liberalism (LWll: 296-97). 
This was no understatement. Although 1920's US society was one of apparent prosperity, it 
was still marked by severe economic inequality, unprogressive income tax, precarious 
employment, lack of industrial democracy and a relatively nonexistent welfare state to 
mitigate such circumstances. By the time of The Great Depression, when such material 
inequality and the lack of means to deal with such conditions became even more acute 
, 
Dewey lamented that there were now 'millions of people who have the minimum of control 
over the conditions of their own subsistence' {LW13: 300).62 Yet, as Dewey points out, 'no 
economic state of affairs is merely economic' (LWll: 295). The most unjust and immoral 
62 As leuchtenburg (1993: 200-202) highlights the prosperity of the 1920's made it seem to some that the US 
was achieving the goals of socialism without socialism's means. In this sense, The Great Society did have some 
significant good effects on the lives of ordinary American Citizens. The US in 1928 spent on education as mUch 
as the rest of the world; radically improved school and college attendance; cut infant mortality rates by two 
thirds; and increased life expectancy for Americans from 49 to 59 years. However, as leuchtenburg goes on to 
show, these statistics do not touch on the aforementioned racial segregation at the heart of the US life or the 
fact that material inequality actually increased by the end of 1920's before the onset of The Great DepreSSion. 
As livingston (2011: 54) points out, the 1920's saw income shares shift from wages to profits. By 1929, then, 
90 percent of tax payers had less disposable income than in 1922, whilst corporate profits rose 63 percent 
dividends doubled and the top 1 percent of taxpayers increased their disposable income by 63 percent. In t h ~ ~
same period there had also been a net loss of 1 million manufacturing jobs due to the increased efficiency of 
technology, which resulted in around a 20 percent fall in the share of wages in the expenditure of industrial 
corporations. These numbers seem to bring home Dewey's point that whilst there had been gains for wider 
society; these changes had been tempered by even wider gains for certain parts of society at the expense of 
others. 
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aspect of such an unequal economic state of affairs was the role they played in the eclipse 
of the public and the stunting of creative democracy. As Dewey outlined: 
'The same forces which have brought about the forms of democratic government, 
general suffrage, executives and legislators chosen by majority vote, have also 
brought about conditions which halt the social and humane ideals that demand the 
utilization of government as the genuine instrumentality of an inclusive and 
fraternally associated public' (LW2: 303). 
The halting of the social and humane ideals Dewey associated with creative democracy 
were inherently down to Bourgeois democracy being founded on the idea that laissez-faire 
capitalism was the true expression of human liberty. This had arisen, Dewey stressed, 
because in the fight against arbitrary government action and religious freedom, mid 19th 
century philosophical branches of Liberalism, from Adam Smith to the Mills', had identified 
the 'immutable truth' that human liberty was to be found in the practises of laissez-faire 
capitalism. In this sense, human nature and natural law could be said to be fulfilled when 
liberty was perceived as the equal right of every individual to conduct free economic 
enterprise free from government constraint, so long as they broke no law on the statute 
books. 
This in turn would be socially beneficial because such the activities of self interested 
individuals would automatically create competition that would provide socially needed 
commodities and services. Any government intervention that interferes with this form of 
liberty was to be taken as an attack on liberty itself. Ultimately, this conception of liberty, 
which was presented by 19th century Liberals as an 'immutable truth' across time and space, 
was used by the commercial and industrial classes to firstly usurp the vested interests of 
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mercantilism and then serve as the hegemonic justification for Bourgeois democracy (LW11: 
26-27,287-86 cf. LW2: 291-93).63 
Dewey found that the hegemonic perpetuation of the ideal that laissez-faire capitalism 
equalled the 'philosophy of liberty' had had a profound impact upon the intelligence of the 
masses and the subsequent eclipse of the public. By the 1930's it was apparent that laissez-
faire capitalism and its conception of liberty had delivered extreme stratification rather than 
the liberty of all. However, defenders of the status quo, such as commercial and industrial 
interests who benefited from such conditions and philosophies such as Social Darwinism 
, 
pointed towards how supposed natural inequalities of individuals in moral and intellectual 
make-up not only explained economic inequality but how such consequences were the 
effects of the natural law of economic enterprise. Against the failure of those who were 
naturally deficient in being innovative, independent and economically proactive stood the 
success of those 'rugged individuals' who managed to practise liberty and gain wealth and 
property. 
As a result, defenders of the status quo again retorted that any government intervention 
interfered with this form of liberty and was therefore to be taken as an attack on liberty 
itself. Such arguments were indicative to Dewey of how, within the confines of Bourgeois 
democracy, the very concept of intelligence itself had fallen under the strictures of laissez-
faire. However, as he reminded his readers, this simply reflected the failure of modern 
proponents of liberalism and the industrial and commercial interests to recognise or admit 
63 Of course the ideal that laissez-faire capitalism equalled the 'philosophy of liberty', argued Dewey, was itself 
incorrect. Such a philosophy failed to acknowledge how 'effective liberty' was a historically relative concept 
based on the social conditions of the cultural matrix at a given moment in time. 
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how individuals were formed by interaction of the human organism with its environment 
and how the current economic regime affected such interaction (lWll: 29-32, 47-48, 286). 
In this sense, 'effective intelligence' was not an 'original, innate endowment' but rather the 
process of 'embodied intelligence' deposited by social habits and customs (lW2: 366). And 
railing against both apologists of laissez-faire capitalism and Democratic Realism, Dewey 
highlighted how economic relationships and hegemonic ideals of Bourgeois democracy 
worked in tandem to limit the access of the masses to information and educative practises 
that could bolster their intelligence. The majority engaged in the production and 
distribution of economic commodities, argued Dewey, had no share in the ' ... imaginative, 
intellectual -emotional - in directing activities in which they physically participate' (lW5: 
104). The strictures of industrial and economic relations within The Great Society, such as 
the mass production techniques of Fordism, meant that that mass of individuals tended to 
'become cogs in the vast machine whose workings they do not understand, and in whose 
management they have no part or lot in' (LWll: 252). 
This lack of emphasis on developing the mind of the masses could also be found in wider 
public education polices of liberal democracies, which through lack of, or unworthy 
standards of, provision systematically failed to provide the masses with the knowledge they 
needed in order to make correct judgements about the nature of The Great Society they 
inhabited. The public school system merely reproduced the hegemony of Laissez-faire 
capitalism and its conception of liberty. For example, by 1935 between 12 million Americans 
had reached the employment age since 1929 and at least half had not found steady 
employment due to The Great Depression. What Dewey found equally as appalling as this 
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situation was how the public education had so ill equipped the youth to comprehend The 
Great Society and perpetuated the so called merits of laissez-faire capitalism: 
'It is terrible enough that so many youths should have no opportunity to obtain 
employment under the conditions set by the present economic system. It is equally 
terrible that so many young people should be refused opportunity in what we call a 
public education system, to find out about the cause of the tragic situation, and, in 
large measure, should be indoctrinated in ideas to which the realities about them 
given them the lie. Confusion and bewilderment are sufficiently rife so that is not 
necessary to add to them a deliberately cultivated blindness' (lWll: 354). 
Added to the intellectual hegemony of stratification, Dewey also believed that technological 
innovation and subsequent integration into consumer capitalism also affected the ability of 
the public to comprehend their present circumstances. This largely concerned the nature of 
the new media technologies and their integration into mass production and mass 
consumption. Man after all, Dewey contended, was a 'consuming and sportive animal as 
well as a political one' and the power of 'bread and circus' to distract citizens from political 
concerns was nothing new. But he took the sheer number and variety of modern cheap 
consumer products, such as the 'movie, radio, cheap reading matter and motor car', as a 
wholly unprecedented scenario of political distraction. 
'In most circles it is hard work to sustain conversation on a political theme; and once 
initiated, it is quickly dismissed with a yawn. let there be introduced the topic of the 
mechanism and accomplishment of various makes of motor cars or the respective 
merits of actresses, and the dialogue goes on at a lively pace. The thing to be 
remembered is that cheapened and multiplied access to amusement is the product 
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of the machine age, intensified by the business tradition which causes provision of 
means for an enjoyable passing of time to be one of the most profitable of 
occupations' (LW2: 321-322). 
Although Dewey did not hold that such modern media technologies and products had been 
purposefully created as a Culture Industry, the fact that they did not originate in deliberate 
desire to divert political interest did not lessen their effectiveness in that direction (LW2: 
321). The use of modern technology and modern mass production techniques to create 
mass consumer products thus lead to forms of mass consumption that often crowded out 
political concerns of citizenship. 
Nevertheless, when Dewey examined how such new media technologies, such as the 
'telegraph, telephone, radio, cheap and quick mails,' impacted upon the dissemination of 
information as 'News' to the public, he saw even more cause for concern. News, as Dewey 
stated: 
' ... signifies something which has just happened, and which is new just because it 
deviates from the old and regular. But its meaning depends upon relation to what it 
imports, to what its social consequences are. This import cannot be determined 
unless the new is placed in relation to the old, to what has happened and been 
integrated into the course of events. Without coordination and consecutiveness, 
events are not events, but mere occurrences, intrusions; an event implies that out of 
which a happening proceeds' (LW2: 347). 
The problem Dewey found with this present news coverage was that it centred on triviality 
and sensationalism. Driven by the 'catastrophic, namely crime, accident, family rows, 
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personal clashes and conflicts,' such news coverage did not supply continuity of coverage to 
its audiences but rather supplied whatever would be taken as the I new par excellence'. As a 
result, Dewey quipped that the contents of news coverage became so interchangeable, that 
only the 'date of the newspaper' could inform us whether such events happened 'Iast year 
or this, so completely are they isolated from their connections' (ibid.,). 
The explanation of this state of affairs, argued Dewey, was once more in the mixing of 
business practises and interests with modern media technology. Bourgeois democracy's 
'quasi-democratic' habits of free speech, free press and free assembly created fertile ground 
for different sources of news production and public discussion. However, such freedoms 
were structurally prone to being undermined by the fact that the centralisation and 
concentration of the means of production and distribution also had concomitant effects 
upon the organisation ofthe public press. As Dewey noted, the smoothest road to control of 
political matters was through the construction of public opinion and it was no coincidence 
that the gathering and sale of news had become part of the existing system of 'pecuniary 
profit' (LW2: 348-49). 
This not only resulted in the influence of 'private interests in procuring suppression, secrecy 
and misrepresentation,' but also the importing of the hegemony of consumer capitalism 
into news production and dissemination. This was what Dewey took as the explanation for 
the sensationalist and triviality of what passed for news. Thus, either through the 
perpetuation of a certain style of consumer capitalism in news production and 
dissemination, or through direct ownership and influence, Dewey believed that large 
corporate capitalism naturally influenced the publishing business (LW13: 168). 
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Contra the arguments of Democratic Realism and defenders of the laissez-faire capitalism, 
then, Dewey argued that the eclipse of the public was not down to its innate intellectual 
deficiency but largely down to the artificial intellectual inequality engendered by Bourgeois 
democracy and elements of its consumer culture: 
'The indictments that are drawn against intelligence of individuals are in truth 
indictments of a social order that does not permit the average individual to have 
access to the rich store of the accumulated wealth of mankind in knowledge, ideas, 
and purposes. There does not now exist the kind of social organisation that even 
permits the average human being to share the potentially available social 
intelligence. Still less is there a social order that has for one of its chief purposes the 
establishment of conditions that will move the mass of individuals to appropriate 
and use what is at hand. Back of the appropriation by the few of the material 
resources of society lies the appropriation by the few in behalf of their own ends of 
the cultural, the spiritual; resources that are the product not of individuals who have 
taken possession but of the cooperative works of humanity' (lWll: 38-39). 
It was therefore useless, Dewey lamented, to ruminate about the apparent failure of 
democracy until the sources of its failure had been grasped and steps were taken, namely 
using government action to address such economic and intellectual inequality, to bring 
about that type of social organisation that would deliver the masses with the correct 
knowledge to comprehend The Great Society and practise creative democracy. For without 
such change we simply 'have no way of telling how the apt for judgment of social polices the 
existing intelligence of the masses may be' (lW2: 366) 
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b. The National and Global Eclipse of Creative Democracy 
The effects of the eclipse of the public meant that creative democracy at the level of the 
nation state had essentially itself become eclipsed. Not only did ordinary citizens have no 
real democratic control over The Great Society at the national level, but publics were not 
able to emerge and articulate demands that could generate the reform of social institutions 
in the first place. Principally, Dewey realised that the eclipse of the public allowed the 
regime of 'Bourgeois democracy' to continue to underpin the institutions and practises of 
political democracy at the nation state level. Due to the fact that democratic government 
had arisen with such a conception of liberty, capitalism and the practise of democracy were 
now seen as 'Siamese' twins, where to attack one was to threaten the life of the other 
(lW13: 137). Indeed, Dewey took the example of the application of laissez-faire to 
individual intelligence to be indicative of how liberalism's tenets had become part of wider 
political malaise within political democracy, which now acted as 'an instrument of vested 
interests' of capital to oppose further social change' (lWll: 35). 
This in turn had a pincer effect on the nature of political democracy under Bourgeois 
democracy and its perpetuation of the eclipse of the public. On one hand, Dewey argued 
that in the 1920's and 30's political parties ruled but they did not govern, acting as quasi 
'servants of the same dominant railway, banking, and corporate industrial forces' (lW6: 186 
cf. lW5: 442). This was not just through blatant or corrupt control of government, but 
rather because the hegemonic identification of capitalism and democracy and the ability of 
business to actually organise itself as a public meant that it was able to reform the state and 
government in much the same way as 'dynastic interests' controlled government two 
centuries prior (lW2: 302). Therefore in the inevitable clash between private property 
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interests and the interest of the masses, all the 'habits of thought and action' impelled the 
institutions of political democracy to side with the former over the latter (LW6: 159). 
On the other hand, the fact that political parties acted in the interests of capital rather than 
people had significant impact on the actual eclipse of public. Government intervention on 
the effects of such an economically and intellectually stratified society was always palliative 
and dealt with symptoms rather than what Dewey took as the causes of such a state of 
affairs. This in turn locked the masses into the perpetual supporting of one impotent 
political party over the other, breeding a swing style democracy where the 'tidal wave' 
swamps one party and the 'landslide' carries the other into office. In such a form of politics, 
instead of real policy difference, it was rather 'habit, party funds, the skill of mangers of the 
machine, the portrait of the candidate with his firm jaw, his lovely wife and children, and a 
multitude of other irrelevancies' which determined the outcome of political democracy 
(LW2: 311). 
The impotency of existing political forms to direct and manage the social effects of The 
Great Society was also now generating 'distrust in political democracy and all forms of 
popular government' (LW13: 105-106). This was because political democracy, with its 
established institutions and practises under hegemonic control of laissez-faire capitalism, 
had seen its 'symbols lose connection with the realities behind them' (LW11: 51). The 
majority of the voting public, convinced that there was 'no important difference between 
the two old parties' and that to vote for one over the other was to signify very 'little', thus 
lost faith with democracy (LW6: 185). Not only did this further add to the political apathy 
engendered in the majority under the auspices of Bourgeois democracy and its consumer 
culture, but with such public apathy, political democracy itself became stratified and turned 
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into just another 'business' run by the 'bosses' and 'mangers' of the 'political 'machine'. 
Political Democracy was thus left to the machinations of professional politicians and elites, 
who rather attempting to serve the public, looked to keep or obtain power for the sake of 
keeping or obtaining power within the confines of Bourgeois democracy (lW2: 321, LW7: 
353-354). 
The ultimate political effect of the eclipse of the public within the nation state was 
destruction of the Deweyan sense of community and disharmony within the nation state. 
This point is pivotal; whilst Dewey believed citizens were unable to correctly locate where 
the indirect consequences that were affecting their daily lives came from and hence could 
not generate publics which could foster the reform of social institutions of the state to 
control and regulate consequences of The Great Society, he did not believe that citizens 
could no longer generate publics. As he pointed out: 
'It is not that there is no public, no large body of persons having a common interest 
in composition in the consequences of social transactions. There is too much public 
, 
a public too diffused and scattered and too intricate in composition. And there are 
too many publics, for conjoint actions which have indirect, serious, and enduring 
consequences are multitudinous beyond comparison, and each one of them crosses 
the others and generates its own group of persons especially affected with little to 
hold these different publics together in an integrated whole' (LW2: 320). 
The irony of The Great Society was that the more it made citizens more interdependent 
through its division of labour and production, the more it seemed to create divisions of 
interest between various groups across society. In fact, due to the inequality and 
stratification of Bourgeois democracy, Dewey saw that groups and their publics referred 
163 
back to the old form of being antagonistic towards one another, rather than democratically 
addressing the cause of their dissatisfactions. 
As Dewey noted in 1939, the emergence 'in political life of populists movements, square 
deals, new deals, accompanies depressions on the party of those most directly affected -
farmers, factory labourers etc, 'was indicative of how such groups were kept from 'uniting 
politically by divergence of immediate interests' (lW13: 106). Under Bourgeois democracy, 
then, the educative rhythm of creative democracy, which looks to ensure a perpetual 
equality of communication and cooperative problem solving as social conditions and 
conceptions of moral value shift throughout history, was essentially non-existent. 
Stuck with old and out-dated social institutions, a form of democracy that was actually not 
democratic, and an eclipse of the public and community which could bring reform to such 
social institutions, creative democracy was thus stunted at the nation state level. The state 
of political democracy in America pre World War Two was a prime example of this process 
and it had ultimately been left without the reform of social institutions, such as wider and 
reformed education, workplace democracy and comprehensive unemployment insurance 
which it needed to deal with the consequences of The Great Society. As Dewey noted, 
whilst Americans had inherited the local town meeting practises of democracy of their 
agrarian forefathers, these practises were now insufficient to enact reforms suitable for 
'national affairs- now also affected by world conditions' (lW13: 95 cf. lW2: 306). 
Even at the Federal level, the success of industrial forces in controlling political parties had 
locked in what Dewey viewed as a flawed system of two party adversarial politics. The idea 
that the conflict between political parties would bring out 'public truths', stressed Dewey, 
was a kind of 'political watered down version of the Hegelian dialectic, with its synthesis 
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arrived at by a union of antithetical conceptions' (LWll: 51). And whether it was the 
'rugged individualism' of the Hoover regime, or the 'piecemeal polices undertaken ad hoc' 
of FDR's New Deal, which whilst seeming radical did not really reform the 'institutional 
scheme of things', political democracy merely 'drifted' along, largely consolidating the 
economic and intellectual stratification of Bourgeois democracy (LWll: 45, 61-62 cf. LW13: 
315). The result, as Dewey observed, was that The Great Society and its new age of human 
relationships had 'no political agencies worthy of it' (lW2: 303). 
It has become the norm to read Dewey's account of the eclipse of the public and the 
stunting of creative democracy as simply being concerned with the American nation state. 
However, there is no doubt that Dewey's claim that The Great Society had no political 
agencies worthy of it, extended to matters of global democracy. As outlined above, the 
underlying theme of The Public and its Problems and his writings thereafter, is of the need 
for The Great Society to become a Great Community. And Dewey knew that The Great 
Society did not just stretch across North America but rather traversed the world's 
continents. That such an international Great Community and global democracy was not 
presently forthcoming due to the eclipse of the public was paramount in Dewey's mind. 
Writing in 1939, Dewey reflected on how since World War One the 'world communities' had 
failed to 'meet and forestall' needed change and left 'us with old problems unsolved and 
new ones added' (lW13: 316). 
Dewey held that the failure to initiate such change was undoubtedly down to the fact that 
Bourgeois democracy and the breakdown of creative democracy within the nation state 
made such change improbable. This was down to two interrelated reasons. The first reason 
was that the hegemony of Bourgeois democracy always meant that political leaders would 
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attempt palliative measures that maintained the hegemony of capitalism and its conception 
of liberty. We have seen how this strangled the reform Dewey thought needed at the level 
of nation state. However, Bourgeois democracy's control of The Great Society was not only 
based on domestically stratified societies in the West, but functioned through a global 
economy based on the captive export and raw material markets of non-Western countries 
(lWll: 55). As a basic provision of global democracy the wretched of the earth would have 
been set free from the shackles of imperialism and have been given the right to have a 
democratic right in the first place. By any stretch of the imagination, global democracy in 
the Deweyan sense would hardly have been palliative or predisposed to being friendly to 
the interests of capital. 
The second reason was that the eclipse of the public meant citizens were in no position to 
demand their leaders enact such changes. In fact the consequences of The Great SOciety 
and the eclipse of the public and community at the nation state undoubtedly had 
detrimental effects on how nation states viewed and conducted international relations 
towards one another. As Dewey noted in The Public and its Problems, throughout history 
man has had problems getting on with his fellows, even in his neighbourhood. With The 
Great Society's engendering of the transnational forms of relationships and 
interdependence, Dewey noted that man was not now 'more successful' with getting on 
with his fellows 'when they act at a great distance in ways invisible to him' (lW2: 317). The 
subsequent problem of there being too many publics who were 'diffused and scattered and 
too intricate in composition,' who were subsequently antagonistic towards one another was 
therefore not confined to groups within the nation states, but also extended to publics 
between nation states themselves. 
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As the 1930's had shown, antagonism towards citizens of other nation states, either through 
outright Fascism or ideals of isolationism, could be seen to be one of the last points of unity 
that the divided and troubled publics of nations states had left. It was therefore no surprise 
to Dewey that the failure of the world communities to meet and forestall the failings of 
Bourgeois democracy and regulate the transnational consequences generated by The Great 
Society through creative democracy at home and aboard had seen the growth of 
'exacerbated N a t i o ~ a l i s m ' ' and left democracy as an ideal and form of government under 
attack from both the 'right and left' (lW13: 106, 316). As Dewey noted: 
'The career of individuals, their lives and security as well as prosperity is now 
affected by events on the other side of the world. The forces back of these events he 
cannot touch or influence - save perhaps by joining in a war of nations against 
nations. For we seem to live in a world in which nations try to deal with the 
problems created by the new situation by drawing more and more into themselves 
, 
by more and more extreme assertions of independent nationalist sovereignty, while 
everything they do in the direction of autarky leads to ever closer mixture with other 
nations - but in war' (lW13: 180) 
The rise of Fascism and hyper-Nationalism was the exemplar of this process and Was 
essentially down to the result of the inequality and stratification of Bourgeois democracy 
and its inability to provide citizens with intellectual and political means of respectively 
perceiving and controlling the consequences generated by The Great Society. Dewey saw 
the success of Fascist movements as being down to their ability to fill the political void 
citizens experienced in Bourgeois democracy by momentarily appearing to offer an 
explanation and political solution to the drastic changes engendered by living in such an 
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interdependent world. Of course such explanations and political solutions were a mirage 
that led to totalitarianism. Rather than creating a community in Dewey's sense, such 
movements attempted to restore a simulacrum of forms of community, such as 
volksgemeinschaft, that were hostile not only to Bourgeois democracy, but also the ideals of 
Creative Democracy and the Great Community (LW13: 176,315-316).64 
This was the scenario Dewey feared most when considering the future of global democracy: 
the eclipse of the public in nation states and the consequences engendered by The Great 
Society leading citizens to turn away from forming a Great Community and turning upon 
one another. This view is summed up when, in the midst of The Great Depression, trade 
protectionism and the increasing sense of another world war, Dewey castigates the hostility 
of not only Fascism, but also the citizens contained within Bourgeois democracies towards 
the ideals of global democracy and a Great Community: 
'We cannot blame our Government or any other government for not instituting new 
polices as long as the peoples themselves are engaged in the futile task of identifying 
patriotism with isolation, and trying to gain independence without regard to 
independence that now exists. It is up to us, the people, to develop a genuine 
cooperative spirit and sense of mutual interests that bind the nations of the world 
together for weal or woe - and at the present time largely for woe. The principle of 
good neighbourliness is as fundamental in international matters as in the village or 
the city ... We shall refuse to live up to it at our peril, the peril of depression, 
64 
Dewey Opposed Fascism and Communism because they essentially did what Corporate America did, but 
substituted big business for a bureaucratic state. As Westbrook (1991: 452) outlines, both Communism and 
Fascism were to Dewey uses of violent state power to enforce a form of autocratic corporatism which stifled 
democracy. 
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unemployment, degraded standard of living, and of war that will kill millions more 
and destroy billions more of property' (LWll: 263-264). 
It was thus Bourgeois democracy and The Great Society's engendering of 'divided and 
troubled publics' within and between nation states and the breakdown of creative 
democracy at the nation state level, that Dewey saw as the 'immense difficulty' facing global 
democracy. Until The Great Society was converted into a Great Community, the Public 
would perpetually remain in eclipse (LW2: 324). As without publics who could comprehend 
the complexity and trans-national nature of The Great Society, communicate transitionally 
and challenge the hegemony of Bourgeois democracy, there was no chance of real political 
innovation both within and outside the nation state. Post Second World War, this 
undoubtedly was the key challenge Dewey identified as facing the new political 'imperative' 
of global democracy after the world war and its own quest of 'discovering and implementing 
politically, areas of common interest' between the peoples of the world. For the failure of 
projects like the UN and other innovations at the transnational level to offer the peoples of 
the world a symbol of what may become an actuality would be the perpetuation of 
Bourgeois democracy and the isolationism, nationalism and outright hostility to others of 
the pre war era. And with such failure came not only the potential of the utter destruction 
of all the material gains of The Great Society, but also catastrophic loss of human life. 
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Chapter 6- Deweyan Lessons for the 21st Century 
After journeying through the work of John Dewey and his views on The Great Society and 
the formation of a Great Community, it seems that we potentially come to an impasse. How 
are we to use his work for our own purposes? How does Dewey's work help us contemplate 
our own present form of globalisation? And how does Dewey's work inform an analysis of 
global democracy in the 21st century? The use of historical analogy is always a curious 
endeavour, as no matter how similar such history is to the present day the reality is that 
history, by its very definition, can never be a true reflection of our own present.. However, 
maybe the focus on reflection and symmetry is itself a false endeavour and the use of 
history is best seen as providing extra colour to the spectrum through which we view the 
present. Perhaps, then, just like the death of a dying star light years away, the actual 
unfolding of events and the lessons to be learnt from the past can only be truly seen long 
after those events have actually taken place. 
Drawing from such an approach to historical analogy, I outline 4 Deweyan lessons for the 
21
st 
century and our own hopes for global democracy. Moreover, these lessons highlight 
that what we often take to be the problems of 'globalisation', the collapse of 'modern 
sovereignty' and 'global democracy' are simply new ways of expressing old concerns and 
debates. And that maybe those of us in the present would be better served by returning to 
Dewey's ruminations about these old concerns for new in sights into our own present day 
problems. 
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6.1 A Great Society does not equal a Great Community or Why Globalisation does 
not equal Global Democracy! 
One of the most galling aspects Dewey would have encountered reading modern global 
democratic theory is how such theorists such as Held, Dryzek and Bohman often conflate 
the division between society and community and neglect the implications of such a division: 
'Associated or joint activity is a condition of the creation of a community. But 
association itself is physical and organic, while communal life is moral, that is 
emotionally, intellectually, conSciously sustained. Human beings combine in 
behaviour as directly and unconsciously as do atoms, stellar masses and cells ... They 
do so in virtue of their own structure, as man and woman unite, as the baby seeks 
the breast and the breast is there to supply its need. They do so from external 
circumstances, pressure from without, as atoms combine or separate in presence of 
an electric charge or as sheep huddle together from the cold. Associated activity 
needs no explanation; things are made that way. But no amount of aggregated 
collective action of itself constitutes a community ... Even if "society" were as much 
an organism as some writers have held, it would not on that account be society. 
Interactions, transactions, occur de facto and the results of interdependence follow. 
But participation in activities and sharing in results are additive concerns. They 
demand communication as prerequisite (LW2: 330). 
Moreover, Dewey was adamant that a democratic community was enacted through the 
conscious creation of signs and symbols, habits of thought, language and action, which ' ... 
add the function of communication in which emotions and ideas are shared as well as jOint 
undertakings engaged in' (LW13: 176): In this sense, Dewey bequeaths us the lesson that 
171 
democratic communication and the subsequent practise of creative democracy are not 
things that merely arise from an interdependent society but rather need to be established 
on the back of the interdependence which arises from societal associations as necessary, 
but not sufficient, conditions. 
This distinction between society and community held, for Dewey, not just across local and 
national societies but also the international associative relationships created by the advent 
of The Great Society. Although the associative relationships and technological 
advancements, engendered by The Great Society, created large scale global 
interdependence and industrial co-operation, Dewey did not believe that such conditions 
alone were sufficient to create a Great Community. In fact, Oewey believed technological 
advancements and the accompanying new habits and social customs, engendered by The 
Great Society's associative relationships, to actually be counterintuitive to community. For 
instance, we have already seen that Oewey thought that the mass communication 
revolution (Wireless telegraphs, telephones, radio) did not by default create a greater sense 
of community, or rather the type of communication that generated community, both within 
and beyond the nation state. And in this sense, Oewey's belief that the advent of mass 
communication technology actually helped to create habits, which contributed to the 
breakdown of the public sphere, places him as a precursor to later media critics ranging 
from Adorno and Horkhemier to the enfant terrible that was Jean Baudrillard.65 
65 Even if he was not totally sold on conspiracy narrative of his successors, Dewey recognised what Tim Wu 
(2011: 6) has recently highlighted, which is that the modern mass communication technologies of the 20th and 
early 21
st 
century have often been brought within the structures of industrial capitalism and become a 'highly 
centralised and integrated new industry' in their own right. 
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Even more tellingly, Dewey introduces the idea that other than mass consumption, the very 
habits and customs of industrial society and its democracy may currently be counter to the 
pursuit of community. This was illustrated by Dewey in his response to the subsuming of the 
concept of intelligence under the strictures of laissez-faire capitalism. The concept of 
'effective intelligence' created by 'embodied intelligence' (habits/customs) was not simply 
about the dispelling of a static or innate conception of intelligence, but also showed how 
technological advancements and new habits of the industrial order also lead to an eclipse of 
the public. This can be narrated as an argument that modern capitalism simply destroys the 
ability of the masses to comprehend The Great Society by turning them into the 
aforementioned 'cogs' in the vast machine whose workings they do not understand, and in 
whose management they have no part or lot in. We have also seen how Dewey lambasted 
the social order for failing to provide an adequate level of suitable education, which Would 
allow the public to get a greater understanding of their present. 
The under-education and intellectual alienation of the masses was of course a problem' 
, 
however, it was not the end of the story. Dewey's use of the term 'cogs' needs to be 
clarified because it does not simply translate into a belief that the masses had regressed and 
become less advanced primates in The Great Society. Reflecting on the new habits of 
knowledge and industry in 1927, for example, Dewey highlighted how present day citizens 
could, due to education and a relative popularising of science, talk about and understand 
science in ways far more complex than their ancestors: 
'CapaCities are limited by the objects and tools at hand. They are still more 
dependent on habits of attention and interest which are set by tradition and 
institutional customs. Meanings run in the channels formed by instrumentalities of 
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which, in the end, language the vehicle of thought as well of communication is the 
most important. A mechanic can discourse ohms and amperes as Sir Isaac Newton 
could not in his day. Many a man who has tinkered with radios can judge of things 
which Faraday did not dream of. It is aside from the point to say that if Newton and 
Faraday were now here, the amateur and mechanic would be infants beside them. 
The retort only brings out the point: the difference made by different objects to 
think of and by different meanings in circulation. A more intelligent state of affairs, 
one more informed with knowledge, more directed by intelligence, would not 
improve original endowments.' (LW2:366) 
Contra Democratic Realism, Dewey held that citizens could, through improving education 
and media practises and forging a greater involvement in industry and politics, develop 
habits that would allow them to act more intelligently without necessarily making them 
'omnicompetent' or improving their native levels of intelligence. The proof itself was 
already apparent in the skill and knowledge of the amateur and mechanic compared to that 
of Newton and Faraday. The under utilisation of the intellectual potential of masses in 
judging public matters thus functioned on the lack of habits rather than inability of the 
masses to ever master such habits. And this points towards Dewey's hopes that the spread 
of such new habits would aid not only a citizen's appreciation of their present 
circumstances, but facilitate creative democracy. 
This reflection on the nature of the industrial and complex habits of The Great Society also 
brings home the fact that just because citizens are conducting complex tasks and 
interdependent relations with one another, it does not follow that such habits will produce 
the understanding of community. Moreover, Oewey's reflections on the division between 
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society and community recognise over 70 years earlier what critiques of global democracy 
such as Kymlicka notes, which is that a community is not defined by 'the forces people are 
subject to, but rather how they respond to such forces ... '(1999:437}. 
Contra writers associated with global democracy, whilst we may live daily in a globaJised 
world, it does not automatically mean that our political ideals and identities have also 
become globalised. From a Deweyan perspective, this translates into healthy and historically 
based scepticism of narratives where our current period of globalisation and advancement 
in modern communication technology or industrial cooperation of individuals across the 
globe, are said to presuppose the emergence of 'communities of fate', 'transnational public 
spheres' or any other movement towards global democracy. Moreover, Dewey provides a 
historical lesson that such globalised conditions may not necessarily lend themselves to the 
actual emergence of what he took to be community both on a national and global level. 
Ultimately, it is the signs and symbols of a possible global democracy within our present 
that we must consult and analyse. What are the signs and symbols of the 21st century that 
facilitate both national and transnational communication? Do they even exist and are they 
effective in creating a Great Community in the 21st century? And are these two types of 
community actually contradictory or antagonistic towards one another? For example, are 
the actions and praxis of Global Civil Society strong enough to provide such transnational 
communication? Or are they, as the evidence of global democracy's own evidence suggest, 
too weak at the moment to create a Great Community? Rather than simply inferring that a 
globalised society will become a globalised community the Deweyan lesson is that all 
communities are made and not simply produced by associated behaviour and technological 
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innovation. And that we must turn our attention to how hopes of a Great Community are 
actually being constructed in the 21st century. 
6.2 A Great Community would likely be a community of national communities 
The discussion of forming a Great Community brings us to the question of the best means of 
bringing about such a Great Community and the forms of government that would serve it. 
As we encountered in chapters 3 and 4, in global democratic theory the nation state has a 
paradoxical role of being fundamentally weakened by globalisation and also being necessary 
to the facilitation of global democracy within globalisation. The problem with this 
perspective, as critics such as Rodrik (2011) have pointed out, is that it neglects the 
prominence of national identities and politics and the interplay between the national and 
international levels of politics. One of the chief lessons of Dewey's work on the potential for 
global democracy is that it must not only begin from the unit of the nation state but must 
include and arise within the nation state. 
Examining Oewey's account of The Great Society we can see that his work highlights that 
another supposed contemporary problem, the collapse of modern sovereignty, is actually a 
lot older than we care to admit. Throughout the 1920's and 1930's Dewey continually 
highlights how the interdependence of the world nations engendered by The Great Society 
has not only seen consequences of associated human action become transnational but also 
how these transnational consequences affected the ability of nation states to govern 
properly. Writing in context of The Great Depression and trade protectionism Dewey notes: 
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'Bad results work both ways. In order to compete with other nations, a competition 
artificially made harder by the present system of barriers, labour standards are 
lowered at home. The other nations find that unless wages are reduced at home and 
labour speeded up, they are disadvantage. Their standards are put in peril. We have 
made almost universal the inquiry of Cain: "Am I my brother's keeper?" , (LW11: 
262) 
As outlined in the last chapter, it was on the back of these conditions and out-dated policies 
of nation states that Dewey constructed his own arguments for the extension of democracy 
globally and took to task what he saw as bull-headed nationalism which turned 'indifference 
and antagonism into a positive virtue' in the face of such global interdependence. His 
subsequent conclusion was that the doctrine of national 'Sovereignty,' that had buttressed 
regressive protectionism, quests of autarky and global war, was a complete denial of 
political responsibility nation states had towards one another (LW2: 376). 
In light of such statements one might infer that Dewey would take the national political 
arena and nationalism to be mere transitory stage in the extension of global democracy. In 
this sense, the concept of all-inclusiveness or what Dewey called the extension of 
democracy as a way of life, would be best served by politically empowering, either through 
cosmopolitan law, global civil society, a transnational public sphere or supranational 
democratic institutions, those affected by the consequences of associated action 
, 
irrespective of nationality. After all, as Dewey made clear, political democracy was only 
effective when the 'government exists to serve its community, and that this purpose cannot 
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be achieved unless the community itself shares in selecting governors and determining their 
policies' (LW2: 327). 
And as Dewey was under no illusion that The Great Society must become a Great 
community then it only follows that it should be the Great community that picks its 
governors. The problem with this account, however, is whilst Dewey (LW2: 377) recognised 
the decline of modern sovereignty and his i anti-essentialism saw him claim that the State 
is pure myth,' he also understood that the loyalty of citizens to the cultural membership of 
the nation and its political fusion in the nation state would have to be taken seriously if 
global democracy was to be successful (LW15: 208-209). 
The rise of European Nationalism, which was cemented by Napoleonic Wars and the 
resistance of foreign rule, Dewey argued, had created a form of nationalism that 
consolidated 'formerly disperse political and social forces' (LW15: 208). However, this 
'modern state unity' had not only been created by resistance to foreign rule but also by The 
Great Society's technological advancements (railways, telegraph, and telephone). These 
technological advancements in turn, not only created the aforementioned economic 
interdependence amongst the citizens of the nation state, but even more importantly the 
'rapid and easy circulation' of opinion and information, which created a national identity 
beyond the face-to-face communities of people's daily lives and laid the possibility of new 
forms of national democratic government (LW2: 306-307). This process of cultural 
membership, contended Dewey, creates a national 'culture' which is exemplified in ' ... ways 
of living so ingrained by long habituation that they form the very fibre of a people'. And as 
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the inter war and post world war periods had made clear, this fibre was so tough 'that it will 
resist, often unto death, attempts made from without to destroy it' (LW15: 208).66 
At the start of the 20th century, then, Dewey, recognised what modern writers such as 
Anderson (1991) and Billig (1997) point out, which is that nation states offer not only legal 
inclusion but a cultural membership that is always in the process of being remade. And such 
nationalism, with its exclusive and aggressive side forms a 'conspicuous' obstacle towards 
global democracy. However, Dewey also noted that nationalism was 'two-sided' and that 
the sense of wider social order and organisation provided by the nation states and its 
nationalism should be seen as 'positive advance' (ibid., 208-209). By this, Dewey viewed the 
nation state as a serious unit of social action not only because of the aggressive side of 
nationalism but because it was exactly one ofthose means which have been most expedient 
in the pursuit of the ethical commitment of democracy as a way of life. The nation state was 
therefore valuable because it was capable of upholding a national democratic community 
and a national practise of creative democracy. 
With both sides of nationalism in mind, then, Dewey took that the nation state and its 
institutions of democracy could not simply be deemed surplus to requirements or 
superseded but must play an active part of global democracy: 
66 The spread of such Nationalism outside of the West and into regions such as Asia also bought home for 
Dewey that the age of European imperialism was now over and that the idea of a global military hegemon was 
also unfeasible. Dewey thus understood in 1946 the ramifications of what was to become known as 'Third 
World Nationalism' and no doubt would have recoiled in horror had he had lived to see the Vietnam war and 
other countless apparent interventions in the 3'd World by Western countries throughout the cold war. 
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'A wider community of interests cannot possibly be attained by the negative process 
if wiping out communities of belief, action and mutual support which have behind 
them centuries of loyalty. Without a basis in them, a world government would lead a 
precarious existence. If a world government is to gain the hearty support of the 
peoples of the earth it must actively enlist the energies of national states as 
dependable organs for execution of its politics. It can accomplish this result only as 
those polices give the social value of National States a more secure opportunity to 
flourish than they now possess' (LW15: 209). 
From the above it is clear that Dewey, much like modern advocates of global democracy, 
acknowledges that nation states would essentially underwrite any form of global 
democracy. It would transpire via coordinated and collaborative actions of nation states 
either through joint state ventures or the granting of legitimacy to supranational institutions 
such as the UN, which would then form the fulcrum of global democracy. 
Where Dewey departs from his contemporaries, however, is in taking this fact and the issue 
of the primacy of the nation state and nationalism seriously. Seen from this point of view, 
the above sheds light on how Dewey believed the 'divided and troubled publics' could 
integrate through the politics of the nation state to form global democracy. A Great 
Community, although facilitating transnational communication, would most likely find its 
political expression through nation state communities who through 'selecting governors and 
determining their policies' could play a part in the deliberation and decision making that 
would transpire at the international level. 
180 
In Dewey's eyes it was this vitality of community and creative democracy at the national 
level which could facilitate the emergence of a Great Community or a community of 
communities and the practise of creative democracy at the international level. This is why 
Dewey was adamant that it was the eclipse of the public and the breakdown of creative 
democracy at national level that explained the lack of global democracy. The lesson Dewey 
therefore provides for 21st century observers is that global democracy cannot function on 
the reification of the global at the expense of the nation state and its politics, but rather 
should always take the primacy of nation state politics into account. 
It is also important, however, to note that the above does not commit the reverse sin via 
reifying the nation state, nationalism and nation state politics at the expense of the global 
or transnational. Whilst we should not abandon the ideas and practises of global citizenship. 
global civil society, transnational public spheres or even transnational democratic 
federations (EU) it is imperative from a Deweyan position that we take the recognition of 
the role of nation sate seriously if we are to assign it such a key role in the role of global 
democracy. For example, a Deweyan position would not rule out or argue against the 
formation of transnational publics, created by the actors within global civil society for 
instance, which then campaigned on issues such as climate change or global poverty on a 
transnational scale. Indeed, this process would be central in the creation of signs and 
symbols for a Great Community to gain some sense of itself across the globe and Would 
reflect Dewey's ideas that 'non-political forces to organise themselves to transform existing 
political structures: that the divided and troubled publics integrate' 
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However, as pointed out in chapter 4, Dewey believed that the political power of publics 
centres not just on mobilisation but on the ability to change the institutions and practises of 
government. And as Dryzek and Kaldor point out, the power of transnational publics upon 
global governance would be in affecting national governments in either the altering of their 
own practises and institutions or the practises and institutions of the global governance 
institutions that they confer legitimacy upon. For Dewey, such a change would still have to 
run through national politics and the politics of the nation state and those global concerns 
may in fact be better served by attempting to harness the politics of the nation state in 
favour of such issues. The same scenario would undoubtedly play out if governments or 
citizens were to espouse an overarching Cosmopolitan Democracy or a transnational form 
of democracy such as Bohman's conception of the EU. 
History may come to show us, for example, that a transnational formation of a democracy 
of demoi is the future. However, as past history has already shown us, it has been the 
feeling of loss of national sovereignty and the resistance of an all-encompassing European 
identity that has thwarted further European integration. The inability of the EU in 2005 to 
ratify its own constitution through the loss of 'national referenda' was thus down to the 
politics of the nation state and national communities. And if the project is to go further and 
indeed create Bohman's vision of a more integrated democracy of demoi, it will be down to 
national politicians who are first and foremost accountable to national citizens. 
The irony of Dewey's position is that it refutes essentialism but deals with the often harsh 
reality of such anti-essentialism. Although embracing anti-essentialist conceptions of the 
public, state and government, which does not essentialise those concepts with the nation 
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state, Dewey's views seems to posit that the emergence of the nation state and nationalism 
places a historically contingent limit on the nature of global democracy. Moreover, Dewey 
denotes that nationalism, the identification of justice by citizens with their nation state and 
the national democratic community has historical fortitude. And in Dewey's eyes such 
cultural membership of the nation state was to be taken very much like a solid brick wall; 
whilst it is undoubtedly a construction, one would be very hard headed to believe that one 
could simply walk through it. In a similar way to the work of Rodrik (2011), Dewey believed 
that the power of nationalism, even in the midst of globalisation and the collapse of modern 
sovereignty, meant that political action, including matters of global democracy, would 
predominantly transpire around and centre on the politics of nation states and their 
governments. 
6.3 Democracy begins at home 
As we can garner from above, a Deweyan position mandates that we take the nation state 
as one of the primary building blocks of global democracy. The logical consequence of this 
appraisal of how global democracy could best be enacted is Dewey's subsequent lesson that 
national conditions of democracy and community are pivotal to forming a Great Community 
and the practise of global democracy. Moreover, Dewey suggests that without the pursuit of 
democracy as a way of life and the practise of creative democracy within the nation state 
, 
there is little chance of the pursuit of democracy as a way of life and practise of creatiVe 
democracy beyond the nation state: 
'It is said, and said truly, that for the world's peace it is necessary that We 
understand the peoples of foreign lands. How well do we understand, I wonder, OUr 
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next door neighbours. It has also been said that if a man love not his fellow man who 
he has seen, he cannot love the God whom he has not seen. The chances of regard 
for distant peoples being effective as long as there is no close neighbourhood 
experience to bring insight and understanding of neighbours do not seem better. A 
man who has not been seen in the daily relations of life may inspire admiration, 
emulation, servile subjection, fanatical partisanship, hero worship; but not love and 
understanding, as they radiate from the attachments of near-by union. Democracy 
must begin at home, and its home is the neighbourly community' (LW2: 368). 
The above highlights two interrelated points about the role of the local and national 
community in the pursuit of global democracy. The first is the point that the local 
community, the one of face-to-face intercourse in institutions such as the family, school and 
neighbourhood, is central in Dewey's eyes to other forms of community such as a possible 
Great Community. This is because it is within these daily and face to relations that the 
primary aspects of communication and acquiring of habits and social customs takes place. 
Moreover, it was within the neighbourly community that ideal and practise of pursuing a 
democratic way of life would be taught, learned and put into practise. 
The second point is that the local is fundamentally informed and affected by the nation and 
the international dimensions of a globalised world. The Great Society was taken by Dewey 
to invade and destroy elements of local communities and led to the 'immediate source of 
the instability, disintegration and restlessness which characterise the present epoch' (LW2: 
367). This is why Dewey firmly believed that the 'heart and final guarantee of democracy' 
was the ability of neighbourhoods and friends within the confines of their living rooms to 
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discourse freely with one another about the news of the day (lW14: 227).67 However, whilst 
Oewey doubted a Great Community could ever ' •.. possess all the qualities of the qualities 
which mark a local community', he was equally as certain that the local community could 
facilitate a Great Community's sense of 'free and full intercommunication' through its ability 
to be reordered and enriched by the Ideals of a Great Community. 
Given his aforementioned take on the role of nation state and nationalism in forming a 
Great Community, Oewey's subsequent views of actively utilising the local and national 
arenas to help form a Great Community and achieve the international practise of creative 
democracy lead him to advocate, what we can call in modern parlance, a form of 
Cosmopolitan Nationalism. As Robyn Eckersley (2007: 689-690) points out, Cosmopolitan 
Nationalism functions on the basis that: 
'Not only would citizens see themselves as belonging to a nation that extends help to 
those In need (such as tsunami victims); they would also regard the international 
role of their state, represented by their political leaders, as one of working 
multilaterally to changed International structures to alleviate global injustices on a 
systemic basis.' 
., Oewey's focus on the face to face communication has, over the years, been presented as the ramblings of an 
old man with nostalgia for a form of localism lost to history (see Westbrook 1991 and Cochran 2002 for 
!lIample). However, as my ellposition highlights this Is actually far from the truth. Indeed, such nostalgia for 
earlier, and so called 'simpler' times, made Oewey downhearted: " find myself resentful and feeling sad when 
In relation to present sOcial, economic, and political problems, people pOint simply backward as if somewher; 
In the past there were a model for what we should do today' (LW 13: 299). 
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And it is plain to see from the prior discussion, and the summation of his view below, 
Dewey's views on the best way to achieve a Great Community largely follow the contours of 
this way ofthinking: 
'With our fortunate position in the world I think that if we used our resources, 
including our financial recourses, to build up among ourselves a genuine, true and 
effective democratic society, we would find that we have a surer, a more enduring 
and a more powerful defence of democratic institutions both within ourselves and 
with relation to the rest of the world than the surrender to the belief In force, 
violence and war can ever give' (LW13: 302). 
This embracement of a form of Cosmopolitan Nationalism Is why Dewey was so adamant 
the struggle to secure the democratic way of life was not simply about choosing respective 
focal points of political action such as the local, national or global but rather was to be 
'".maintained on as many fronts as culture has aspects: political, economic, international, 
educational, scientific and artistic, religious' (LW13: 186). And there is no greater example of 
this than Dewey's own immediate present and his take on the school system at that time. 
The nation's school system, for example, was seen by Dewey not just as a place of training 
for industry, but also an underutilised arena where there could be a positive and 
constructive cultivation of the democratic way of life both within and beyond the nation 
state. Moreover, Dewey believed that the school, as an Institution that taught the 
democratic way of life, could be reformed and better utilised to ', .. break down class division, 
creating a feeling of greater humanity and of a membership in a single family .. .' (lW13: 302). 
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Contra contemporary proponents of global democracy, then, a Deweyan position on global 
democracy requires that we do not take our current phase of globalisation and the advent 
of the need for global democracy to simply transcend local or national democracy and the 
importance of their forms of community. Whilst contemporary advocates of global 
democracy are quick to point out that local and national economic issues are tied up with 
the global economy they fail to acknowledge and then research how this informs the 
relationship between national and international politics. We have already seen how Dewey 
believed the emergence of The Great Society, the shattering of local and national 
community and the eclipse of Creative Democracy at the nation state prohibited the 
emergence of Creative Democracy at the international level via actually leading to the 
embracement of hyper nationalism, beggar thy neighbour trade protectionism and autarky. 
And in this instance, Dewey highlighted how the collapse of community and democracy at 
the local and national level translated into the collapse of any hope of a Great Community. 
The key lesson that Dewey's work bequeaths to us in the present is that we must come to 
terms with the fact that fronts of culture are in fact linked and feed back upon one another 
and that this was no more apparent than in the relationship between the local, national and 
international. Indeed, Dewey's work goes beyond simply pointing at an interactive and 
iterative relationship between the local, national and international by actively pOinting to an 
order of phases between the sites of democratic community. Given the pivotal role of the 
nation state to its cause, global democracy's very fate, in its manifestation and 
implementation, is taken to rest with the vitality of local and national community and 
democracy and its ability to foster a form of Cosmopolitan Nationalism. 
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In the second phase, the fate of the local and national community is taken to rest on the 
success of such Cosmopolitan Nationalism and the implementation of creative democracy at 
the global level. For without a form of global democracy the local and national levels are 
beset with instability, disintegration and restlessness. However, Dewey is quite adamant 
that the second phase cannot happen before the first phase has taken place. It is not just 
that we cannot examine the chances of global democracy without taking into consideration 
the status and vitality our democracy at home. But rather without a strong form of creative 
democracy at home there will never be creative democracy away and beyond from home. 
And this is the case even if our ultimate goal is too make the 'away and beyond' our 'home' 
in the final instance. 
6.4 The spectre of bourgeois democracy must be exorcised 
The Deweyan formulation that a Great Community and the practise of creative democracy 
at the international level must begin at 'home,' inherently brings us back to the conditions 
of the national community and the need for a 'true and effective' national democracy. What 
emerges from the underlying theme of Dewey's advocacy of Cosmopolitan Nationalism as 
the best means to achieving global democracy is of a present haunted by the spectre that he 
called bourgeois democracy. We have seen, for instance, that creative democracy and the 
pursuit of democracy as a way of life demands the perpetual adaption of social institutions, 
including democratic institutions and practises themselves, as new publics are engendered 
by social change. However, Dewey also understood that such adaption centred on the 
promise of political democracy being ' ... a mode of government, a specified practise in 
selecting officials and regulating their conduct as officials' (LW2: 286). 
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In this scenario, democracy not only needs enlightened publics but enlightened publics who 
can appoint enlightened officials and governments to live up to the ideal of being creative 
both nationally and internationally. And Dewey was all too aware that Bourgeois democracy 
and its engendering of the eclipse of the public was a hindrance not only to any practise of 
creative democracy but the very practise of a form of political democracy which could 
facilitate the practise of creative democracy in the first place: 
'The dominant issue is whether the people of the United States are to control Our 
government, federal, state and municipal, and to use it is behalf of the peace and 
welfare of society or whether control is going to go on passing into the hands of 
small powerful economic groups who shall use all the machinery of administration 
and legislation to serve their own ends' (LW6: 149). 
On a sheer historical level, then, Dewey's work on the eclipse of the public and stalling of 
creative democracy provides us with the realisation that problems of such material and 
intellectual inequality, political distraction and apathy, elitism and plutocracy, which as We 
explored in chapter 3 are taken to afflict our current democratic praxis, are not 
unprecedented but rather have afflicted democratic praxis since the late 19th and early 20th 
century. And whilst we would be fools to deny that our present has made advances 
(Dewey's present had no real welfare state for example), in light of the narration of neo-
liberalism outlined in chapter 1 it is more than feasible to suggest that our present political 
strictures still exhibit the key traits of bourgeois democracy. 
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Rather than simply being a point about historical continuity of bourgeois democracy, 
however, Dewey's work also reveals analytical lessons about the interconnected nature of 
the conditions of a national democracy run under the auspices of bourgeois democracy, 
hyperglobalisation and the possibility of global democracy. For instance, we have become 
accustomed to noticing how inequality between developed and developing nation states, 
such as the unequal representation within international institutions such as the IMF, World 
Bank or UN, affects the cause of global democracy. However, Dewey's take on the effects of 
Bourgeois democracy brings home the fact that material and intellectual inequality and 
consumerism within the nation state and the eclipse of the public fundamentally informs 
the ability of publics to grasp their present conditions and affects the praxis of democracy 
both within and beyond borders.68 
On a participation level, for example, Dewey is adamant that without the provision of 
knowledge and habits, within social institutions such as education and political democracy, 
which lead to the greater political awareness and participation by the masses there is little 
to no chance of creative democracy at the national level. Moreover, Dewey suggests that 
within the context of globalisation, the perpetuation of high levels of material and 
intellectual inequality within nation states often breeds an anti-Cosmopolitan nationalism 
and the rejection rather than embracement of global democracy at the international level. 
Dewey therefore extends his narrative of the collapse of community and democracy at the 
local and national level to the hope of forming of a Great Community by linking such a 
collapse to the structural inequality engendered by bourgeois democracy. For contemporary 
68 
Somewhat ironically, this point is recognised by developed countries when assessing the development and 
governance of developing countries. It does, however, seemingly disappear when developed countries assess 
the inequality within their own borders. 
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eyes, the question then becomes how does the structural imbalance, such as inequality, 
engendered by our own contours of bourgeois democracy affect our current publics and 
how do these affect ideals of global democracy? Does the structural imbalance within 
nation states, for instance, lead to the embracement an anti-Cosmopolitan nationalism? 
This analytical lesson about the interconnection of the auspices of bourgeois democracy, 
hyperglobalisation and the possibility of global democracy is again repeated in Dewey's 
reflection on how the national political arena and party politics cannot simply be 
transcended or deemed unimportant when examining global democracy. Indeed, as 
outlined in chapter 1, the hegemony of Neo-liberalism amongst both its traditional home of 
the Right and its new home of Third Way governments seems to eerily reflect Dewey's 
(LW5: 442) rumination that the political parties within his present had become 'the errand 
boys' of big business within The Great Society. And the process of political disenchantment 
and apathy within nation state politiCS narrated by writers such as Hay (2007) seem to 
mirror Dewey's narration of The Great Society's own political disenchantment and apathy; 
where the belief that reigned supreme was that there was no important difference between 
the two old parties,' and where to vote for one over the other was to signify very 'little' 
(LW6: 185). 
The key point that Dewey's work hands down to us, however, is that we cannot simply 
disconnect the current state of national democracy or a lack of a proper national democracy 
within bourgeois democracy from the issues of forming a Great Community and practising 
creative democracy both within and beyond the state. As Dewey comments on his Own 
present, although national democratic practises and institutions favoured the interests of a 
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'privileged plutocracy' and were inflexible and uncreative under the hegemony of Bourgeois 
democracy, it was nevertheless: 
' .. sheer defeatism to assume in advance of actual trial that democratic political 
institutions are incapable either of further development or constructive social 
application. Even as they do exist, the forms of representative government are 
potentially capable of expressing public will when that assumes anything like 
unification' (lWll: 60). 
Once more we can see that Dewey, much like modern advocates of global democracy, 
acknowledges that nation states and their political institutions and practises of government 
hold the key to both national and international reform. However, Dewey departs from his 
contemporaries by actually taking this issue seriously and stressing the need to examine the 
link between national and international arenas of community and democracy. And when 
one factors in an elitist and plutocratic Bourgeois democracy the need for examining this 
link between the arenas of a national and a possible global democracy becomes even more 
apparent. Quite simply, the issue of who controls the nation state and whose interests it 
serves are too important to the cause of founding a Great Community and praxis of creative 
democracy internationally.69 Rather than simply noting that the state has become a fulcrum 
for Neo-liberalism, al la GDT, we must examine how the strictures of Bourgeois democracy 
maintain such as state of affairs both national and internationally. 
69 D . I 
anle Bray (2010) also makes the point that a form of 'Pragmatic Cosmopolitan ism' would effectively 
demand effective leaders of nation states but he fails to see how Dewey believed the contours of Bourgeois 
Democracy affected national politics. 
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A Deweyan analysis of global democracy would thus not just examine the sign and symbols 
of a possible Great community, but would implore to ask questions about our present 
national democracy, such as who are the people who represent the public within national 
political institutions? Is our political democracy open to all citizens and all political 
discourse? Quite simply, can publics remake the state? Is national political democracy co-
opted by big business and the hegemony of Bourgeois democracy? How do national 
politicians help to perpetuate the hegemony of Bourgeois democracy? And how do these 
affect not only national forms of democracy but also movements and ideals that espouse to 
take democracy beyond the state? 
At the same time, such a position would also want to explore how political apathy and 
disenchantment in our present affects Bourgeois democracy - is such apathy and 
disenchantment actually pivotal to the perpetuation of the plutocracy of our current era? 
Does such apathy towards formal politic mean that populaces are in fact apolitical or are 
they finding new outlets other than formal politics to express their politics? And if so, how 
does such apathy and disenchantment of the public with formal politics match up against 
the ideals and machinations of social movements and groups within Global Civil Society? 
The answers to these questions under the tenets of a Deweyan analysis of global democracy 
simply cannot go unanswered. For the underlying answers to these questions will reveal 
how the conditions of our national democracy are related and in fact inform the ideals 
, 
practises and hopes of global democracy in the 21st century.70 
70 This fact is important because even if one embraces Rodrik's substantive criticism of Global Democracy, the 
actions of nation state leaders at the international level and the motivations behind them are readily 
important. One then does not have to agree with Oewey's ideas of global democracy to find his formulation of 
the relationship or rather his breaking of the dualism between the national and international levels valid. 
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6.5 Global Democracy: A new name for an old problem? 
What the preceding exposition of Dewey's work should have made clear is that the 
'problem' of global democracy is a lot older than we believe. Indeed, Dewey's work from 
the 1920's onwards can be seen as an attempt to deal with incoherence and impotence of 
national democracy in a globalised world. And there is little doubt that had Dewey lived to 
see the collapse of the Cold War and the rise of late 20th century globalisation he too would 
have seen it as a moment to signal the potential move towards global democracy. For 
instance, Dewey would have largely agreed with Cosmopolitan Democracy about the need 
for the rule of law at the international level. In Dryzek's case, Dewey would have agreed 
with the emphasis on what he would have seen as the formation of transnational publics. 
And of all the theorists encountered, James Bohman's work is the most Dewey-like in its 
philosophical conception because of its emphasis on providing citizens with the resources to 
fight off domination. The question that arises from this, however, is how does Dewey's work 
relate to and differ from his contemporaries associated with GOT? What is the overall 
contribution of a Deweyan perspective on global democracy? 
To get to grips with these questions I want to return to the argument that GOT suffers from 
the embracement of an ontology of paradox and to do this I want to examine Dryzek's 
conception of what he calls a 'post-Westphalian ontology'. In his recent work Dryzek argues 
that globalisation, global civil society and the contours of global governance mean that we 
must now shift our ontological conceptions of international relations. More specifically, he 
argues that we must shift from examining global democracy via a Westphalian ontology to a 
post-Westphalian ontology which: 
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' ... enables us to take more seriously the possibility that global civil society is central 
to meaningful global democratisation, rather than an ersatz substitute for elections 
or a supporting way station on the road to cosmopolitan institutions or indeed 
something whose contribution to global democracy has to be ruled out because it 
cannot play the same role that it does within states. Becoming post-Westphalian in a 
deep ontological sense means letting go not only of the idea of the sovereign state, 
but also of the individualistic basis for the establishment of sovereign authority 
formalised by Thomas Hobbes at the same time as the Treaty of Westphalia ... A post-
Westphalian ontology can stress discourses and informal networks as well as 
individuals and formal organisations.' (Oryzek 2012: 113-114) 
What is interesting here is that Oryzek creates a distinction between a Westphalian and 
post-Westphalian ontology where the latter transcends the limitations of the former. 
However, as I have shown in chapter 3, one could argue that theories of GOT all espouse the 
virtues of 'discourses and informal networks' at the expense of really examining 'individuals 
and formal organisations' both at the national and international level. The crux of the 
argument that GOT embraces an ontology of paradox centres on the fact that the limitations 
and obstacles global democracy faces, both in the guise of individuals (national publics and 
politicians/technocrats) and formal organisations (national governments/supranational 
institutions) at both national and international levels, are seemingly acknowledged but 
never truly deliberated or countenanced properly in GOT's analysis and evaluation of global 
democracy. 
GOT writers thus create a dualism between the Westphalian age of nation states and 
national democracy and the post-Westphalian age of discourses, global civil society and the 
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emergence of global governance and end up paying too much attention to the latter over 
the former. As such, GOT does not truly embrace a post-Westphalian ontology, but an 
ontology of paradox where discourses and informal networks, even when it is 
acknowledged that they do not do so, are taken to have transcended the importance of 
Westphalian nation states and national democracy in the formation and pursuit of global 
democracy. And as I highlighted in chapter 3, in embracing such an ontology of paradox, 
proponents of GOT often wield conclusions about the vibrancy of global democracy in the 
face of evidence which appears to contradict such assertions. In this sense, we can say that 
GOT pays little heed to the Westphalian elements that remain within a post-Westphalian 
ontology.71 
It is on this final point that we see that a Oeweyan approach to global democracy is not a 
dismissal of GOT. In fact, GOT offers insights into how global civil society and the emergence 
of a transnational public sphere in the early 21st century offer the potential for the 
advancement of global democracy. However, a Oeweyan approach can act as a corrective or 
rebalancing away from GOT's ontology of paradox and towards the actual embracement of 
a post-Westphalian ontology. A Oeweyan position on global democracy achieves this 
through two key interventions. The first is the idea that the post-Westphalian condition or 
what he called the emergence of The Great Society is a lot older than we commonly believe. 
We have been living within a post-Westphalian ontology since the dawn of the First Great 
Globalisation and there may indeed be lessons we can learn from our predecessors' 
71 
Dryzek (2012) attempts to distance his position from that of Cosmopolitan Democrats such as Held via 
espousing a post-Westphalian ontology. My argument here and in chapter 3, however, is that both Dryzek and 
Held and other GOT writers such as Bohman actually replicate an emphasis on the post-Westphalian elements 
on the present without truly examining how the remaining elements of the Westphalian order (states, national 
democracy) also inform such a post-Westphalian ontology. 
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appraisal of democracy within a globalised world. This study is itself a case in point - we 
turn our backs on our history at our own peril. 
The second intervention is that a Deweyan approach actually provides a far better account 
of how to examine a post-Westphalian ontology. Rather than merely taking post-
Westphalian (or what Dewey would call the emergence of The Great Society) to mean the 
simple transcending of the prior epoch, a Deweyan position views this as a new complex 
environment which incorporates both the old and the new; a situation which mandates that 
we examine the links between both the Westphalian and post-Westphalian elements of Our 
present in order to forward the democratic way of life. For instance, Dewey's ideas that 
global democracy, although being informed through transnational citizen publics, will largely 
centre around the vibrancy of inter-nation state relations through 'Cosmopolitan 
Nationalism' at home and abroad, and that this itself would be informed through the 
tackling of 'Bourgeoisie Democracy' at home, are pivotal to an appraisal of global 
democracy. Indeed, this is the key insight Dewey bequeaths to us who now live within the 
current confines of The Great Society: the fate of global democracy is inherently linked with 
the fate of national democracy. 
The merits of a Deweyan position can easily be seen when one returns to the work of GOT. 
Take Dryzek's (2006, 2010, 2012)72 work for instance, his account of Transnational 
Discursive Democracy argues that the actors of global civil society and discourses within the 
72 This flaw in Dryzek's work is actually surprising given his earlier work within Dryzek et al (2003). In this work 
Dryzek outlines a number of different state formations such as the neo-liberalism within the UK and US vis-a-
vis the social market approach in Germany affect how national social green movements can affect democracy. 
The book essentially serves as handbook of the best strategies for green social movements within such state 
typologies on how to avoid co-option by state forces and create social change. However, Dryzek and he fellow 
authors (2003: 131) close the international structuring of green agendas off and focus largely on national 
contexts. Dryzek would have been better of taking his approach of looking at the interplay of between 
democratic structures in the national context into an analysis of how the very same national democratic 
structures also interact with global civil society and the agenda of global democracy. 
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transnational public sphere struggle to hold national governments to account and limit 
global democracy to contestation. At this point Dryzek (2012) seals off the debate about 
global democracy by simply stating that global democracy is qualitatively different to 
national democracy and that the use of global civil society as both an arena of contestation 
and circumscribed agent do not necessarily conflict with the goal of global democracy. 
A Deweyan approach to global democracy would undoubtedly agree with Dryzek; that 
democracy can not be reduced to its practises at the national level, but it would question 
why contestation is the only real alternative left at the international level and why nation 
states are allowed to renegade on their international commitments. For instance, a 
Deweyan position would not accept that the formation of publics at the transnational level 
constitutes democracy. As we have seen, for Dewey there is no democracy without an 
ability of publics to remodel the social institutions of government. The vibrancy of 
contestation then does not translate into actual creative democracy. A Deweyan position 
would thus question why national publics cannot and do not hold their national 
governments to account on such issues? Are such global issues seen as anathema to 
national politics? Or is this because of the practises of bourgeoisie democracy causing 
regulatory capture by an elite, political apathy amongst the masses and a lack of 
Cosmopolitan Nationalism at home? The same questions would also be applied to empirical 
realities facing Cosmopolitan Democracy or Republican Cosmopolitanism. Fundamenta"y, 
then, a Deweyan position forces us to take seriously the links between democracy at home 
and abroad when examining the current practises and conceptualisations of global 
democracy. 
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What should be clear from the above is that a Deweyan take does not simply provide the 
answer to the enigma that is global democracy. If anything a Deweyan approach to global 
democracy further complicates matters. Beyond all else, however, such a position mandates 
that we approach social reality head on and deal with the mess we are likely to encounter; 
even if it pains our normative convictions to do so. As Dewey noted: 
' ... reflective thinking transforms confusion, ambiguity and discrepancy into 
illumination, definiteness and consistency. But it also pOints to the contextual 
situation in which thinking occurs. It notes that the starting point is the actually 
problematic, and that the problematic phase resides in some actual and specifiable 
situation ... thinking is continuous process of temporal reorganisation within one and 
the same world of experienced things, not a jump from the latter world to one of 
objects constituted once for all by thought' (LW1: 61). 
In keeping with the tradition of Dewey's approach to reflective thinking, this study will now 
attempt to take on the Deweyan lessons encountered above and enter the confusion, 
ambiguity and discrepancy of our present. The final part of this study will therefore focus on 
the empirical examination of global democracy by focusing on the events that have 
unfolded since the onset of 'The Great Recession' in 2008. Through taking The Great 
Recession as a critical case study, I endeavour not only to highlight how Dewey's work helps 
us comprehend the politics of globalisation, but also the present and future of global 
democracy. 
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Part Three: From Lehman Brothers to the OCCUpy Movement 
The previous part of the study presented John Dewey's ruminations on The Great Society as 
providing pertinent analytical lessons for the 21st century advocates of global democracy. 
Within this part of the study I aim to utilise those Deweyan analytical lessons to analyse the 
politics of The Great Recession and its cascade of crises. Rather than explain every detail of 
the Great Recession it will aim to highlight how the cascade of crises from the fall of 
Lehmann Brothers onward highlights a history of publics and the persistence of what Dewey 
called bourgeois democracy. 73 Moreover, this history of publics highlights a democratic 
disconnect between publics of transnational elites, which emerged after the fall of Lehman 
Brothers and who are subservient to the tenets of bourgeois democracy, and citizen publics 
which have emerged since 2008. 
To highlight this history of publics this part of the study will be divided into two chapters. 
Chapter 7 will narrate the 'Bank Recapitalisation' and 'Keynesian Stimulus' publics of elites 
and experts, which emerged after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and enacted the 
stimulus packages of 2008-2009. And will conclude by examining how bourgeois democracy 
was at the heart of policy post the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Chapter 8 moves the story 
onto the rise of the 'Austerity' public of elites, which emerged to complete the 
rehabilitation of market fundamentalism. After highlighting how austerity is simply a litter of 
half-truths, I turn in chapter 9 to citizen publics who have emerged in response to austerity 
and rampant bourgeois democracy. I will end the chapter by examining whether such 
73 I say this because there has been an explosion of academic and journalistic accounts of the events leading to 
Lehman and the fall out that ensued. See La's (2012) 23 book reviews of books on the 2008 crisis and The 
Great recession, onto to which one could easily add another twenty or so titles. 
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movements provide strong evidence for the viability of global democracy in a climate of 
elite smokescreen and subterfuge. 
Chapter 7: Transnational Elites and their Publics 
7.1 Flash Gordon and the Defenders of the Global Economy 
'If money isn't loosened up, this sucker could go down' -G.W. Bush (cited in 
Herszenhorn: 2008) 
'It was while I was flying across the Atlantic that I resolved what we as government 
had to do ... I wrote it on a piece of paper, the thick black felt-tip pens I've used since 
a childhood sporting incident affected my eyesight. For good measure, I underlined it 
twice. It simply said: RECAPITALlSE NOW: - Brown (2010: xvii-xviii) 
The words of the then leaders of the US and UK governments after the fall of the 
investment bank lehman Brothers highlights how both governments eventually moved from 
panic to action. George W. Bush's penchant for providing the quotable, even when trying 
not to do so, arose once more when he warned Congress about their rejection of Ben 
Bernanke and Hank Paulson's $700 Billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). On 
Monday the 16th of September 2008, for example, the Dow had fallen 504 points, which Was 
at the time the biggest drop since 9/11 (Rawnsley 2010: 577). And by September 25th, ten 
days after the fall of lehman, the interconnection of lehmans as counterparty in interbank 
loans and Credit Default Swaps and the fear of economic meltdown spread by media 
technology, basically 'brought the entire world capital market down' (Krugman cited in 
Haldane: 2009). As President Bush put it, as only he could, for the American government to 
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not now do anything or to reject the plan hatched by the Chairmen of the Federal Reserve 
and US Treasury Secretary was tantamount to letting the American economy 'go down,.74 
Gordon Brown's narration of his transatlantic flight on the 26th September 2008, two days 
after Bush's comments, took place just hours after he had met with President Bush in order 
to sell his government's idea of bank recapitalisation to help solve the banking crisis. Much 
like Paulson, Brown's government realised that global crisis in world capital markets, where 
banks could not raise enough capital to cover their liabilities, was actually a symptom of a 
deeper problem of US and UK banks being overleveraged and undercapitalised. The collapse 
of the US housing bubble had resulted in large losses for financial institutions that had 
bought or become connected by 'toxic assets' backed by mortgage payments. This in turn 
had left overleveraged financial institutions with simply too little capital to lend and too 
much debt to roll over. Exacerbated by Banks trying to sell assets in an attempt to pay their 
debts asset prices fell and left banks with ever dwindling amounts of capital on the balance 
sheet (Brown 2010: 47). 
By this point Brown had largely come to the right conclusion on two major economic and 
political points. One was that the TARP program, which centred on buying toxic assets off 
banks, would likely be slow and ponderous because the toxic assets could not be quantified 
and that the banks needed recapitalisation in order to deleverage and start lending to the 
real economy once more. The second was that the US approach of dealing with one 
74 
The Bush administration had already signalled its intent with an $85 billion bailout of the US insurance 
company AIG the day after the Lehman Bankruptcy. This in turn had signalled a reversal of a reversal: lehman 
Brothers had been allowed to go bankrupt by Paulson whilst earlier in 2008 investment bank Bear Stearns and 
as late as the weekend before the government-sponsored mortgage enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
had not. 
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institution at a time and only on a national basis was itself too slow and ponderous to calm 
panicking markets. Rather, what was needed, was coordinated action across firstly the UK 
and US but also Europe, whose own interbank market had drawn to a standstill. 
Although, both events happened within only days of each other, they mark distinct points in 
the historical unfolding of the crisis from the national to multilateral coordination on a 
transnational level. Up to this point, the US, UK and European governments had been fire-
fighting flare-ups in their own banking systems without much co-ordination. Ireland, for 
example, announced a guarantee on the 30th of September on all deposits in the country's 
main banks for two years without informing its own central bank: the European Central 
Bank (ECB). On the 5th October 2008, Germany appeared to follow Ireland's action and as 
Rawnsley (2010: 581) points out, 'threatened to endanger the rest of the EU' by 
encouraging the moving of capital into Germany and out of EU countries not offering 
guarantees. The UK government itself had been partaking in such fire-fighting methods with 
the part nationalisation of Bradford and Bingley and the waiving of completion laws to 
merge the solvent Lloyds TSB with insolvent (HBOS) Halifax and Bank Of Scotland (Smith 
, 
2010: 174-180). 
This all changed, however, on the 8th October, when the UK government announced the 
availability of £50 billion of public money in capital, £250 billion in guarantees of lending in 
the inter-bank market and an increase in the Bank of England's Special liquidity Scheme 
which allowed banks to exchange mortgagees for bonds from £100 billion to £200 billion 
(Rawnsley, 2010: 588). And when HBOS, Lloyds TSB and RBS utilised such funds and were 
partly nationalised, with the UK tax payer taking a majority stake in Royal Bank of Scotland 
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(57%) and a 40% stake in the now merged HBOS and Lloyds TSB, the Brown government's 
realisation that what was needed was recapitalisation, as well as guarantees, liquidity and 
toxic asset management, seemed to present a more coherent approach for fellow 
governments to pursue. On the same day Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Spain and 
Austria announced similar recapitalisation and guarantee schemes. And on the next day, 
Hank Paulson used elements of the TARP program to inject capital into nine major US banks 
and countries from Australia to South Korea followed suit (Brown, 2010: 66). The result was 
a surge on stock markets and cooling of the mass panic that had helped to nearly bring 
about the 'apocalypse of a total banking collapse' (Rawnsley, 2010: 597). 
On the back this turn of events, Paul Krugman (2008) asked 'Has Gordon Brown, the British 
prime minister, saved the world financial system 7' and went on to suggest an affirmative 
answer: 
'This is an unexpected turn of events. The British government is, after all, very much 
a junior partner when it comes to world economic affairs. It's true that London is one 
of the world's great financial centres, but the British economy is far smaller than the 
U.S. economy, and the Bank of England doesn't have anything like the influence 
either of the Federal Reserve or of the European Central Bank. So you don't expect 
to see Britain playing a leadership role ... But the Brown government has shown itself 
willing to think clearly about the financial crisis, and act quickly on its conclusions. 
And this combination of clarity and decisiveness hasn't been matched by any other 
Western government, least of all our own ... Luckily for the world economy, however, 
Gordon Brown and his officials are making sense. And they may have shown us the 
way through this crisis.' 
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Much has been made from a biographical point of view about whether or not it is right to 
characterise Gordon Brown as the world's saviour in 2008 (See for example Rawnsley, 2010; 
Radice, 2010). This is because of the obvious dichotomy of Brown's failing on the domestic 
front and his spectacular rise in prominence on the international scene (Brown even made 
The Time 100 in 2009) and Brown's own recognition of that dichotomy in a rather ill-advised 
slip up in Parliament.75 The question of Gordon Brown's historical legacy is, of course, a 
matter for political historians to fawn over. The key point for our study, however, pivots on 
the fact that Krugman's praise of Brown is actually unintentionally misleading because it 
seems to suggest that the UK only provided an example of how to tackle the post-Lehman 
banking crisis and that those other countries then followed this lead. 
What had actually emerged in London amongst Prime Minister Brown, his Chancellor 
Alistair Darling and technocrats such as the Governor of The Bank of England Mervyn King76 
was not a plan which was then merely copied, but a plan that was copied because its 
general outlines had already been exported through lobbying and discourse amongst other 
elites. For instance, Brown's plane journey home had prefigured not only a meeting with 
President Bush but an impromptu meeting on the 25th of September of world leaders in the 
one 'dingiest' of rooms in the UN building after a meeting of the UN General Assembly. Here 
Brown was to 'test whether there was a common approach to financial crisis, whether there 
was a chance the world could come together in one forum, and whether the G20 meeting of 
any other arrangement could command consensus.' (Brown, 2010:44). The meeting also 
75 I am of course taking about the moment when Gordon Brown uttered the words at the dispatch box in the 
House of Common that his government 'had saved the world' instead of 'saved the world's banks' as was 
written in his notes. 
76 In 2008 King appeared to have turned an entire 180 degrees on the issue of moral hazard attached to bailing 
out financial institutions in the light of UK government's nationalisation of Northern Rock in 2007. In a speech 
made some nine months before Lehman Brothers failed, King actually suggested that nationalisation, even 
forced nationalisation, was now the best strategy for governments (Rawnsley, 2010: 579). 
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resulted in Brazilian President lula proposing that the UK would assume G20's finance 
ministers' chairmanship some three months earlier than its allotted date. 
The same focus on acquiring the hegemony of the British approach amongst governments 
was simultaneously pursued by Darling and King at the G7, where King told other politicians 
and technocrats that what was needed was a 'little less conversation, a little more action'. 
And also by Brown at his invitation to the then new euro group of 15 heads of state, of 
which Britain was not a member or originally invited. Here Brown relayed to European 
leaders and European technocrats like the ECB's chairmen that although the financial crisis 
may have originated in America it was now also a European crisis due to the amount of toxic 
assets within the European banking system and the high leverage levels of leverage 
European banks were running in comparison to their American counterparts (ibid., 62-63). 
At this point, the Brown government's ascendancy amongst other governments was best 
reflected by praise from its historically antagonistic ally the French; when President Sarkosy 
revealed to Gordon Brown that he ' ... Ioved him. But not in a sexual way' (Rawnsley, 2010: 
593). 
From a Deweyan approach to global democracy the events of 2008-2009 clearly reflect that 
nation state leaders, national technocrats and international organisations such as the IMF 
clearly formed a transnational public. The initial leadership shown by the Brown 
government and the multilateral nature of what followed seems to bring home the fact that 
rather than just setting an example, the Brown government helped to directly construct 
what amounted to a transnational public of elites (politicians and technocrats) post-lehman 
Brothers. Together with the US, other countries within Europe such as France and economic 
technocrats one can easily see that the UK government helped to form a public which 
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conducted what Dewey believed was the primary task for any public: to achieve such 
recognition of itself across wider society to give weight to its attempts to modify 
government and associative behaviour in it interests (Dewey, LW2: 283). 
This was not a public of citizens attempting to change the state and government of their 
respective nation states. But rather, as Dewey suggested, it was the likely trajectory of 
global democracy, a public of national governments acting in consort and attempting to 
remould both national and international governance. Most importantly, however, what 
emerged from the formation of such a transnational public of elites was the lasting sense 
that multilateralism through coordinated and collaborative actions of nation states was the 
best way forward in the crisis of the real economy, which ensued after September 2008. 
This was reflected, for example, when domestic monetary policy, which pre-crisis had 
followed the Neo-Liberal mantra of inflation targeting, was subject to coordinated interest 
rate cuts from central banks such as the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve, the ECB, the 
People's Bank of China and Bank of Canada.77 By February 2009 both the Federal Reserve 
and the Bank of England had cut rates to 0.5% and both emulated the actions of the Bank of 
Japan at the turn of the century by embarking on quantitative easing7S (Smith, 2010: 197-
201). However, the most significant policy change which came about on the back of the 
emergence of such a transnational elite public and its enduring sense of the need for 
multilateralism, was the appearance of a new transnational consensus within this 
transnational elite public about the need to return to Keynesian analysis and policy 
prescription to deal with the crisis in the real economy. 
77 The changing of monetary policy actually took place on the same day (8th October 2008) of the initial 
announcement of the structure and funds of the UK government's bank bailout and continued through 2009. 
78 Quantitative Easing involves central banks creating money to effectively buy assets such as government debt 
issues. 
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7.2 The apparent return of the Master: Keynesian Stimulus 
The grounds for the emergence of what we can call a 'Keynesian Stimulus' public had been 
laid with the growing expert opinion of economists such as the IMF's Chief economist Oliver 
Blanchard and public interventions by economists such as Barry Eichengreen, Paul Krugman 
and Joseph Stiglitz. The banking crisis in 2008 had now morphed into a crisis of the global 
economy which saw 7Yz per cent decline in the GDP of advanced economies and a 6 X per 
cent decline in Global GDP (annualised) during the fourth quarter of 2008 (IMF, 2009: xv). 
These authors saw the bank recapitalisation policies as the first step of a re-emergence of 
Keynesian policy prescription and subsequently believed that the second step would be to 
use Keynesian policies such as increasing government spending (fiscal stimulus) to stimulate 
demand to deal with the fall in aggregate demand, rising unemployment and the liquidity 
trap79 national economies and governments were now confronted by in late 2008/early 
2009. 
This had been rather revolutionary because it seemed to suggest that lessons Neo-
liberalism had provided for over thirty years were actually factually wrong. As Farrell and 
Quiggin (2012: 21) point out: 
'The dominant approach to macroeconomic policy was based on the assumption 
that an independent central bank, adjusting short-term interest rates in line with a 
'Taylor rule,' could manage the economy in such a way as to achieve both stable 
inflation and reasonably steady economic growth. Active fiscal policy could not 
improve on this outcome, and would effectively be neutralised by offsetting 
79 Th, . IS IS where at zero per cent interest rates citizens are still unwilling to purchase as much as they are willing 
to produce. At the same time, the amount being saved - income not spent on consumption - is more than the 
amount businesses are willing to invest (Krugman 2012: 136). 
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adjustments to monetary policy. The "Great Moderation" (a general reduction in the 
volatility of output, prices and employment beginning in the 1980s) was seen as the 
happy outcome of this policy framework.' 
The IMF was the first to herald the return of Keynesian policy when it called for a $2 trillion 
coordinated stimulus in late 2008 at the G20. The UK government was again at the heart of 
policy action announcing this sea change in economic thinking, with the first fiscal stimulus 
package of any advanced Western economy in November 2008. This amounted to £20 
billion stimulus, the centrepiece of which was a cut in VAT from 17.5% to 15% which was to 
run from December 2008 to the end of 2009. This had taken place nearly simultaneously 
with the announcement of China's $584 billion stimulus package and was followed by 
Barrack Obama's signing of $787 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in 
February 2009. Throughout 2009 countries such as France, Japan and Germany and others 
across both the developed and developing worlds put forth their own fiscal stimulus 
packages (Skidelsky, 2009: 19 cf. Table 2 below). 
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Table 2: Fiscal Stimulus Packages 2008-2009 
Total fiscal Total fiscal Ukely spendlnl Spendlnl In 2009 
packale (USD packaleas I In 2009 (In USD as a percentile 
billions) percentile of GDP billions) ofGDP 
In 2009 
Argentina 13.2 3.9 13.2 3.9 
Brazil 3.6 0.2 3.6 0.2 
Canada 31.06 2 15.53 1 
China 586 13 257.84 6.1 
France 32.75 1.1 33 1.1 
Germany 103.3 2.8 44.42 1.2 
Italy 6.3 0.3 6.3 0.3 
Japan 110 2.3 70.4 1.5 
Netherlands 7.56 0.8 7.56 0.8 
Spain 14.05 0.8 14.05 0.8 
United Kingdom 36.36 1.3 33.81 1.2 
United States 787 S.6 251.84 1.8 
Advanced Economies 1194.41 515.6 
Developing and 
Emerging Economies 795.57 378.87 
Source Khatiwada (2009) 
Although the enduring legacy of the transnational elite public and its sense of 
multilateralism created post-Lehman's had laid the ground for such initiatives, it would be a 
misnomer not to consider the elite lobbying that also transpired to form the 'Keynesian 
transnationa l elite public'. Initially, as Smith (2010: 196) and Newman (2010) outline, 
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German Chancellor Angela Merkel and policy makers were essentially opposed to the idea 
of fiscal stimulus of any kind. The UK and US governments, however, applied external 
pressure to Germany, with Gordon Brown once more lobbying the EU member states to 
form a coordinated policy and the EU Commission itself pushing for Germany to spend 1% 
of its GDP on stimulus packages before the European council summit in December 2008 
(Farrell and QUiggin, 2012: 25). In turn, Brown once more sought to get global coordination 
on stimulus before the meeting of the G20 by embarking upon a three continent tour in five 
days, a week before the summit. This saw him deliver speeches at the European Parliament 
and in the US and conduct a press conference with President lula in Brazil, all of which 
argued for the need of stimulus to revive the global economy (Brown 2010 cf. Rawnsley, 
2010: 623-625). 
The zenith of the 'Keynesian Stimulus' public and its continuance of the traits associated 
with the transnational elite public that preceded it, took place at the G20 conference in 
London in April 2009. The overall tenor of the G20 was presented as nothing less than the 
reformation of global governance and approach to globalisation. It was here that that 
Keynesian transnational elite public, spearheaded by Brown and the rock star status of 
newly elected President Obama, announced the supplanting of the G8 with the far more 
representative G2080 which now included Brazil, India and China; the three fold increase of 
the IMF's resources to $750 million, $250 billion in credit for trade finance and the provision 
of $250 billion currency reserves for developing nations. Moreover, the leaders' 
communique engendered multilateralism further through a commitment to coordinated 
economic stimulus totalling up to a mind boggling $5 Trillion. 
80 The G20 member countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, UK, US, EU. 
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'We are undertaking an unprecedented and concerted fiscal expansion, which will 
save or create millions of jobs which would otherwise have been destroyed, and that 
will, by the end of next year, amount to $5 trillion, raise output by 4 per cent, and 
accelerate the transition to a green economy. We are committed to deliver the scale 
of sustained fiscal effort necessary to restore growth' (G20, 2009).81 
7.3 Creative Democracy or Bourgeois Democracy? 
How then do we assess the publics of transnational elites, which emerged from 2008 up to 
2010 from a Deweyan perspective on global democracy? At the time many believed that the 
long cherished ideas of neo-liberalism were being challenged after being shown to be 
questionable. Keynes' biographer lord Skidelsky (2009) proclaimed 'The Return of the 
Master'; whilst Dani Rodrik (2008), citing challenges by economists such as Paul Krugman, 
Martin Wolf and larry Summers, even seemed ready to declare the 'death of neo-Iiberal 
globalisation' . 
Keeping in line with this style of thinking and as hinted at above, one could argue that the 
leadership shown by the Brown government seemed to take such a questioning of neo-
liberalism into the international arena. And that the multilateral nature of what followed 
seems to bring home the fact that rather than just setting an example, the Brown 
government helped to directly construct what amounted to a transnational public and 
community of elites and experts (politicians and technocrats) post-lehman Brothers. The 
actions of 'Bank Recapitalisation' and 'Keynesian Stimulus' publics can be said to have lived 
81 
The G2Q was to later announce changes to the voting distribution in the IMF to try and reflect the new found 
appreciation for the rising economic power of countries like China and India. The organisation also provided 
the impetus for reforms of voting representation in the World Bank (see Wade 2011b). 
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up to cosmopolitan nationalism that resides at the heart of a Deweyan conception of global 
democracy. 
The crux of the argument here is that there was a realisation amongst elites that rather than 
pursuing unilateral strategies, what was needed was multilateral action in order to deal with 
what amounted, either through direct contagion or through the panic of markets, to a 
global financial crisis. Moreover, this was the realisation that communication between 
respective nation state elites and coordinated and collaborative actions at state and inter-
state level, such as bank recapitalisation or interest rate changes, would be key to securing 
not only national financial systems but the overall global financial system. 
This in turn was built upon by the emergence of the Keynesian Stimulus public whose elites 
coordinated multilateral stimulus packages which were ' ... instrumental in averting a 
potential deflationary spiral and protracted period of exceedingly high unemployment' IMF 
(2011: 18). And in the process of the Keynesian Stimulus public supplanting the G8 with the 
G20, the proposed reform of international financial institutions like the IMF and its demand 
for new global banking rules in the guise of Basell Ill, one could argue that this process 
amounted to a form of cosmopolitan nationalism which enacted creative democracy at the 
international level. In short, it appears that both publics recognised that their own national 
interests were linked with the national interests of other nations and that multilateralism 
trumped unilateralism. 
Without doubt the 'Bank Recapitalisation' and 'Keynesian Stimulus' publics and their 
multilateral policies have meant that we have endured a global Great Recession and in large 
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part avoided another global Great Depression.82 However, as writers such as Stiglitz (2010) 
point out, the problem with the above narrative is that it only tells half of the story. It is 
quite true that neo-liberalism was questioned and that the Brown government did help to 
construct a transnational public elite. And that at various moments this looked much like 
Dewey's suggested trajectory of global democracy: a public of national governments acting 
in consort and creating a transnational 'community' of sorts. However, just as Dewey was 
aware that publics could be created which harboured undemocratic intentions we must also 
be aware of such possibilities. And as we shall see below and in the next chapter, what has 
happened since late 2008 is not governments and technocrats forming a public to enact 
creative democracy at the domestic and international level, but rather the perpetuation of 
bourgeoisie democracy both at home and beyond. 
Dewey argued that in the 1920's and 30's political parties ruled but they did not govern, 
acting as quasi 'servants of the same dominant railway, banking, and corporate industrial 
forces' (LW6: 186 cf. lW5: 442). This was not just through blatant or corrupt control of 
government, but rather because the hegemonic identification of capitalism and democracy 
and the ability of business to actually organise itself as a public meant that it was able to 
reform the state and government in much the same way as 'dynastic interests' controlled 
government two centuries prior (LW2: 302). Therefore in the inevitable clash between 
private property interests and the interest of the masses, all the 'habits of thought and 
action' impelled the institutions of political democracy to side with the former over the 
latter (LW6: 159). 
82 A . 
recession is normally taken to be a GDP contraction of six months, where as a depression is period before 
the real level of GDP regains its previous high. 
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What is startling is that the very same characteristics Dewey aligns with the practise of 
bourgeoisie democracy in the 1920's and 1930's are easily found in the bank bailouts of 
2008. And as' document below, in 3 key areas one can easily find the tenets of bourgeois 
democracy, where through the hegemonic identification of capitalism and democracy lead 
governments to favour property interests over the interests of the masses, in the actions of 
the 'Bank Recapitalisation' and 'Keynesian Stimulus' publics. 
1) Bourgeoisie Democracy created a blank cheque to socialise losses and privatise 
pro/its 
The debate about whether the nationalisation of banks via recapitalisation was the right 
course of action has raged since September 2008. The adage 'too big to fail' has essentially 
become the byword for explaining that governments and technocrats believed that UK and 
US bank balance sheets posed a systemic risk to the domestic and latterly global economy. 
At the height of the banking crisis, for example, the biggest 6 US banks had combined asset 
footprint that totalled 61 % of US GDP and the top four UK banks held assets footprints that 
were equal to 394% of GDP (Blyth 2013: 82-84). And as we have seen, the result of this Was 
that in 2008 the UK and US governments, acting in the apparent interests of their citizens 
, 
effectively nationalised most of their biggest banks. In turn governments across Europe 
followed suit in what can be seen as the largest corporate bailout in history. 
Governments and taxpayers in 2008 effectively bailed out the incompetence of the finanCial 
services at unprecedented expense to the public purse. In fact the numbers are mind-
boggling. In the US the up-front costs of the bailout amounted to 12.1 percent of GDP 
, 
around $1.75 trillion. However, when the entirety ofthe Fed's commitments are factored in 
, 
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such as guarantees and foreign-exchange swaps with foreign central banks, this total 
approaches near 80% of GDP and totalled some $12 trillion (Stiglitz 2010). In the UK the 
guarantees and bailouts peaked at 83% of GDP at £1.2 trillion but more recently has been 
revised down to a not too measly sum of £512 billion by 2011 (NAO 2010). Some of this 
money is only on state balance sheets as guarantees and may not actually be paid out, but 
the direct bill for the financial crisis will run into tens, if not hundreds, of billions. 
As Robert Peston outlines, the favouring of the finance sector's interests over the general 
citizenry is easy to spot with the bank bailouts of 2008: 
'In 2008 when it all went wrong for banks and for the economies of Britain and 
America, bank bosses and traders lost some of their accumulated wealth, if it was 
held in bank shares. And their pay fell a bit, although not remotely in proportion to 
what happened to the value of their banks. Nor did they hand back the vast bonuses 
and rewards they had pocked in the previous years, even though we now know 
those bonuses came from profits generated in a way that came to bankrupting us all. 
As for the allegedly sophisticated institutions that lent to banks, they weren't forced 
to endure write-ofts of their loans to banks ... So those mainly responsible for the 
banking crisis suffered limited pains - in stark contrast to the rest of us.' (Peston 
2012: 49-50) 
The above quote highlights the inherent favouring of the interests of finance capital over 
the interests of citizens in both the short and long term. In 2008, governments essentially 
provided banks and financial institutions with a blank cheque to transfer their losses from 
the state to the government and keep the profit. In this scenario, top bank executives and 
creditors benefitted from government money and actually exploited such a situation to 
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extract immediate capital out of the bailout; a scenario that would not have happened if 
financial institutions had been left to go bankrupt. Indeed, the handing out of government-
backed monies appeared to open the flood gates for bankers to game the system. 
The prime example of this form of short-term opportunism happened in the US where the 
government seemed to provide money with very little oversight as to where it was gOing or 
why it was actually needed. The Bush administration for instance, worried that if AIG was 
not bailed out, large banks to which it had sold credit-default swaps, and which function like 
insurance polices on corporate failure, would also begin to fail. Prior to its bailout AIG had 
been negotiating with the banks in order to get write downs and accept as little as 60 cents 
on the dollar. However, the banks were confident that the government would not allow AIG 
to go bankrupt and thus held out for 100 cents on the dollar (Johnson and Kwak 2010: 169-
170). 
With the AIG bailout that objective was achieved and the initial £85 billion bailout of AIG 
eventually ballooned to $180 billion. From this, over a quarter of it would immediately go to 
settle debts with Goldman Sachs, Merrill lynch, Bank of America, Citigroup and foreign 
banks such as Deutsche Bank (Johnson and Kwak 2010: 169-170). And disturbingly one can 
find similar examples of bankers gaming the system to extract money from the government 
and transfer losses to citizens in bailouts of Citigroup and Bank of America after its merger 
with Merrilllynch (Sorkin 2010: 533-537).83 These examples bring home the fact that in the 
83 The Bank of America merger with Merrill Lynch, for example, was presented as the best way to save the 
latter. However, in the run up to the deal Merrill Lynch's trade losses ballooned and by early 2009 Bank of 
America was itself to ask for $20 billion bailout from the government to cover itself. What later emerged, 
however, is that Merrill Lynch's executives had made the balance sheet of the bank even worse by paying 
themselves billions of dollars just before the deal was signed. 
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initial stages of the crisis the US government seemed to favour the interests of finance 
capital and didn't use the leverage it had over banks to extract the best deal for its wider 
citizens. 
The use of hundreds of billions of dollars in the US was apparently geared towards saving 
insurance and pension funds from big losses. Banks and financial institutions were 
presented as 'socially worthy' claimants. However, this thinking seemingly disguises the 
bailing out of banks that conducted risky lending with saving those with whom we have 
made a social contract. The alternative of simply throwing money at things without 
oversight simply carries no weight. As Stiglitz (2010: 130) bluntly puts it, there was 'no 
justification for spending twenty dollars to bailout investors so that one dollar can go to a 
pension fund that might otherwise be in trouble.' Instead of simply giving Wall Street carte 
blanche the US government should have examined where the money needed to go and 
made sure it went there and only there. 
Despite finance capital's brazen approach of from socialising losses and extracting profits 
from tax payers in the crisis of 2008 the greatest example of government favouring finance 
capital interests over the interest of ordinary citizens centres on the long term effects of the 
2008 bailouts. This concerns what has happened to the real economy and banking industry 
after the crisis of 2008. Or rather what has happened to the real economy and what hasn't 
happened to banking industry post 2008. As we have seen post Lehman Brothers the global 
economy nose dived and unemployment soared across both advanced and developing 
economies. Lost output from 2008 to 2011 totals some 8 percent across advanced 
economies. And as Haldane (2010) outlines the total loss of output (now and in the future) 
is between one and five times annual world GDP in 2009. To put this in cash terms, the 
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financial crisis led to output loss of $60-200 trillion for the global economy and between 
£1.8-7.4 trillion for the UK. 
With such a contraction of GDP also came fall in state tax revenues and states took on debt 
on to plug the shortfall. Governments thus began running budget deficits in the first 
instance and saw increased government debt in the second instance. (Blyth 2013: 46). 
Between 2007-2009, for example, the UK, the US and the Eurozone increased public debt by 
between 20-40% of GDP (Blackburn 2011). And as the IMF (2010: 14) point out, two-thirds 
of the increase in debt across DECD counties and the can be explained by the fall in GDP 
during 2008-9, the cost of bailing out financial sectors and revenue losses from lower asset 
prices and financial sector profits. This is why the 2012 report issued by the Better Markets 
Institute of Washington locates the total cost to the US economy, when GDP loss is factored 
in, as somewhere around $13 trillion dollars (Blyth 2013: 45). 
These secondary costs induced by the financial crisis and the recession it brought about 
, 
however, have not been passed onto the financial industry. In fact rather perversely, the 
baking sector has continued to be a site of bonuses and profit. By 2009 whilst 
unemployment in the US was around 10%, due to what had now become known as The 
Great Recession, banks were seemingly 'minting money again'. Goldman Sachs posted 
record profits of $13.4 billion and paid out $16.2 billion in bonuses, on average $498,000 
per employee. Even apparently 'troubled firms' like Citigroup and Bank of America raced to 
payoff their TARP money as to not undergo the bonus restrictions they signed up to When 
taking US government funds (Sorkin 2010: 545-46). By 2012 the US banking industry had 
recovered to the point of posting $34.7billion profits. (Nasiripour, 2013). In the UK, bonuses 
in 2009 stood at the same levels as 2006 and the wage bill for The City actually rose from 
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£32 billion in 2007 to £37 billion in 2009 (Peston 2012: 46; Englen at al: 31). By 2012 the 
underlying pre-tax profit of the UK's top five banks {Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, 
RBS and Standard Chartered rose by 45% to £31.5 billion84• 
What the contrasting fortunes of the baking sector and national economies bring to life is 
how the bank bailouts and actions since 2008 favoured the interests of finance capital over 
citizens. Both the UK and US governments have brought in a 'bank levy', which aim to 
recover money given out to the financial sector and to promote better business practises. 
The thinking on the latter point being that banks would roll back executive bonuses to cover 
the levy fees. However, when the details are examined the numbers don't realty add up. For 
instance, President Obama's 'Financial Responsibility Fee' is geared towards securing $90 
billion over 10 years from 2014 (Braithwaite 2010). The Labour government did implement a 
5-month bonus tax at the end of 2009 but it was temporary so as not to make the City of 
London uncompetitive in a global finance and its successor, the UK's collation government, 
brought in a bank levy that raises around £2.6 billion a year (Peston 2012: 371). Yet, when 
one compares these figures to the estimated secondary costs of the UK (£1.8-7.4 trillion) 
and US (12-13 trillion) the ruse becomes clear that 'banks may have made the losses, but 
the citizenry will pay for the losses' (Blyth 2013: 47). 
84 This figure was later reduced to El1.7 billion, some 40% down on 2011 profits. However, this was nothing to 
with tough business conditions but rather because the banks had been find for regulatory failures such as the 
misspelling of Payment Protection Insurance (PPI) to people who could not claim in the first place. 
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2) Market fundamentalism persisted post-Lehmann Brothers even in the face of 
evidence that contradicted such belief 
The question that emerges from the bank bailouts of 2008 is why did they favour of finance 
capital's interest in the first place? The actions of governments post Lehman Brothers have 
been taken by some to be a reflection 'regulatory capture' by finance capital. As Stiglitz 
(2012:253) points out, ' .. .in the great bailout that marked the beginning of the Great 
Recession, the head of New York Fed was one of the triumvirate (along with the federal 
reserve and secretary of Treasury) that shaped the bailout, determined who got saved and 
who got executed. And he, in turn, had been nominated by a committee that consisted of 
bankers and CEOs from the same firms that were bailed out on the most favourable terms.' 
As Englen et al. (20122: 173) highlight, the City of London has also gained greater influence 
and access through successive Conservative and Labour governments since the 1980's and 
the UK's government's susceptibility to the City's influence increased markedly under New 
Labour. 
However, despite this accusations of plutocracy and outright corruption what makes the link 
between finance capital and government truly powerful was the hegemonic ideas of neo-
liberalism amongst near all concerned. As Wade outlines, the crisis and its aftermath 
highlights the hegemony of neo-liberalism rather than its demise and saw the re-emergence 
of neo-liberal ideas that had served governments well in the 30 year period beforehand. Old 
habits die hard and neo-liberalism was too all intents and purposes still the dominant policy 
paradigm even after the fall of Lehman Brothers (Wade 2011a: 17,31-32). 
What the above highlights is the validity of Oewey's contention about bourgeoisie 
democracy not simply being about blatant corruption but the hegemonic identification of 
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capitalism and democracy where in the inevitable clash between private property interests 
and the interest of the masses, all the 'habits of thought and action' impelled the 
institutions of political democracy to side with the former over the latter (LW6: 159). The 
real reason the bank bailouts took place in the way they did then is because governments 
had bought into the narrative of neo-liberal globalisation and continued to do so even in the 
face of evidence that contradicted such a belief. 
The bank recapitalisation programs of the UK and US government highlight how both 
governments attempted to restore the priority and efficiency of the market in a belief that 
this would restore prosperity. The model of bank bailouts via recapitalisation that most 
governments followed, especially the UK, was Sweden's approach of the early 1990's. When 
Sweden suffered a banking crisis in 1992, produced by the collapse of a property boom, its 
government took control of near all banks and restructured them. At the end of this process 
the Swedish government re-privatised the banks in the late 90's breaking even with the 
Swedish taxpayer and maintaining the flow of credit in the economy (Peston 2012: 373-
375). However, because of residual beliefs about the inefficiency of government and the 
public sector vis-a-vis the apparent efficiency of markets and the private sector the 
governments of the Bank Recapitalisation public did not nationalise but rather 'semi-
nationalised' banks. 
In the UK, for example, based on the advice of Treasury technocrats such as Tom Scholar, 
John Kingman and Shriti Vadera, the worry was that nationalised banks would turn into 
supposed unproductive state entities. On the basis of this, the UK Financial Investments 
(UKFI) company was created and staffed by recruits from The City of London to manage the 
banks in a commercial way and to create value for taxpayers and shareholders. This allowed 
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banks like RBS and Lloyds to continue running as independent commercial companies and to 
allow their boards to continue to make decisions in the best interests of shareholders. The 
thinking being that when the banks would return to profit the government, as Sweden's 
government had done in the 1990's, would sell its shares at a profit {Peston 2012: 373-374}. 
This process was also replicated in the US where both President Bush and his successor 
President Obama rejected nationalisation on the basis that it contradicted the free market 
and the so-called (American way' (Stiglitz, 2010: 111-118}.85 
The problem with this approach of reinstating the principles of the free market by 
governments was twofold. On one hand, such an approach failed to question how neo-
liberalism's values of the power of markets and the incentive of shareholder value helped to 
create the financial crisis in the first place. As Englen et at. (2011) point out, the pursuit of 
shareholder value and the excessive remuneration for top executives for securing such 
shareholder value largely explains the over leveraging which caused the financial crisis in 
2008. The US and UK government policies of leaving control of the banks to apparently self-
interested independent commercial companies, who pay market rates on pay, effectively 
restored the credibility of such practises rather than questioning them. Moreover, both UK 
and US governments took it as axiomatic that market forces, rather than government 
intervention, would help to restore banks to profit and via eliCiting such market-self interest 
to eventually alleviate the financial burden governments and tax payers had taken on. This 
8S The same non-criticism of neo-liberal ideals can also be found in the way banker remuneration was not 
regulated after the crisis. The pay of top bankers increased tenfold in the UK between 1990-2006, Whilst 
average gross pay did not even double. In the 2007-8 financial year, at the height of the crisis, 45% of all 
bonuses paid in the UK, some £19 billion, was paid as bonuses in the financial sector despite it only accounting 
for 3.7% of the workforce. Even in 2011, RBS' chief Simon Hester, who is technically a state employee, took 
home pay packages worth £7.1 million (Peston, 2012: 46). The rationale here was that government owned 
institutions must be able to attract top bankers in order to restructure and reform the insolvent banks 
governments had to rescue 
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coming on the back of the biggest example of how free markets are essentially prone to 
creating consequences which go against the interests of citizens. 
On the other hand, the policies of governments fundamentally failed to acknowledge how 
those very principles were actually suspended by government action in the 2008 financial 
crisis. Put simply, in late 2008 capital markets were claiming that the price of US and UK 
bank's assets were incorrect and on that basis were withdrawing liquidity in the form of 
short term lending to banks. Governments intervened because the ramifications of such 
market action would have essentially bought down the banking sector both nationally and 
internationally. One can argue that this was necessity to safe guard the banking system and 
literally guarantee that citizens could withdraw their money from cash points in late 
September 2008. But the basic argument still stands: governments questioned the logic of 
free markets and took actions that basically suspended markets by substituting commercial 
capital for public expenditure. Yet, this apparent realisation that markets are not always 
rational or beneficial was routinely forgotten after the saving of the financial industry via 
recapitalisation. 
Without government control of banks, UK and US banks for example, have been left to 
make commercial decisions about lending. In essence, banks were left to act as if they were 
never actually bailed out by the government. In turn, as banks have attempted to 
deleverage, they have contracted their lending to the wider economy. This was partly to be 
expected due to the deleverage process, but what also happened was that banks have 
effectively stopped lending to business and the general real economy. During December to 
February 2012 for instance, bank lending to business in the UK contracted at 7.9%, which 
small and medium sized business need to expand and grow (Peston 2012). Despite 
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government attempts to force banks to lend by setting targets like the ones under project 
Merlin, the reality is that banks received public funds and then have been starving the public 
of funds. Again some deleveraging was needed and loans to risky loans should be harder to 
obtain. However, the reality is that successive governments have abided by bourgeoisie 
democracy's mantra that the market knows best and that the market secures democratic 
outcomes. In turn government have failed to get the lifeblood of capital out to people who 
actually need it and favoured the interests of those who do not deserve such support. 
3) Both publics provided palliative policy dealing with the symptoms rather than the 
causes of the financial crisis 
In the hindsight the bailout of the banks was probably economically correct and politically 
inevitable. The alternative of simply allowing the market to correct itself would have 
probably led to depression (Stiglitz 2012). And as Peston (2012: 49) outlines 'when mega 
banks get into difficulties, they are always bailed out and rescued by taxpayers' because no 
politician wants bank failure to happen on their watch. But if we agree with this we 
subsequently don't have to agree with the means used to achieve such ends. Or to put it in 
a Deweyan register we don't have to agree with the bourgeoisie democracy that informed 
the means of the bank bailout and which dealt with the symptoms rather than the causes of 
financial crisis.s6 
The classic case in point is the structural flaws that were left and indeed remain within 
banking sectors. Given that many have argued, incorrectly as I show below, that the banking 
crisis was simply a regulatory failure derived from the de-regulation under neo-liberalism it 
86 For a different that argues that banks should have probably been left to go bankrupt see Blyth (2013) 
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is rather odd that there has been little regulation post 2008. The case of moral hazard in 
banking is a classic example. Where governments simply handed out billions to banks 
without punishing the excessive risk taking such institutions had partaken in. As Stiglitz 
(2010: 135-37) outlines, in the case of the US, the government could have been forward 
looking and decided not to reward excessive risk taking with a bailout. In its place the 
government could have rewarded healthy and well-managed banks or even constructed 
new banks with TARP funds. Rather the actions of the US government seemed to reveal a 
perverse moral hazard that suggested that those who committed the worst practise of risk 
management were to get the biggest gifts from government. 
The outcome of this is that whilst banks have been stabilised through public funds and 
socialised their losses they are still too big to fail. In the US, Bank of America absorbed 
Countrywide and Merrill Lynch and saw its asset base jump from $1.7 trillion to $2.3 trillion. 
Whilst JPMorgan Chase absorbed Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual and grew from $1.6 
trillion to $2 trillion. In all the biggest five banks in US now have balance sheets that equal 
56% of GDP up from the 43% at the height of the crisis. The situation is even worse in the 
UK. In 2008, the UK's four biggest institutions had 64 per cent of market share, and that 
share had been falling; by 2010, it was 77 per cent. Within the UK banking sector RBS (£1.5 
trillion), BarcJays (£1.6 Trillion) and HSBC (£1.6 trillion) whose loan and investments match 
or are even higher than UK GDP of about £1.5 trillion (Kwak and Johnson 2010; Peston, 
2012: 389-90). To paraphrase someone more eloquent than myself, then, some 4 years 
down line and billions later these banks still hold the potential to bring this sucker down. 
When one turns to Keynesian Stimulus public the same issue of neo-liberal resurgence 
amongst elites emerges. As writers such as Krugman (2012) and Stiglitz (2012) have made 
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clear, the relative size of the fiscal stimulus packages were too small and did not tailor 
themselves to long-term investment but rather looked to save the present order. This is 
itself backed up by the fact the stimulus packages also failed to come to terms with how the 
very structure of their societies facilitated the financial crash in the first place. 
Roubini et al. (2010: 2-3) point to the fact that the financial crisis was largely a bye product 
of how the global economy has been structured under the tenets of neo-liberal 
globalisation. This has basically seen the world economy become split between surplus 
countries such as China and Germany who export to deficit countries such as US, UK and 
southern European states. In export countries such as China and Germany wages and thus 
internal demand are held down by state policy forcing other countries to run trade deficits. 
The outcome was that world economic growth became dependant on the expansion of 
demand in US, UK and other deficit countries. In turn this induced capital flows from 
surplus countries to achieve such ends: 
'The resulting fragility manifested itself in two kinds of problems. The first was the 
external problem of currency recycling from surplus countries to deficit countries 
(especially from China, with its giant dollar surplus, to the United States, with its 
giant deficit). The second was the corresponding internal problem of credit recycling 
in the United States and the UK, as households and firms took on the debt 
corresponding to the external deficit, raising debt-to-income ratios to historically 
high levels.' (Wade 2009: 10-11) 
This situation was compounded by the rise of wealth inequality within advanced economies 
like the US and UK which shifted wealth from those who readily us their all their income to 
consume to those with a lower marginal propensity to consume. The result of such a 
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situation was that speculative surplus capital at the top of the income stream was diverted 
into financial speculation, which contributed to the power of financial capital and lad the 
ground for its risky endeavours. Surplus capital and the international capital flows were 
thus used to fund a great expanses of credit, which helped to mitigate the insufficient 
aggregate demand such wealth inequality normally generates. As Wade (2009: 13) sums up: 
'The liquidity crisis itself was due to holders of securitized financial assets suddenly 
panicking about not knowing the reliability of the loans wrapped into their 
securities; and to financial organizations restricting credit because of not knowing 
their would-be borrowers' exposure to "toxic" assets or to other organizations 
holding toxic as- sets. The liquidity crisis then transmuted into a global economic 
crisis as the inherent tendency to overproduction broke through the earlier credit-
and-debt defenses against overproduction-overproduction itself being partly a 
consequence of widening income inequality.' 
What this highlights is that it was therefore incorrect to believe that temporary stimulus and 
the restoration of bank lending to pre-crisis levels would be a desirable outcome or be likely 
to address these issues (Stiglitz 2012: 233). In fact the movement towards deficit countries 
to expand imports to rebalance could not take place without expansion of domestic demand 
in surplus countries such as Germany and China. Despite the claims of Brown (2010) and 
Darling (2011) these issues were never really countenanced by the Keynesian Stimulus 
public in any form of policy. Indeed, as we shall see in the next chapter, Germany fails to see 
how its growth model is key to understanding the Eurozone crisis. 
This failure to act on the core issues of the financial crisis is also exemplified in the wealth 
inequality was inherently accepted by elites within the Keynesian Stimulus public because it 
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was literally the flip of the same coin used to justify paying supposed market rates for 
bankers. Within the tenants of Neo-liberalism the competitive labour market provided 
optimal income distribution; pay is fair as long as markets are competitive. The Keynesian 
Stimulus public failed to see how such income inequality, which is structurally embedded in 
economies such as the US and UK, was part of the reason why economies became 'debt-
intensive' in the first place. And as Wade (2012) shows, wealth inequality continues to rise 
both within and between developed and developing states. What was thus seen in polices 
of the Keynesian Stimulus public, however, was the inability of elites to go beyond the 
hegemony of Neo-liberalism and its ideal of the market dictating the perception of reality. 
7.4 Wither (Creative) Global Democracy? 
This tracing of the political reaction to the financial crisis as a Deweyan history of publics 
inherently has two important insights for the current politics of globalisation and fortunes of 
global democracy. In the first instance, the actions of states had essentially proven once and 
for all that when push came to shove nation states could act multilaterally and move against 
markets. Neo-Liberal globalisation may have bought about the decline of modern 
sovereignty but when acting together nation states can achieve multilateral goals. 
However, in the second instance it is quite clear that the tenor of the transnational elite 
publics did not depart from the tenets of bourgeois democracy. The policies of the Bank 
Recapitalisation and Keynesian Stimulus publics were asymmetrical, with finance capital 
receiving the benefits and citizens receiving very little of the upsides. And there actually 
was a rehabilitation of ideas of market fundamentalism that others thought had been 
thoroughly questioned and discredited 
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There consequently was not great rethinking of cherished ideas but rather the negation of 
questions about the general order of Neo-Liberal globalisation such as income distribution 
and the status of banking. Rather than Deweyan creative democracy, the Bank 
Recapitalisation and Keynesian Stimulus publics continued to practise bourgeois democracy 
with neo-liberal ideals informing government policy. The status of banking is the greatest 
example of the negation of neo-liberalism's apparent negation. For after committing 
trillions of public expenditure to the financial system and uncovering the now well known 
secret that the banking sector, due to the liabilities it creates is effectively always part of the 
public sector even when in private hands, government's continued to treat banks as private 
entities. It was not only the banks that had catastrophically failed but also elites who failed 
hold their nerve and move on from neo-liberal's long cherished ideas. And as I show in the 
next chapter, this form of bourgeoisie democracy has not only become more prevalent in 
the age of austerity but has also led to a return to bull headed nationalism and a 
contemporary eclipse of the public. 
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Chapter 8: Austere World 
Upon first glance it is tempting to see the 'Bank Recapitalisation' and 'Keynesian Stimulus' 
publics of elites and experts, which emerged after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and 
enacted the stimulus packages of 2008-2009, as a unified collective of 21st century 
government interventionists and Keynesians. However, as the last chapter showed this 
narrative fails to acknowledge the hegemony of neo-liberal globalisation amongst elites and 
how government policy not only reasserted neo-liberal ideals of markets and non-
government intervention but also saw the continuance of bourgeois democracy. Within this 
chapter I shall examine how the practise of bourgeois democracy, where the interests of 
capital and markets are placed above ordinary citizen, have continued with the rise of a 
transnational public of elites and experts, which we can dub the 'Austerity' public. 
The chapter will thus consist of three sections. In the first section I sketch out how the 
transnational Keynesian Stimulus public was replaced by an 'Austerity Public'. This entails 
examining the campaign of elites and experts who opposed the Keynesian Stimulus public 
both from those outside and those inside the Keynesian Stimulus public itself. The second 
section then goes on to demonstrate how the polices of the 'Austerity Public' display 
bourgeois democracy in full bloom and inherently put to an end any residual cosmopolitan 
nationalism amongst elites and experts that was evident in 'Bank Recapitalisation' and 
'Keynesian Stimulus' publics. 
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8.1 From Schadenfreude to the Euro Crisis: The rise of austere elites 
'In the scary months that followed Lehman Brothers, just about all major 
governments agreed that sudden collapse of private property had to be offset, and 
they turned to expansionary fiscal policy and monetary policy - spending more, 
taxing less, and printing lots of monetary base- in an effort to limit the damage. In so 
dOing, they were following the advice of standard textbooks; more important, they 
were following the hard-earned lessons of the Great Depression. But a funny thing 
happened in 2010: much of the word's policy elite - the bankers and financial 
officials who define conventional wisdom - decided to throw out the textbooks and 
it quite suddenly became the fashion to call for spending cuts, tax hikes, and even 
higher interest rates even in the face of mass unemployment.' (Krugman 2012: 188-
189) 
The words of Paul Krugman are a paradox of both reality and myth. The reality is that in 
2010 elites and experts had moved from a public of 'Keynesian Stimulus' to a public of 
'Austerity', which appeared to forget Keynes' contribution to economics. Krugman and 
other Keynesian economists who were key to forming the Keynesian consensus amongst 
other experts had essentially become voices in the wilderness, when not so long ago they 
seemed to be informing government policy. 
The myth, however, as shown in the last chapter is that the move to austerity was a sudden 
move out of nowhere. The start of the rehabilitation and reassertion of neo-liberal 
globalisation's ideas of free markets had itself taken place before austerity became a policy 
norm across the advanced economies. And as I highlight below, austerity is essentially the 
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return to orthodox neo-liberal ideas that markets are always correct and that government is 
a hindrance to economic growth. Contra Krugman, the unravelling of a Keynesian consensus 
to dissensus and then back to relative consensus on the need for fiscal austerity should 
really have come as no great surprise. Moreover, the rise of the 'Austerity' public of elites 
and experts simply confirmed the rehabilitation and reassertion of neo-liberal 
globalisation's policy ideals and the continuance of bourgeois democracy. 
The beginning of the emergence of the Keynesian Stimulus public had not been uncontested 
and had even been contested by people who would en up within the public itself. The 
Governor at the Bank of England, just before the G20 meeting in London, had voiced 
concerns about the UK's fiscal position in light of its own stimulus package. Whilst the 
Conservative Party (still in opposition in 2010) who up to now had backed the New Labour 
government's policy in the financial crisis now saw the fiscal condition of the UK as a policy 
platform to attack Labour upon (Rawnsley, 2010: 623). 
On the continent, post-Lehman Brothers the French and German governments held the 
belief that the 2008 financial crisis was inherently down to the irresponsibility of Anglo-
Saxon Capitalism and indulged in schadenfreude citing UK and US slavish adherence to 
ideals of deregulation and loose money.87 This was reflected in President Sarkozy and 
Chancellor Merkel initially rejecting the need for stimulus and German finance minister Peer 
Stein beck mocking the UK's apparent conversion from the supply side economics of neo-
liberalism to 'crass Keynesianism'. And although both Germany and France would 
eventually join in the Keynesian Stimulus public that emerged in 2008-2009 they were 
87 Even though as it turns out Eurozone banks were more exposed to risk that their US and UK counterparts via 
having lent more to foreign governments within the Eurozone. By 2010 Eurozone banks were taking On far 
more risk that US and UK banks lending 35% more on average relative to their capital than UK banks (Peston 
2012: 232) 
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undoubtedly resistant followers of what appeared to be international consensus amongst 
elites and experts 
Table 2: Government gross debt (as a ~ e r r e n t t g e e of GDP) 
Major advanced economies 
Actual Projections 
United States 71.6 85.2 94.4 100 105 115.4 
Euro Area 70.1 79.7 85.8 88.6 90 86.6 
France 68.2 79 82.3 86.8 89.4 87.7 
Germany 66.4 74.1 84 82.6 81.9 75 
Italy 106.3 116.1 119 121.1 121.4 114.1 
Japan 195 216.3 220 233.1 238.4 253.4 
United Kingdom 52 68.3 75.5 80.8 84.8 80.4 
Canada 71.1 83.3 84 84.1 84.2 73 
Source: IMF (2011) 
By late 2009 and early 2010 the effects of dealing with the financial crisis had lea d to a rise 
in national debt of countries that had launched bank recapitalisation and fi sca l st imulus 
packages. Between 2007-2009, for example, the UK, the US and the Eurozone increased 
sovereign debt from between 20-40% of GDP (Blackburn 2011: 33; Table 2 above). At t he 
same time, there had been a stabilisation of GDP and growth had returned amongst th e 
advanced economies in 2009 and early 2010 (Wade 2011a: 14). Early in 2010 economic 
conservative commentators such as Niall Ferguson and even left leaning economist s such 
Jeffrey Sachs, began to question the stimu lus route and began arguing for fi sca l 
consolidation or what has become known as austerity politics of public spending cuts, t ax 
rises and interest rate rises (B lyth and Shenai 2010). 
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This thinking was replicated in technocratic institutions such as the Bank for International 
Settlement and in the OECD, whose spring 2010 Economic Outlook called for spending cuts, 
tax rises and higher interest rates (Krugman 2012: 189-90). The consensus around Keynesian 
stimulus amongst the elites appeared to wane in the movement of such a body of expert 
opinion and moved towards fiscal consolidation. The first prime examples of this being 
when The ECB and Germany, citing rising fiscal deficits, resisted US calls for another round 
of stimulus packages in early 2010 (Farrell and Quiggin,2012: 36). And the subsequent 
announcement in March 2010 by Gordon's Brown's government of their plan to implement 
£50 billion pounds worth of spending cuts should they win the May 2010 general election 
(Englen at al., 2011: 222). 
In 2010, the move from Keynesian stimulus to austerity became complete amongst most of 
the transnational elite public that arisen in response to the 2008 financial crisis. The catalyst 
for this being the attack on the Greek state by capital markets as the true nature of its fiscal 
position became clear.B8 Unable to raise loans to finance its budgets deficit Greece was 
forced to go cap in hand to the EU and received a (110 billion Euro bailout from the 'trOika' 
of the EU, ECB and IMF in exchange for implementation austerity measures and the reform 
of its public sector. On the back of this, the newly formed collation government in the UK 
, 
headed by Prime Minster Cameron and Chancellor Osborne, who had earlier argued that 
the fate of Greece could become the fate of the UK, now prepared plans for an emergency 
budget in June 201089• 
88 The outgoing Greek government in 2009 had effectively committed fraud with the aid of investment banks 
like Goldman Sachs had hidden public debt as currency transfers. When George Papandreou took over as 
Prime Minister he uncovered a financial deception of gigantic proportions where Greece's budget deficit was 
not the projected 5% but actually 15.6%. 
89 See Osborne (2009), which argues that the then Labour government spending policies could attract the 
wrath of the bond markets as Greece had started to endure in late 2009. 
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Figure 2: DEeD implemented (2009-11) and planned austerity measures (2012-15) as GDP % 
Source OECD (2012) 
As Wade (2011a: 15) outlines, it was the unusual coming together of British and German 
governments, albeit with some resistance from the Obama administration, which facilitated 
a volte-face by G20 leaders at the Toronto summit in June 2010. The undoubted consensus 
amongst the transnational elite was a relative agreement to now halve budget deficits by 
2013: 
'Sound fiscal finances are essential to sustain recovery, provide flexibility to respond 
to new shocks, ensure the capacity to meet the challenges of aging populations, and 
avoid leaving future generations with a legacy of deficits and debt. The path of 
adjustment must be carefully calibrated to sustain the recovery in private demand. 
There is a risk that synchronized fiscal adjustment across several major economies 
could adversely impact the recovery. There is also a risk that the failure to 
implement consolidation where necessary would undermine confidence and hamper 
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growth. Reflecting this balance, advanced economies have committed to fiscal plans 
that will at least halve deficits by 2013 and stabilize or reduce government debt-to-
GDP ratios by 2016.' (G20, 2010) 
After its cementation as the policy norm (see figure 2 above) for advanced economies 
within the G20 in 2010 the policy of the austerity was itself publicly underpinned by two 
central contentions. On one hand, the situation of Greece, as is espoused by elites such as 
Osborne and Merkel, was taken be no outlier. Rather, Greece was emblematic of the fact 
that nation states across the advanced economies had been profligate in their public 
spending and now needed to move towards fiscal consolidation in order to avoid being 
punished by the bond markets. 
On the other hand, this assumption was buttressed by the economic assumption that fiscal 
consolidation can actually be expansionary in the current context and create economic 
demand and growth.90 In this scenario, although a reduction in government spending is 
taken to reduce demand the creation of 'confidence', either through the perception of 
lower interest rates inducing investment or consumers gaining confidence about the 
governments long term tax plans and hence spending again, is taken to more than make up 
for the shortfall. In short, fiscal consolidation is taken to generate conditions of confidence 
that would offset the reduction in demand caused by lower government spending (Krugman 
2012: 196). And these contentions have held fast as the European Sovereign debt crisis has 
evolved throughout 2010 (Greece, Ireland), 2011 (Greece 2nd bailout, Portugal, Italy) and 
2012 (Spain) as various countries and their financial institutions struggled to raise money on 
90 This was primarily based on the work of Harvard economist Alberto Alesina who updated his earlier work 
from the 1990's with Silvia Ardagna in 2009. Alesina and Ardagna (2009) essentially became the bedrock of 
claims about expansionary austerity. 
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capital markets and required EU and ECB assistance to remain liquid and/or solvent. This 
assistance has come at the demand by the ECB that governments who receive assistance 
embark upon austerity 
8.2 Austerity: bourgeoisie democracy with a different name 
If it is safe to conclude that 'Bank Recapitalisation' and 'Keynesian Stimulus' transnational 
publics of elites and experts were still in a sense governed by the hegemony of neo-
liberalism and the practise of bourgeois democracy. Then it is equally safe to say that the 
Austerity public of elites and experts which created relative transnational consensus on 
austerity have completed the restoration of neo-liberalism. But what does this exactly 
mean? Below I firstly highlight how the tendencies of bourgeois democracy amongst elites 
has created a false argument for the merits austerity, which has the all too real 
consequences of benefiting finance capital and the interests of those at the top of the 
income stream. And in the second instance I argue that such an approach has led to the 
collapse of even the pretence of multilateralism that was the hallmark of the 'Bank 
Recapitalisation' and 'Keynesian Stimulus' publics. 
a. Big bank takes little bank 
The fundamental rationale of austerity is that capital markets, primarily the bond market, 
have shown that advanced economies have far too big public sectors and that government 
spending is hurting economic growth and creating unsustainable debt burdens. This 
rationale has been espoused by political elites such as members of the British collation 
government and members of the Eurozone such as Germany. As pOinted out above, this 
rationale is based on two central contentions. On one hand, the situation of Greece is taken 
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be no outlier but rather as being emblematic of the fact that nation states across the 
advanced economies have been profligate in their public spending and need to move 
towards fiscal consolidation in order to avoid being punished by the bond markets. On the 
other hand, this assumption is buttressed by the economic assumption that fiscal 
consolidation can actually be expansionary in the current context and create demand and 
growth. 
The problem with the above argument about austerity as good democratic government is 
that both its central contentions stand on shaky ground and actually reveal the practise of 
bourgeois democracy and the collapse of the traces of cosmopolitan nationalism that were 
residual parts of the prior transnational pUblics. Take for instance, the process where 
political elites and technocrats have attempted to, in the words of Krugman (2012: 179) 
'hellenize' the narrative of advanced economies about the reasons for the fiscal positions of 
advanced economies and the threat of the bond markets. This argument that nation states 
have been over spending is undoubtedly disingenuous because Greece is actually an outlier 
amongst other countries. 
Not only in terms of the fraud Greece conducted with Goldman Sachs in order to cook it 
books but also the nature of the budget deficits it was running vis-a-vis G20 countries. As 
highlighted in the pervious chapter, the reason why states took on large budget deficits and 
increased sovereign debt was down the financial crisis and its secondary costs. Only 1/10 of 
the 'average' 39 percent increase in debt to GDP ratios G20 has been down to fiscal stimulus 
or what we can call extra spending. The vast increase in public debt, two-thirds according to 
the IMF, and the running of budget deficits can rather be explained by the fall in GDP during 
2008-9, the cost of bailing out financial sectors and revenue losses from lower asset prices 
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and financial sector profits. (IMF 2010: 14) Most advanced economies in Europe and North 
America can be accused of spending based on false assumptions of GDP growth and low 
inflation buoyed by runaway global finance but they were not simply over spending at the 
point of the onset offinancial crisis in 2008.91 
The same thing can be said about the second half of the argument that attempts to 
Hellenize the current fiscal balance of advanced nation states: the threat of the bond 
markets. This inherently misunderstands the nature of the present and its liquidity trap. This 
is where at zero percent interest rates, citizens are still unwilling to purchase as much as 
they are willing to produce. At the same time, the amount being saved - income not spent 
on consumption - is more than the amount businesses are willing to invest (Krugman 2012: 
136). The scenario today is that the private sector has been deleveraging and has excess 
savings that do not compete with government spending. There is quite simply a glut of 
money in the private sector that needs an outlet and government debt is essentially a safe 
investment for UK and foreign private sector excess savings. This is backed by the fact that 
UK government borrowing costs are at historical lows and essentially the UK can borrow 
money at 0 % interests rate. As Martin Wolf puts it, governments who are scaremongering 
about 'bond vigilantes' are 'terrified of a confidence bogey who is asleep' (Wolf 2011a).92 
91 
See Portes (2011) for similar arguments specifically against the view that the UK was running large fiscal 
deficits before the 2008 crisis. As Wolf (20l0a) makes clear, the economic legacy of New labour rather than 
being one of over spending was the hubris to believe in the ' ... conventional wisdom about the prospects for 
durable economic stability, the robustness of modern financial markets and, surprisingly perhaps, the strength 
of the post-Thatcher UK economy. He [Gordon Brown] then doubled up on this bet by building his plans for 
public spending on the assumption that the good times would roll on forever' 
92 
As Wade (20lla: 38n11) points out the 'UK government argues that borrowing costs have been contained 
only because of its plans for tough spending cuts. Not so. The spreads on UK government debt over German 
bunds stabilized in February 2010 and have fallen only 0.2percentage point since the election, which suggests 
that the government's strong fiscal stance has brought only modest credibility gains' 
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The assumption that fiscal consolidation can actually be expansionary is also a half-truth 
dressed up as a fact because it fails to comprehend the current situation. The work of 
Alesina and Ardagna (2009) does not, for example, take in consideration that many of the 
options they suggest would induce confidence, such as lowering interest rates or devaluing 
of currency, are not available to today's governments because their central banks are 
running interests rates at effectively 0% or because they are part of a monetary union. At 
the same time, because countries who are interconnected trading partners (e.g. Eurozone 
countries and the UK) are all embarking on austerity at the same time there is very little 
chance of an export boom fuelling economic expansion because there is simply very little 
demand (Krugman 2012: 198). As George Soros explains, successful expansionary austerity 
such as that embarked upon by Canada in 90's is not possible today: 
'For a very good reason: economic conditions are very different. The global financial 
system is reducing its excessive leverage and exports are slowing down worldwide. 
Fiscal austerity in Europe is exacerbating a global trend and pushing Europe into a 
deflationary debt trap. That is, when too many heavily indebted governments are 
reducing their budget deficits at the same time, their economies shrink so that the 
debt burden as a percentage of GDP actually increases' (Soros 2012) 
This has been recently backed by the IMF who argue that when economies are in the midst 
of a liquidity trap and synchronised austerity policies, any attempt to reduce budget deficits 
by 1 per cent has a multiplier effect of 1 to 1.5. This translates into a scenario where a 
reduction in spending equals to a reduction in GDP by 1 to 1.5 % (IMF 2012: 43). As larry 
Summers (2012) argues, this means that austerity is actually 'counterproductive in terms of 
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creditworthiness' as it 'reduces incomes, limiting the capacity to repay debts' and achieves 
only a modest reduction in budget deficits. Whilst at the same time such austerity stifles 
growth by reducing capital investment and perpetuating unemployment. Ironically, then, it 
is not government spending but the very practise of austerity and its slavish adherence to 
correct judgment of the market, or rather what elites mistakenly believe the market is 
saying in relation to government spending, which is actually stifling growth and 
employment. 
In the UK, for example, on the back of relative economic recovery in 2009 the onset of 
austerity saw the economy return to recession in 2012. The onset of austerity in turn led to 
sluggish growth in between these recessions, which actually means that the UK is actually 
living under a depression that is set to be longer than one endured during the Great 
Depression between 1930-34 (Peston 2012: 151). Whilst in the Euro zone GDP is projected 
to contract in 2012 by -0.4% and only grow by 0.2% in 2013. Individual countries within the 
Euro zone under enforced austerity by the EU due to bailouts such as Spain (-1.5, -1.3), Italy 
(-2.3, -0.7), Portugal (-1.7, -3.0) are projected to contract in 2012 and 2013 respectively. And 
as a consequence unemployment rates at the current time Spain (26.2%,), Greece (25.4%), 
Portugal (16.3%), and Italy (11.1%) continue to rise year on year (Guardian 2012: see figure 
3). 
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Figure 3: Unemployment in EU, Euro zone and selected countries 
Source The Guardian (2012) 
What should not be inferred from my above analysis is a simple either/or between austerity 
and fiscal stimulus. One does not need to fall into a false debate about fiscal austerity vs. 
stimulus in order to grasp the current state of the global economy. As Roubini (2010) POints 
out, in an ' .. ideal world, where policymakers could credibly commit to medium- to long-
term fiscal adjustment, the optimal and desirable path would be to commit today to a 
schedule of spending reductions and tax increases, phased in gradually over the next decade 
as the economy recovers: And even the G20 (2010) communique in Toronto outlined that 
there is ' ... a risk that synchronized fiscal adjustment across several major economies could 
adversely impact the recovery: The question then becomes, why is the current public of 
transnational elites firmly set on austerity? Why did they agree to such policy initiatives in 
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the first place and not heed their own warnings of synchronized fiscal adjustment? And why 
have they been misrepresenting the facts on issues like the explanation of sovereign debt 
and expansionary fiscal consolidation? 
The details of the answer to these questions can shift in different context; austerity in 
Europe has different factors behind it than austerity in the Anglosphere (UK and US). 
However, they both still fundamentally centre on the perpetuation of bourgeois democracy 
where the interests of capital and markets are placed above those of ordinary citizens. I will 
return to the Eurozone in the next section but in the Anglosphere it is quite clear that the 
return of neo-liberalism, which began post-Lehman Brothers, has come full circle post-20i0. 
Whether real as in the case of Greece or imagined as in the case of the UK or the US, the 
rise in sovereign debt since 2008 has facilitated the advance of neo-liberal desires of certain 
national elites and technocrats to shrink the welfare state. The hegemony of neo-liberalism 
amongst political elites had meant that even prior to the rise in sovereign debt caused by 
the financial crisis the welfare state was seen as bloated and counterproductive for market 
efficiency and economic growth (Blackburn 2011: 33). The sovereign debt crisis and panacea 
of austerity has essentially buttressed this take on state expenditure. As one can see below 
in Figure 4 the welfare state, health care and pensions are the biggest targets of austerity: 
244 
Figure 4: Major Austerity programme Measures - Frequency (2009-15) 
Source OECD (2012) 
The best example of this use of austerity to achieve a shrinking of the welfare state can be 
found in arguments by deficit hawks in the US and UK. The British collation government, for 
example, has trumped the New labours government's proposed spending cuts. In 2010 
Chancellor George Osborne announced spending cuts of£81 billion, which include 25% cuts 
across all government departments and a proposed £18 billion cut in the welfare budget. In 
all when taxation rises are factored some the total package of fiscal consolidation would 
amount to £113bn by 2014-15 (Wolf 2010b). What emerges from this picture of aggressive 
cuts to state expenditure, however, is the sheer hypocrisy of bourgeoisie democracy. 
Osborne's 2010 emergency budget, for example, is regressive and disproportionally falls on 
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poor who depend more on the state but who had no real part in causing the financial crisis 
(Browne & levell 2010). And as highlighted above, the shrinking of the welfare state is 
actually having little to no effect on the economic fortunes of advanced economies. 
What austerity is having an effect upon, especially within neo-liberal havens such as UK and 
US, is the disproportionate transference of wealth upwards to the top (Wade: 2011a: 35). 
As the DECD (2013) has recently outlined, the result of the financial crisis and recession has 
seen a worsening of inequality within advanced economies. Across DEeD countries, whilst 
the average income of the top 10% in 2010 was similar to that in 2007, the income of the 
bottom 10% in 2010 was lower than that in 2007 by 2% per year. Out of the 33 countries 
where data are available, the top 10% has done better than the poorest 10% in 21 countries 
throughout the crisis. 
This is even more apparent in the UK, which as highlighted earlier is the poster child for 
using austerity to remodel the state and its provision of welfare. In the year to June 2010, 
for example, the average director's remuneration in FTSE 100 companies increased by SS 
percent and the median director's remuneration by 23 percent, while average earnings for 
the rest of the population increased by 1.5 percent. By 2011 the average pay awarded to a 
FTSE 100 CEO including bonuses equalled £4.8 million - some 184 times the average wage 
(£26,000) of a full time British employee. Whilst in 2012 it became clear that large 
corporations such as Apple, Amazon, Google, eBay and Facebook have paid UK corporation 
tax of less than £20 million on sales over £12 billion (Peston 2012: 410-414). When this is 
added to the direct and secondary costs of the financial crisis and the return of banks to 
exorbitant profit the problem of bourgeois democracy where the interests of capital, 
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especially finance capital, are subsidized and put over the interests of ordinary citizens is 
pretty clear for everyone to see. 
b. Die Multilateralism Diel 
What then are we to make of the rise of the Austerity public in terms of global democracy? 
As highlighted in the last chapter, whilst the Bank Recapitalisation and Keynesian Stimulus 
public attempted to reanimate the policy objectivities of neo-liberalism and effectively 
practised bourgeois democracy there was a genuine construction of form multilateralism 
around stemming the financial crisis. In a limited sense one may even argue that traces of 
cosmopolitan nationalism could be detected in how nation state leaders seemed to tie their 
own national interests with the fate of others. However, with the onset of austerity it has 
essentially become every country for themselves. In this situation, somewhat perversely, 
the hegemony of austerity means that every country has the objective of securing their Own 
future in the face of once more all powerful and all knowing global markets. And this has 
seen a return to the bull-headed nationalism that Dewey so warned against in 1930's. 
The primary example of austerity leading to the collapse multilateralism can be seen in the 
way elites in Eurozone, namely the Northern countries such as Germany, have narrated the 
Eurozone crisis. Austerity in the Eurozone, for example, is inherently being pursed due to 
Germany's hegemonic influence over the ECB and its role as the economic superpower 
within the Eurozone. The reason for this revolves around the hegemonic influence of 
Ordoliberalism amongst German elites. Constructed as a post war response to classical 
liberalism and Nazi state intervention Ordoliberalism dictates that states must create rules 
(order) so that the market (liberalism) cannot be captured by cartels or monopolies: 
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'The central tenet of ordoliberalism is that governments should regulate markets in 
such a way that market outcome approximates the theoretical outcome in a 
perfectly competitive market (in which none of the actors are able to influence the 
price of goods and services). Ordoliberalism differs from other schools of liberalism 
(including the neo-liberalism predominant in the Anglo-Saxon world) in that it places 
a greater emphasis on preventing cartels and monopolies. At the same time, like 
neo-liberalism, ordoliberalism opposes intervention into the normal course of the 
economy. For example, it rejects the use of expansionary fiscal and monetary 
policies to stabilise the business cycle in a recession and is, in that sense, anti-
Keynesian.' (Dullien and Guerot 2012) 
Significantly, however, although Ordoliberalism breaks with neo-liberalism over the role of 
the state its economics remain as 'classical as Smith and Hume' (Blyth 2013: 140). In this 
schema prosperity is gained through actions that favor the supply side of saving and 
investment rather than the demand side and consumption. Ordoliberalism was essentially 
merged with the ideal of the social market economy of the 1950's and set the rules for 
German economic development going forward. Significantly, however, although 
Ordoliberalism breaks with neo-liberalism over state as Blyth suggests its economics remain 
as 'classical as Smith and Hume' (2013: 140). In this schema prosperity is gained through 
actions that favor the supply side of saving and investment rather than the demand side and 
consumption. And as Dullien and Guerot (2012) further, such thinking has led to a 
contemporary consensus in Germany which largely resembles Neo-Classical Economics in 
the Anglosphere where: 
'Output and employment are determined mainly by supply factors. If demand falls 
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short of supply, neo-classical economists believe that prices and wages will adjust 
swiftly so that demand increases again and any excess supply rapidly disappears. If 
prices and wages sometimes do not react quickly, they would argue that this is due 
to legal barriers such as collective bargaining or legal minimum wages. The solution 
is structural reform to make markets more flexible.' 
This approach to economic development has largely been incorporated into the ECB 
constitution and EU Commission's competition based policies (e.g. telecommunications , 
energy supply) and through the rules based approach to EU governance (e.g. Maastricht 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact). With this in mind it becomes clear why Germany 
was initially a reluctant participant in the Keynesian Stimulus public and an all too keen 
participant in the emergence of austerity. In German eyes the start of the sovereign debt 
crisis amongst southern European states, which following Krugman (2012: 178) we can call 
the GIPSI (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy) countries, is a consequence of a loss of 
economic competitiveness and excessive state spending in the deficit countries. The logical 
reaction is for GIPSI countries is then to resort to deflationary wage restraints to restore 
competiveness and immediate cuts to government spending to restore bond market 
confidence (Dullien and Guerot 2012). 
The key point here is that German and by default EU institutions still revolve around the 
same tenants of bourgeois democracy as neo-liberal countries such as the US and UK. This is 
because despite different approaches to state intervention both privilege efficient markets 
over the interests of citizens or rather see citizen interests as centering on efficient markets. 
The problem is that such a hegemonic belief in the efficiency and correct judgment of 
markets has led Germany to misunderstand and misdiagnose the Eurozone crisis. 
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Moreover, the narrative that Eurozone crisis centres on the profligate nature of the 
southern European states and hence can be solved with austerity misses how the structure 
of the Eurozone or the exposure of northern European banks to southern European private 
and public sector debt. 
As highlighted above, the 'Hellenization' narrative of profligate government fails to explain 
the rise of nation state debt in the G20. The fudging of the facts in hellenization of countries 
like Spain and Ireland is beyond all doubt. In 2007, for example, Spain and Ireland had 
respective public sector debt to GDP ratios of 36% and 25%. This was well below the 60% 
figure the EU's Growth and Stability Pact (1997) had apparently placed on its members 
(Peston, 2012: 251). What actually made both countries vulnerable when the financial crisis 
hit was that both countries had property and credit booms that saw household and private 
business take on massive debts. And it has been the bailout of Irish and Spanish banks and 
the collapse of the property boom that has swelled sovereign debt. 
Now it is very true that economies such as Spain had a failing economy post 2008 and the 
onset of their own austerity packages in 2011 has acerbated their situation93• As we have 
see unemployment in Spain stands at 25%, with youth unemployment at 50% and a fiscal 
deficit of 8.6% (OECD 2012). One could argue that such numbers would explain why capital 
markets started to desert Spain but it actually does not. The main problem Spain has is that 
it does not have a central bank or its own currency. The ECB, as per Germany's wishes, 
whilst being the central bank for the Eurozone is not permitted to print money in order to 
93 S . h 
pain as for example started a temporary increase in income tax, saving tax and property tax (local); no 
public sector hiring (with few exceptions); a freeze of public wages; a freeze of the guaranteed minimum wage; 
elimination of renting subsidies for young people .. The government has also started to draft an amendment to 
the law on political parties in order to reduce their subsidies. (DEeD 2012). 
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fund a country's debt. And as pointed out above, Spain and other countries enacting 
austerity in the Eurozone, lack the ability to devalue their currencies because of being in 
monetary union with the other members of the Eurozone. It is thus the fundamental 
structural problem of the Eurozone, which has created the sovereign debt crisis in the wake 
of governments bailing out their financial industries: 
'By transferring what had previously been their right to print money to the European 
Central Bank, the member states exposed their sovereign credit to the risk of 
default. Developed countries that control their own currency have no reason to 
default; they can always print money. Their currency may depreciate in value, but 
the risk of default is practically non-existent '(Soros 2012 cf. Krugman 2012: 183) 
The reason the bond markets have targeted the GIPSI countries sovereign debt is three fold. 
Firstly, austerity has exacerbated the economic down turns in those countries. Secondly, 
investors fear that GIPSI countries can't devalue to raise exports. And thirdly, investors don't 
believe that the ECB will not print money to payoff the debts and those countries like Spain 
, 
Greece or Italy may default. All three of issues then act to trigger off bond market 
'vigilantes' , who have pushed up the price of GIPSI sovereign debt to the point the ECB has 
had to provide emergency funding via loans that came with austerity policies attached. It is 
the nature of the Eurozone and its monetary union, then, rather than nation state profligacy 
that has created the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. And why even though the UK has more 
debt and a bigger budget deficit it can borrow money at historically low interests rates 
whilst Spain is squeezed until the pips squeaks (Soros 2012). When told this way, however, 
the story does not fit with the narrative that all the GIPSI countries have been profligate. 
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Indeed, when one digs further into how the Eurozone structures facilitate the current crisis 
it becomes clear that the seeds of the crisis were also sown by the same structures. 
The primary reason the Eurozone is in this mess is because of national government failure in 
the midst of structural conditions engendered by monetary union between Germany, 
Europe's powerhouse economy, and Southern states. When the Euro was launched 
Germany's economic power and credit rating was applied to all Euro zone countries, which 
saw the interest rates for the nations of Southern Europe fall not only on government debt 
but across the board on household and private sector borrowing. This was the form of 
cheap credit that would see national governments sit back and do nothing as the 
indebtedness of households and private sector debts increased radically. Spain's overall 
indebtedness doubled to 360% of GDP by 2011 and the private sectors of Portugal, Ireland, 
and Italy all saw their private sectors take on massive debt. This explains for instance why 
Spain and Ireland had debt fuelled property booms and why their national governments did 
nothing as tax revenues increased (Peston 2012, 255). 
At the same time, however, Germany experienced significant debt and wage inflation linked 
to the reunification between East and West Germany and as a result when Germany joined 
the Euro it lost out to countries on other countries on wage competition. However, German 
authorities embarked upon labour market and other structural reforms in early 2000's. This 
now made it easier for Germany employers to fire workers, whilst the government reduced 
unemployment benefits and job seekers received greater assistance. This in turn expanded 
the labour force and kept wages down in Germany. The German state also adopted a 
constitutional amendment requiring the federal budget to be balanced by 2016 (Soros 
2012). 
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The result was that Germany effectively regained cost advantage by holding down the costs 
at home as southern European debt fuelled growth drove up labour costs abroad. By 2004 
onwards Germany starting running 5% current account surpluses and had an export-led 
boom, significantly financed by housing and consumption booms in the southern Europe 
(Soros 2012). As Peston (2012: 261) ruefully quips, 'Greek and Spanish profligacy was a 
pretty good analgesic for the pain that would otherwise have been felt for the pain that 
would otherwise have been felt by Germans from their cost-cutting.' 
Nevertheless, German elites with their slavish adherence to bourgeois democracy and faced 
with a domestic population that fails to really grasp Germany's role in the crisis have 
embraced the narrative that it was GIPSI fiscal profligacy of state spending that has caused 
the Eurozone crisis. Within this narrative the wider arguments about the Eurozone's 
structural imbalances between current account surplus countries and current account 
defect countries are ignored or deemed unimportant. And the fact that most of southern 
European private sector debt that spurred German economic growth came from northern 
European banks, which are now over exposed to such bad debt, also disappears. 
What is equally apparent here is how such bourgeois democracy in Germany has affected 
conceptions multilateralism within the Eurozone. The natural course of action based on 
such imbalances between surplus Germany and the Southern states is for Germany and 
other surplus countries in Eurozone to actually become the source of demand rather than 
supply for deficit countries like the GIPSI countries. This would entail not austerity but 
inflation through fiscal expansion by Germany other surplus Eurozone countries (Krugman 
2012: 185). However, the embracement of the austerity argument that markets are correct 
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and hence their judgment that GIPSI countries are profligate public spenders gets rid of this 
course of possible action going forward. 
At the same time the embracement of austerity argument that markets are correct and 
hence their judgment that GIPSI countries are profligate public spenders also highlights how 
bourgeois democracy has fostered a lack of cosmopolitan nationalism within Germany itself. 
The southern European States, although not blameless given their private indebtedness, 
cannot not devalue or print money as they do have their own currency or central bank and 
are themselves, as Germany too, locked in a monetary union. The primary problem is that 
the Eurozone is a monetary union that lacks the fiscal union of other currency unions like 
US. In the US, for example, not a" states are equal in their economic performance and 
failing states like Nevada are effectively bailed out through transfers from the Federal 
government (Krugman 2012). However, what German elites do not want to do, given that 
Germany is the strongest economy in Eurozone and her ill-informed citizens would 
themselves say no, is to offer the German taxpayer as the final guarantor of southern 
European states (Soros 2012). The reality is thus that the Eurozone is driving towards the 
edge of an economic cliff with very little to suggest it has the intelligence to hit the breaks94• 
Regardless, of what does happen, however, the reality remains that German elites and their 
valorisation of the market as the purveyor of truth seemingly collapses European 
multilateralism and signal the death of any nascent form of cosmopolitan nationalism. And 
in doing so the German led ECB has gone about systematically destroying multilateral 
relations between EU nation states and restored to a bull headed nationalism that has run 
94 It is becoming increaSingly clear that Eurozone will have to move towards fiscal union and some form of debt 
sharing via a 'Eurobonds' that would effectively pool all of Europe's debt together. This seems to be strategy of 
new ECB President Mario Draghi (2012) who has spoken of the need for a new public space to accompany the 
deepening of fiscal ties between countries. It remains to be seen, however, given the nature of nationalism in 
other Eurozone countries and within Germany itself whether a United States of Europe is forthcoming. 
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shot over democracy in southern European states. In this sense, southern European citizens 
are bearing the brunt of the failure of their financial centers and the failure of Germany to 
admit her own role in what has become a European tragedy. 
What is worrying is that the lack of cosmopolitan nationalism shown by German elites in the 
Eurozone highlights how the rehabilitation and reassertion of ideals such as the rationality 
and efficiency of markets is actually symptomatic of a wider decline of the limited sense of 
community amongst nation states and their elites engendered by the events of late 2008. 
The prime examples of this can be found in the fate of projects that as was argued in last 
chapter appeared to promise a quasi form of creative democracy at the international. level. 
The reforms of the 'Bank recapitalisation' and 'Keynesian Stimulus' publics in arenas such as 
the G20 were not fully thought out and actually undemocratic (e.g. G20 vis-a-vis the 
remaining 197 UN states). However, even such structurally flawed plans have become ether 
as the nascent belief in multilateralism has crumbled with the onset of austerity. For 
example, Wade (2011b) not only questions the legitimacy of representativeness of G20 but 
also flags up that the reforms engineered in 2010 by the G20 for the IMF and World bank 
actually did relative little to enhancement the representation of developing countries and 
were actually the site of nation state realpolitik between the US, European nation states and 
China. 
The same can be said for reform of the global banking standards that were much talked 
about in 2008 and 2009 and were delivered in 2010 in the guise of Basel Ill. It had been 
hoped that states would be able to form new global rules that would force banks to hold 
more capital than the previous rules of Basel 11 and Basel I, which had allowed the massive 
overleveraging to take place. However, as Martin Wolf (2010c) outlined, the ' ... world needs 
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a smaller and safer banking industry. The defect of the new rules is that they will fail to 
deliver this.' The reason for this is because nation states looked to tailor the regulation to 
suit their national financial sectors needs. For instance, Germany and France opposed high 
level capital ratios desired by the Governor of the Bank of England's Mervyn King and the 
early phase in of such rules because they had found out how insolvent their own banks 
actually were (Englen 2011: 232). The result being that the Basel rules have been kicked into 
the long grass and now do not come into play until 2018/19 (Peston 2012: 389). 
This re-emergence of nation state realpolitik at the IMF and World Bank and the lacklustre 
nature of Basel III can be linked to an emergence of a more 'bull headed nationalism' post 
the collapse of the 'Keynesian Stimulus' public and re-emergence of markets as the primary 
explanation of sovereign debt and justification for austerity. The ramifications of this 
collapse of multilateralism and cosmopolitan nationalism is that in many ways we are still 
not too far removed from situation of four years ago in 2008. The reform of global banking 
rules has largely ground to a halt due to the timidity of the Basel III and allowed nation 
states to redefine finance once more as a national priority. For instance, the UK Chancellor 
George Osborne diluted his own Independent Commission On Banking's 2011 report on 
reforming UK banks by rejecting its high leverage ratios in favour of Basell Ill's lower 
leverage ratios. This was done to avoid losing the City of London's privileged pOSition as one 
ofthe world's hubs offinancial services via penalising in it global competition. And the same 
competiveness argument has been utilised by the UK government to deny the validity of a 
European Financial Transactions Tax (FIT) has used the same arguments. 
Nevertheless, perhaps the most dangerous thing that has emerged with rehabilitation of the 
market as the grounding of truth is that the destruction of nascent multilateralism amongst 
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elites has left the global economy in a state of anarchism. The move to austerity has 
effectively curtailed the communication between governments that would be invaluable to 
deal with on-going Great Recession and issues such as Euro zone crisis. Instead, fractures 
are emerging with governments in the GIPSI countries coming to resent what Germany and 
her inability to own up to her own role in the Eurozone crisis. And even international 
institutions appear to be at odds with the very nation states who endorse and provide them 
with legitimacy. For example, more recently the IMF (2012) has turned against 
synchronised austerity in the face of evidence that such synchronised austerity is 
counterproductive. On one hand, this is good because it hands anti-austerians the chance to· 
create a transnational consensus and community amongst elites. On the other hand , 
without a consensus about the way forward both between nation states and international 
institution such a situation may compound the bull headed nationalism states are currently 
pursuing. 
This worry is no understatement. By 2011 even the supposed leader of the free world had 
come to the conclusion the collapse of the multilateralism engendered by the events of 
2008 through to the stimulus packages of 2010 was a real problem: 
'When we met in London two years ago, we knew that putting the global economy 
on the path to recovery would be neither easy nor quick. But together, we forged a 
response that pulled the global economy back from the brink of catastrophe. That's 
the leadership we've demonstrated before. That's the leadership we need now - to 
sustain economic recovery and put people back to work, in our own countries and 
around the world' (Obama 2011) 
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The perverse consequence of the rise of the austerity public and the hegemony of its 
economic ideals is that such an approach actually has pitted nation against nation in deficit 
reduction. There is thus no real transnational public of elites and experts anymore but 
rather nations once more bowing or being forced to bow to the power of the market. Even 
if we argue that the reforms put forward by the Bank Recapitalisation and Keynesian 
Stimulus publics of elites and experts were never much more than a smokescreen for the 
status quo; that status quo was better than this present. The global economy and global 
politics therefore appears in a state anarchy with the only constant being bourgeois 
democracy and extraction of wealth up towards the higher echelons of the income stream. 
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Chapter 9: Democracy Eclipsed 
The narratives of the two preceding chapters should have bought home the fact that 
bourgeois democracy is alive and well in the early 21st century. The reassertion of neo-
liberalism's hegemony was and is being carried out because national democracy and by 
consequence global democracy are in the thrall of bourgeois democracy. As it stands, this is 
far removed from Dewey's idea of the Great Community, which would involve the practises 
of creative democracy at both national and international levels. But the question remains 
what about the publics of ordinary citizens? How have they reacted to what was and 
continues to be an international economic crisis? And what do their actions tell us about the 
prospects of global democracy? 
To answer these questions I shall firstly how initial public bewilderment and anger Post-
lehman Brother's bankruptcy produced publics that turned to mainstream politics for help. 
In turn I shall highlight how this seems to have changed with backlashes against austerity in 
Europe. However, I will suggest that there has been a rise of publics who are apathetic 
towards political democracy because of a democratic disconnect between elites and 
citizens. Moving on I shall examine the rise of Occupy Movement in 2011 and how despite 
the movements redeeming points its lack of desire to reform political democracy makes its 
politics ultimately impotent. 
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9.1 Return of the Public? 
The initial action of citizens can be seen as a mixture of sheer bewilderment and anger at 
events post September 15th 2008 and subsequent near collapse of the Anglo banking sector. 
This was predominantly due to the members of the Bank Recapitalisation public keeping 
details of the banking crisis behind closed doors. For example, the public was not made 
privy, until around year after about the emergency loans given by the Bank of England to 
the Royal bank of Scotland and Halifax and Bank of Scotland between October 2008 to 
January 2009. And if not for journalists such as Robert Peston the actual scale and nearness 
of the collapse of the UK banking sector would have probably never been properly relayed 
to the public by those elites attempting to deal with the crisis. Even then it could be argued 
that due to the complexity of the financial crisis the public in the UK and US were initially 
eclipsed. When the reality of the situation post-Lehman Brothers did start to filter into the 
general knowledge of ordinary citizens their initial anger seemed to turn on governments 
and the new public enemy number one: bankers (Skidelsky 2009: 23-25). 
Can we thus talk of an emergence of publics in directly after the crisis of 2008? There was of 
course an effect in general elections such as US and UK in 2008 and 2010 respectively. 
Holdbrook et al. (2012) argue that the fall of Lehman brothers did have an effect of swinging 
independent voters to Barack Obama and away from John McCain. And the financial crisis 
in the UK discredited the New Labour government's claims to economic competency. This 
was both through New Labour's actual failure, over the course of ten years, to regulate the 
banking industry and the re-writing of history by the Conservative opposition that blamed 
austerity on government overspending. These responses were in a sense typical of the early 
citizen responses to the financial crisis in that they largely turned towards established 
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political channels to register their discontent: general elections. And this generally reflects 
the respective insights of Rodrik and Dewey that when globalisation creates strife within the 
nation state citizens look to their national governments for help and to express their anger. 
Yet, as early as 2009 at G20 conference in London, which included a confrontation between 
protestors and workers in the City waiving £10 pound notes at them from office windows 
and the unfortunate death of newspaper vendor lan Tomlinson (Rawnsley 201: 628), one 
could see an emergence of a public anger towards formal politics. And with the onset of 
austerity across the UK and Europe there emerged publics around 2009 into 2010 that 
replicated the move towards protest as the main political weapon of citizen publics. 
For writers such as Tarrow (2011: 261) this highlighted that ' ... despite globalisation _ 
societies do not respond in lock and step to the same stimuli ... countries responded to the 
Wall Street crash with different combinations of transgressive and conventional contention.' 
Contra Tarrow, I believe despite the differences in responses there are discernible traces to 
quite a lot of these movements that unite in them a commonality of sorts. The dominant 
characteristic that unites nearly all of these movements is their exasperation at such little 
engagement by political elites but their consequent disengagement with formal mainstream 
politics. This centres on citizen disenchantment with formal politics as citizens realised that 
the actions of national elites displayed all the hallmarks of bourgeois democracy post 2008. 
This is rejection of mainstream politics is even more apparent in the EU where conceptions 
of a European democracy, politics and political identity have been discarded in national 
based protests in Ireland, Greece and Spain in the light of the EU's enforcement of austerity: 
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'At present, the public in many Eurozone countries is distressed, confused, and 
angry. This finds expression in xenophobia, anti-European attitudes, and extremist 
political movements. The latent pro-European sentiments, which currently have no 
outlet, need to be aroused in order to save the European Union.' (Soros 2010). 
Now we neither have the time nor space to run through all these movements in chronology 
or in extensive detail but The Indignados ('The Outraged') movement in Spain, which has 
taken direct inspiration from the Arab Spring, illustrate this point nicely. As Castaneda 
(2012) outlines the Indignados ('The Outraged') movement arose out the fact that young 
Spanish citizens did not feel that economy offered them any chance of employment. Having 
been locked out of the labour market because of low wages young people became apathetic 
towards formal politics. Trust in 'politicians, the government, parliament, and the justice 
system was Virtually nill' and when the financial crisis and in turn austerity impacted Spain 
this 'desperate' generation followed the citizens of Egypt, Ireland, Greece, and Portugal in 
protesting in the streets and occupying public spaces. (Puig 2012: 210). 
Utilising Web 2.0 technology such Facebook, Twitter and Slogs the ISM or May 15th 2011 
movement emerged in Madrid and soon spread around all of Spain. The goal of the 
movement was to bring attention to the May 22nd local and help bring attention to cause of 
opposing the political elites of Spain. Working without leaders and through decentralised 
and distinct city movements public assemblies were created through occupying public 
space. This was done for example through camps set up in public squares, which utilised 
working groups to disseminate knowledge to citizens on issues regarding: 
'education, health, migration, national finances, proposals for alternative national 
budgets, movement fundraising and accounting, internal security and so on. 
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Different proposals were written carefully and formally, uploaded to the Internet, 
printed and distributed among the occupiers, who would later be asked to debate 
and vote them. Walking through the camp, one would see single and collective tents 
as well as booths hosting commissions, libraries and book sales.' (Castaneda 2012: 
311). 
Despite this politically charged organisation the ISM movement was inherently apathetic 
towards formal mainstream politics. May 22 thus saw the increase in protest votes with a 
48% increase in null votes and 37 % increase in blank votes. This was mainly to voice 
discontent with the incumbent leftist government who had initiated austerity in Spain. And 
it was this abstention of young voters, which helped the conservative Popular Party to gain 
electoral victory. The new government did not listen to the protestors but rather continued 
the austerity packages in line with those advocated by the ECB (P; Castaneda 2012: 309-
311). 
9.2 Enter The Occupy Movement 
The citizen publics, which have emerged in response to austerity in Europe have largely 
been reactions against bourgeoisie democracy at home. And some such as the Indignados 
have been able to transnationalise their form of politics9s• However, no social movement or 
civil society group that has emerged in response to financial crisis and austerity has had the 
same impact transnational impact as the emergence of New York's Occupy Wall Street 
Movement. What has become known as The Occupy Movement or simply Occupy seems to 
represent a watershed for many academic commentators. Judith Butler saw the movement 
9S Indeed, groups like the Indignados have created transnational links not only with groups across Europe but 
groups from Chile and were involved in helping form Occupy Wall Street (See Castaneda 2012). 
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as people standing together 'making democracy'; Angela Davis called the movement as the 
resistance against all occupations stretching from New York to the Middle East; Slavoj Zizek 
called the movement's 'basic message' as northing short as 'what social organisation should 
replace capitalism?' (Harcourt et al. 2013). 
Inspired by the Arab Spring and Indignados movement the Occupy Wall Street Movement 
cam into the spotlight on the 1ih September 2011 with the occupation and establishment 
of a camp at Zuccotti Park. As well as this form of site occupation, the movement also 
utilised Web 2.0 technology such Facebook, Twitter and Slogs to not only promote its cause 
but to ask others to join the cause in their respective countries. The slogan 'we are the 99 
per cent', which focused on the wealth capture by the top 1% of population in the US, 
seemed to strike a chord with citizens around the world in midst of The Great Recession and 
shadow of the banking of crisis. The movement itself saw itself as part of a 'broader 
movement: which is largely a rebellion against undemocratic regimes answerable only to 
global power structures (especially financial ones) and in the name of popular, direct 
democracy' (Graeber 2012: 17) 
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Figure 5: Map of Occupy Movement Protests 2011-2012 
Source: The Guardian (2011) 
On October 15th 2011 the movement launched a day of global action that saw Occupy 
camps open all across North America and Europe to cities in Argentina, Australia, Japan and 
North Africa. In all, the Guardian (2011) logged 951 protests in 81 countries (see figure 5) 
and the spread of similar tent communities as found in Indignados movement in Spain. 
David Graeber (2012a: cf. Tarrow 2011), one of Occupy's founders, pOints out the main 
rationale of Occupy Wall Street stemmed from its anarchist roots. The Occupy movement 
, 
much like the Indignados, operates on a 'decentralised and leaderless' form, which rejects 
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formal political engagement to avoid conferring legitimacy on existing political institutions 
and laws. 
Occupy thus functioned on the premise of disobeying the 'conventional political grammar' 
and marked a move towards political rather than civil disobedience. In this schema, civil 
disobedience can be seen as the hallmarks of prior social movements such as The Indian 
Independence movement and US Civil Rights movement. Within these movements its 
members accept the legitimacy of the political structure and institutions but look to reform 
the existing laws that such structures and institutions enforce. To do this movements of 
civil disobedience often practise the art of breaking the law to highlight the law's 
unjustness. In contrast, political disobedience is styled as resistance to the 'way we are 
governed' and translates into the resistance: 
' ... of the structure of partisan politics, the demand for policy reforms, the call for 
part identification. It rejects the very idea of expressing or honouring "highest 
respects for law" It refuses to willingly accept the sanction meted out by our legal 
and political system. It challenges the conventional way in which political 
governance takes place and actors who govern us. And, beyond that, its resists the 
very ideologies that have dominated the post-war period.' (Harcourt et al. 2013: 46-
47) 
The Occupy Movement's initial goals, then, were to promote freedom and sense of 
community between its participants rather than create demands which could seized and co-
opted by mainstream political parties. This rationale is why the tent occupations became 
central to the movement, which attempted to create communities not only through 
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frequent assemblies and participatory decision-making structures96 but also through 
providing kitchens, libraries media centres and educational spaces where ' ... anarchist 
principles of mutual aid and self organisation' could flourish (Graber 2012b: 145 cf. Hardt 
and Negri 2011). Occupy camps were therefore about deliberative interaction and about 
forming new ways of living in a neo-liberal world: 
'What they want [ ... ] is to do exactly what they are dOing. They want to occupy 
Wall Street. They have built a campsite full of life, where power is exercised 
according to their voices. It's a small space, it's a relatively modest group of people 
at anyone time, and the resources they command are few. But they are practicing 
the polities of place, the politics of building a truly public space. They are explicitly 
rejecting the politics of narrow media, the polities of the shopping mall. To 
understand #OccupyWaIlStreet, you have to get that it is not a media object or a 
march. It is first and foremost, a church of dissent, a space made sacred by a 
community. But like Medieval churches, it is also now the physical centre of that 
community. It has become many things. Public square. Carnival. Place to get news. 
Day-care centre. Health care centre. Concert venue. Library. Performance space. 
School.' (Stoller, 2011). 
Towards the end of 2011 there was a crackdown on Occupy and camps in New York 
, 
Oakland, Montreal and Berlin were violently cleared by state authorities (Calhoun 2011). By 
2012 the last remaining high profile camps in London and Washington DC were cleared by 
state authorities. More recently, however, the Occupy Movement has relented on its earlier 
claims of not making formal political demands through producing a Global Manifesto in May 
2012, which has been derived from its International Occupy Assembly. (Occupy 2012) The 
main gist of the Manifesto are a set demands not addressed to 'illegitimate' governments 
but the 'the people of the world, both inside and outside our movements'. The essence of 
96 See Smith and Glidden (2012) for a fascinating critique of this form of democracy from research into the 
Occupy Pittsburgh Movement. 
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the manifesto puts an emphasis on democratising the global economy for the general 
welfare of people. Many of their ideas such as a maximum wage, a global FIT, a new 
declaration of human rights and democratisation of International Financial Institutions like 
the IMF are far from eccentric and largely replicate large elements of GOT. 
9.3 How to win friends but still not really influence p e o ~ ~
What then are to make of the citizen publics that have emerged since the financial crisis? Do 
such publics point to the forming a Great Community via the tenets of cosmopolitan 
democracy and the practise of creative democracy at home and abroad? The answer is that 
such movements have presented more despair than hope and represent the globalisation of 
the politics of disenchantment with bourgeois democracy; where the focus on creating 
alternative conceptions of community has come at the real expense of empathising the 
reforming of the democratic community at home and abroad. Why then has this happened? 
The answer is quite simple. The biggest effect of austerity's subordinating of whole national 
populations to the dictates and whims of rational and all knowing markets has been the 
destruction of national democratic communities. For in the face of questions about whom 
they actually represent governments have clearly substituted market interests for those of 
citizen interests. 
The initial reaction of citizen publics in 2008 was to move towards their governments but as 
elites formed transnational publics without real democratic input, and which obeyed the 
market rather than the people, the magnitude of government's complicity with the interests 
of capital has meant a rise in disenchantment with formal politiCS. This apathy does not 
mean a collapse of citizen politics but apathy towards political democracy because of it 
facilitation of bourgeoisie democracy. In this situation the majority of the voting public, 
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convinced that is 'no important difference between the two old parties and that to vote for 
one over the other was to signify very 'little', have lost faith with political democracy (LW6: 
185). Movements like The Indignados in Spain, bring home the fact that citizens are acting 
just as Dewey believed politically apathetic citizens were doing so in 1930's. 
However, from a Deweyan point of view this is inherently more dangerous situation for 
democracy as a way of life. On one hand, the rise of extreme politics marks overtones of the 
anti democratic politics that emerged from The Great Depression. On the other hand, even 
if we can argue that political extremism is a minority position within such public, the 
alternative of an anti-political populism that simply rejects political democracy is even more 
worrying. For whilst citizens have appeared to organise themselves into publics in response 
to austerity these publics lack the ambition or desire to gain access to influence the 
reforming the state. The fatigue of bourgeois democracy simply renders them exasperated 
with political democracy all together. 
This for Dewey ultimately reduces such groups to civil society advocates or even mere 
observes rather than publics who can effect change. This is because as Dewey believed the 
state and its government had the remit to reform social institutions. And without this 
emphasis of reforming the institutions of political democracy the practise of creative 
democracy both at the domestic and international level becomes highly improbable. More 
importantly, in their apathy, such publics leave society to the same professional politicians 
and dynastic interests of capital who have enacted austerity and collapsed the national 
community in the first place. Unlike finance capital, then, the citizen publics that have 
emerged to oppose austerity have not been able to exercise their true power as publics 
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capable of reforming the state and government. These publics, as Dewey would have 
argued in 1930's, are publics who are ultimately eclipsed. 
Nothing illustrates this argument better than the Occupy movement. Occupy clearly formed 
a citizen public which created signs and symbols of information and solidarity in the same 
way as groups such as Indignados but on a much larger scale. Occupy's narrative of the 
exploitation of the 99% by the 1% spoke beyond Wall Street and Manhattan and translated 
into other contexts all across the world. The main strength of the Occupy outside of the 
spatial freedom of camps was essentially rhetorical. Although the main Occupy camp in New 
York and others across world were closed down by the police and often in violent ways 
Occupy also provided a visual and vocal denouncement of bourgeois democracy. As Stiglitz 
(2012: xiv) points out, over two-thirds of Americans supported Occupy because 'protestors 
were peaking to their values.' Martell (2012) furthers this viewpoint by stating that Occupy's 
main role has been to provide oppositionallanguage for defending modern welfare states in 
the face of austerity: 
'The protests of the 2010s have also been the welfare state that gave security and 
opportunities to post-war generations. This is being torn from under the feet of the 
current, young and justified by deficit reduction but clearly ideological. Of course you 
can say that the wider publics haven't been voting against capitalism. But that's not 
what Occupy's about. It hasn't stood for election. But its words are on people's lips. 
In a poll a year ago more than half agreed that protesters are right to want to call 
time on a system that puts profit before people.' 
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Moreover, Occupy managed to get something on the agenda, which as pointed earlier, 
rarely gets mentioned as a political problem within formal politics: income and wealth 
inequality. The framing of the issue of the bottom 99% against the top 1% effectively 
captured the rage felt by citizens about the financial crisis. And the concept of the 
'undeserving rich' has become a useful to contrast against arguments about the apparent 
mob of 'welfare scroungers' and profligate nature of welfare spending. There is even a case 
to make that this rhetoric fed into policy circles and political discourse (Wade 2012: 24). For 
instance, new French President Hollande proposed a new top 75% tax rate for high earners 
and radical technocrats such a the Bank of England's Andrew Haladane (2012: 2) credited 
Occupy has helping to stir the re-regulation of finance. Moreover, a highpoint for Occupy 
appears to have been leaders President' Obama's endorsement the 'Buffet rule' which 
named after the investor would see a 30% tax on millionaires and his integration of 
Occupy's focus on wealth inequality in his 2012 State of the Union Address: 
'It was the Occupy Movement's ability to connect in a way that the president had 
not that gave Obama the political space to shift the focus of the nation's ire from the 
poor to the rich: to talk about responsibility and hand-outs - not with regard to the 
poor, but to the rich in general, and the financial industry in particular. At one stage, 
the president even appealed to the 98% of the country that earns less than 
$250,000. "Let's never forget," he said: "Millions of Americans who work hard and 
play by the rules every day deserve a government and a financial system that do the 
same. It's time to apply the same rules from top to bottom: no bailouts, no hand-
outs, and no cop-outs. An America built to last insists on responsibility from 
everybody" , (Young 2012) 
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On the back of this apparent influence one would have thought that Occupy heralded a 
perfect Deweyan style public for the practise of creative democracy both at home and 
abroad. Not only did Occupy Wall Street in the US through highlight the complicity between 
finance capital and US government but they also saw such a complicity as being linked to 
neo-liberal globalisation and other countries, both formally (UK, EU) and non-formally 
democratic (Egypt), within the global economy. Occupy can thus be said to be bearers of a 
cosmopolitan nationalism that held the possibility of reforming democracy at home and 
aboard. 
The problem as I pOinted out above, however, is that Occupy replicated the same 
disenchantment with political democracy that other movements against austerity also 
embrace. As Wolf (2012) put it at the time of the emergence of Occupy: 'Is this the 
beginning of a resurgent leftwing polities? I doubt it. Are the protesters raising some big 
questions? Yes, they are.' This brings us to the crux of matter from a Deweyan point of 
view: community. The concept of community constructed by Occupy was largely based 
around its camps, the ethos within those camps and the trans-nationalising of that ethos 
across the globe. However, the form of community constructed around these practises 
would not in a Deweyan sense be classed as the formation of a 'democratic community'. 
This is because the public formed by Occupy practised a form of 'political disobedience' that 
cut off any participation with the institutions and actors of political democracy. And as 
pointed out above, it is within these institutions such as the state where the ability to 
implement creative democracy both at home and aboard is most paramount. 
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Thus, although the Occupy Movement has taken the issues of the dominance of financial 
capital global its embracing of political apathy towards formal politics has meant that it has 
voluntarily chosen to make the social institutions of democracy off-bounds as a political 
target. And without an engagement with social institutions and the sign and symbols to 
encourage this such as a clear set of demands or practises to rally around there can be no 
facilitation of the practise of creative democracy both at home and abroad. Occupy 
therefore practised a hollow form of cosmopolitan nationalism because it never held the 
possibility of creative democracy at home or aboard. 
Despite Occupy's rhetorical power it was therefore politica"y vacuous because of its very 
ideal of democratic praxis. One can see the political vacuum itself in the thought of those 
who valorised Occupy as heralding a new form of democracy. Take Hardt and Nergi's (2011) 
statement that Occupy symbolised a new constitutional moment: 
'Confronting the crisis and seeing clearly the way it is being managed by the current 
political system, young people populating the various encampments are, with an 
unexpected maturity, beginning to pose a challenging question: If democracy -- that 
is, the democracy we have been given -- is staggering under the blows of the 
economic crisis and is powerless to assert the will and interests of the multitude 
, 
then is now perhaps the moment to consider that form of democracy obsolete?' 
What Hardt and Negri exude here is a form of philosophical and empirical hubris. The result 
is that citizens who harbour progressive politics and who want to push beyond neo-liberal 
globalisation now are said to have to evacuated the contours of domestic politics and do not 
see democratic institutions as hospitable. But this conflates the destruction of community at 
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the national level and the hopes of creative democracy with the destruction of bourgeois 
democracy 
As the last two chapters have shown, Neo-Liberalism may have staggered but it did not fall 
and quickly reasserted itself against thr masses within advanced economies. Despite 
suffering one of its biggest crises bourgeois democracy is alive and its political institutions 
still effectively hold the best hand. In fact it was Occupy who was left staggering after the 
sustained blows of police batons and water cannons in late 2011. Hardt and Negri's (2011) 
celebration that no 'Martin Luther King jnr.' would emerge from Occupy who would help 
negotiate with the state and government therefore appears to entirely miss the point. This 
is because the reality is that the state and government are both key for creative democracy 
at home and aboard. Much like the idiocy of tellingly your child that the bullies will leave 
you alone if you don't respond to them, the act of not interacting with the institutions of 
political democracy does not mean that they will fall and crumble. 
The result of Occupy's failure to launch a clear set of demands to rally around and its 
rejection of formal politics created a vacuum for the very co-option of their ideas or the 
simple ignoring of their rhetoric all together. As Tarrow (2011) points out, whilst elite policy 
makers have often embraced Occupy and provided a name check in the same breath this 
was normally followed with a 'but .. .' that reduced the movement to a minority protest 
whose heart in the right place but whose methods are misguided. Hollande's 75% tax rate 
has yet to materialise and The Buffet rule was put to Congress but it fell to filibuster from 
The Republicans. And as we have seen wealth inequality has actually risen within The Great 
Recession. Thus, regardless of the merits of the emphasis on the underserving rich given the 
previous account of the breakdown of the multilateralism at the international level, the 
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continuing hegemonic effect of Neo-liberalism and the ascent of austerity seems to 
highlight the vivacity of bourgeois democracy rather than the reach of Occupy. As Wade 
sums up: 
'The net result is that politicians have done little beyond talk to rein in inequality at 
the top. They and their intellectual supporters have tended to steer public debate 
along the track of "Does individual X deserve his £1.4 million bonus?" and "Why 
should people be rewarded for failure [leaving intact the premise that 'whatever-
corporate-boards- will-bear' should be given for 'success']?" Once on this track, the 
issues of the society-wide structure of income distribution and demand generation 
are bypassed ... And so the assumptions prevailing before the financial crash and the 
Occupy movement continue to prevail in government circles. . Especially in the 
Anglosphere, arguments like "governments are corrupt and inefficient," "state 
interference with market incentives lowers economic welfare," "the free market 
maximizes freedom," "failures must be allowed to fail," "austerity is the solution to 
recession" continue to command wide emotional support.' (2012: 24-25) 
The Occupy Movement thus suffered from the same problem that afflicts the publics of The 
Indignados and the other national movements against austerity: there is a lot of talking, 
there is even a lot doing but there is very little actual policy change at the centres of power: 
political democracy and its officials. And the reason for this is because very form of 'political 
disobedience' or what Dewey would have taken to be political apathy creates a political 
vacuum that will always be filled by more bourgeoisie democracy rather than a radical 
reform or revolution of the current system. Occupy and the other movements against 
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austerity lack the democratic power to really create change and seem to reject and in in 
turn perpetuate their own inability to inherit the task of the democratic way of life. 
9.4 Occupying Democracy 
The pages of this chapter and the two preceding chapters have painted a dark landscape 
with only rare flashes of light. The persistence of bourgeois democracy and the eclipse of 
citizen publics means that creative democracy at home and abroad appears to be a long 
shot. However, I want end this chapter with what I believe is a Dewey would say to the 
citizen publics created by movements such as Occupy. The primary message from Dewey 
would be for such publics to not abandon their creation of community within Occupy camps 
or alternative ways of living but to incorporate such a sense of community to include 
interacting with the formal institutions of political democracy and the formation of a 
democratic community. As cited earlier, Dewey fully believed that it was: 
' .. sheer defeatism to assume in advance of actual trial that democratic political 
institutions are incapable either of further development or constructive social 
application. Even as they do exist, the forms of representative government are 
potentially capable of expressing public will when that assumes anything like 
unification' (LWll: 60). 
And the actions taken by democratic governments post 2008 despite their inherent 
favouring of the interests of capital should not blunt our perception of government's power. 
We should be alert to the power shown by the 'Bank Recapitalisation' and 'Keynesian 
Stimulus' publics. As I highlighted earlier, there really was a realisation amongst such elites 
that rather than pursuing unilateral strategies, what was needed was multilateral action in 
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order to deal with what amounted, either through direct contagion or through the panic of 
markets, to a global financial crisis. And this was the realisation that communication 
between nation state elites and coordinated and collaborative actions at state level, such as 
bank recapitalisation or coordinated interest rate changes, would be crucial to securing not 
only national financial systems but the overall global financial system. Gordon Brown did 
really I save the world': but it unfortunately was the neo-liberal world we should have left 
behind. 
Nevertheless, such actions bring home the fact that the belief that states are powerless 
within the confines of Neo-Liberal globalisation is a misnomer we must learn to forget. Once 
more we must heed the Deweyan lesson that democracy begins at home and our national 
state is one that we must win back in order to affect change beyond it. The actions that 
were used to rescue banks and maintain Neo-Liberal ideals the practises of these publics, 
how they were formed and how consensus and community was achieved, highlights how 
powerful a collection of national elites working together could be. If we can restore a 
connection between citizens and national democracy and create conditions that would 
perpetuate cosmopolitan nationalism amongst citizens and elites, then there is no reason 
why a new transnational public of national elites, with a sense of creative democracy rather 
than bourgeois democracy, could achieve greater global democracy for the world's 
population. 
And it with this realisation about the power of formal political institutions that it becomes 
apparent that progressive groups like The Occupy Movement have something to learn from 
an unprogessive movement like the Tea Party in US. The Tea Party was probably the first 
major citizen public to emerge post-lehman Brothers and inherently represents both 
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elements of continuity and disparity with the citizen publics that would follow it. The 
continuity is like other publics The Tea Party has been disgusted with what it sees as 
corruption at the heart of political democracy. The disparity is that Tea Partiers looked to 
infiltrate the GOP and formal politics whilst other publics in the response to The Great 
Recession and onset of austerity have moved away all together. 
The Tea Party's genesis can be traced to the bank bailouts of 2008 and the initiation of US 
stimulus, where grass root activists who are typically Republican voters set out to rid the US 
of what they saw as an unholy alliance between finance capital and government. In 
February 2009, when CNBC report Rick Santelli argued that the Obama's administration 
stimulus package amounted to corporate welfare. On the back of this Santelli invited 
'capitalists' for a 'Chicago Tea Party'. This in turn went viral and the Tea Party and this brand 
of 21
st patriotism was taken up and advertised by Fox News. Against such an unholy alliance 
between finance capital and government Tea Party activists put forward the ideal of real 
'free markets' which does not end in monopoly and huge corporate entities (Wade 
2012:33). 
By April 2009 hundreds of thousands rallied and marched on what was dubbed 'Tax Day 
2009'. And this activism drew the attention of conservative advocacy groups, right wing 
media stars like Glen Beck and rich conservative benefactors 97 By late 2009 and early 2010 
the Tea Party stood as a beacon for supposed ideals of the 'free market' such as smaller 
government and lower taxes and became the main opposition to President Obama's 
97 
As Skocpol and Williamson (2012: 12-13) contend the Tea Party is thus not a bottom up or top down entity 
but rather has evolved out of intermixture of grass roots activists; national funders and ultra-free market 
advocacy groups that wish to mould the Republican Party (GOP) who fund the party's grass root activity to 
achieve such ends; and conservative media hosts from Fox news to radio and the blogosphere. However, as 
Wade (2012: 33) also points the fact is that the Tea Party is itself funded by 'millionaires and billionaires from 
big buSiness, not by the entrepreneurs of small and medium-size enterprises whom they celebrate' 
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Affordable Care and Patient Act or what has since become known as 'Obama care'. 
Unperturbed by failing to repeal Obama care The Tea Party's activism helped the GOP win 
the November 2010 midterm elections and seize The House of Representatives. The was a 
double success as not only did Tea Party aligned governors take charge in places such as 
Florida, Ohio and Wisconsin. But on the back of this election success many of the other GOP 
winners openly admitted an affinity with the Tea Party's ideals and the activism of its grass 
roots (Skocpol and Williamson 2012:3-5). 
The Tea party although heavily linked to formal politics is actually exemplary in the trend for 
citizen publics in the post-lehmann Brothers world becoming disenchanted with political 
institutions and political parties. The difference between them and other citizen publics is 
that where as such disenchantment has lead to apathy for The Tea Party it has became a 
source of politicisation. This might sound like a contradiction but when you factor in the its 
relationship to the GOP it becomes clear. As Skocpol and Williamson (2012: 180-186) point 
out, Tea Partiers do not consider non-Tea Partiers as the true heirs to GDP and espouse an 
ideal of 'Government by and for the Tea Party'. This has translated into a scenario where the 
Tea Party has attempted to take over the GDP's apparatus such as the local and state 
committees which direct resource during elections and who make nominations. At the same 
time Tea Partiers have shown no love for GDP members who oppose their ideology. This 
was highlighted when Tea Partiers went against the strong business wing of the GDP and 
were effectively ready to let the US default on its debts during the debt ceiling debacle of 
2011. And the party have also played a significant part in achieving austerity in the US 
through the imposition of spending cuts to the Federal budget in exchange for raising the 
debt ceiling. 
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The Tea Party movement may look to be a bizarre creature because of its rather eccentric 
and in the case of President Obama flat out racist viewpoints. However, if we put its 
considerable ugly aspects to the side The Tea Party should be seen as one of the most 
cogent responses to the financial crisis: formal politics is bankrupt and is unable to be 
reformed by those within it; thus we the people must reform it from within. As 
counterintuitive as it thus seems, the most Deweyan public, in formal rather than normative 
terms, to emerge out the financial crisis has been the Tea Party. Whilst The Tea Party is an 
illiberal public it has to all intents and purposes become a public that has quite literally 
attempted to reform the state and the democratic community and unfortunately for 
progressives been successful.98 The Tea Party thus highlights that for progressive 
movements like Occupy the only way to move from having weak rhetorical and contestation 
based power to having the power to enact change is to move towards a platform that looks 
to interact and reform political democracy. 
This Deweyan analysis of Occupy's strengths and fundamental weakness would probably be 
given short shrift by Graeber (2012) or Harcourt et al. (2013) because of its emphasis of 
working with the formal institutions of political democracy they take to be bankrupt. 
However, it is given credence and can actually be found in the work of one of Occupy's 
biggest supporters Noam Chomsky. Chomsky (2012: 54-55) was quick to outline that he 
believes Occupy is an indictment of the neo-liberal order. The emergence of Occupy is 
therefore the first 'major public response' in 30 years to what he perceives as a bitter class 
98 
The Tea party has of course since the 2012 US elections been given a setback via a drop in support. But this 
has nothing to do with strategy of how to reform politics but rather with the content of the reforms they wish 
to enact. The Tea Party is essentially an anti-democratic community party because it does not want to interact 
or deliberate with others about the nature of social institutions or its own beliefs As they move the GOP ever 
rightward and away from the African American and Hispanic vote that will be the key to winning American 
elections gOing forward they seem to miss the fact that as James Livingston (2009) has pointed out: even 
though the Left lost the battle for economic justice it did win the 'culture wars' . 
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war that has led to 'social, economic and political in which the system of democracy has 
been shredded.' Chomsky goes to argue that the Occupy's poll support is a 'big step' from 
engaging with the wider populace and actually 'being part of their lives, something they 
think they can do something about' (Chomsky 2012:72). 
He thus recommends two things for Occupy to pursue as a movement, The first is that the 
educative and communicative ethos of the camps should be broadened so that they 
essentially create a general 'Occupation' and 'bring in wider sectors of the population' This 
in turn would be supported by 'worker and community' appropriation of the economy 
through co-operative enterprises. In the same breath, however, Chomsky argues that this 
from of community should be wedded to a more formal political platform. And in many 
ways Chomsky's suggestion for such a platform largely mirrors the social democratic ideals 
of the New Deal and embedded liberalism. In fact Chomsky points towards the gains of The 
New Deal legislation as proof of what 'large scale popular activism' can achieve. 
Nevertheless, Chomsky's ideas of reregulating finance, orientating government towards 
creating growth and eradicating corporate personhood are based on Occupy's suPPOrters 
gaining entrance to political democracy and challenging the hegemonic influence of capital 
over political democracy. Taking the example of the US primaries as a case in point Chomsky 
argues for greater participatory democracy from Occupy supporters to change the political 
system. Chomsky's argument centres on the fact that the way the primaries are carried out 
in the United States is radically undemocratic. Where candidates show up to a town and 
declare 'Here's what I am going to do' and 'Of course they don't say much. And if they do 
say anything no one has a reason to believe them'. Chomsky thus puts forward the idea 
that: 
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' ... the people in town would get together, have town meetings and discussions and 
come up with some ideas about what they think ought to be down in the locality, in 
the country, foreign policy, the whole range, They might just pick their own 
candidates; or, if there are national candidates running, they could say "You come 
visit us if you like, but we won't want to hear speeches from you. We're going to tell 
you what we think policy ought to be. And if you can convince us that you'll accept 
these polices and carry them forward, then maybe we'll vote for you" Either that or 
direct representation coming out of communities would be a democratic alternative 
to the farcical system that we simply take for granted.' (Chomsky 2012: 78-79) 
In turn, such participatory democracy would not just be about 'elections' but would involve 
the Occupy supporters getting behind legislation which for example would restrict capital's 
influence on politics (e.g. state funded parties) and give populaces the right to 'recall' 
candidates without a constitutional crisis (Chomsky 2012: 79-83). In Deweyan parlance, 
then, what you can see is that Chomsky's idea for the expansion of the Occupy largely 
centres on how Occupy as a public can gain democratic recognition and enact creative 
democracy. Chomsky therefore recognises that Occupy was never going to muster a 
communist revolution within advanced economies; there is just not the appetite for such 
things in countries at this time. And that it becomes even more nonsensical to equate 
Occupy with movements such as the Arab Spring, regardless of the praxis similarities, when 
the revolution in countries such as Egypt was largely around securing the very liberal 
democratic freedoms that Hardt and Negri believe are now obsolete. 
In Chomsky's eyes, just as Dewey's would have viewed the world today, it is thus bourgeois 
democracy rather than liberal democracy that must be eradicated and the democratic 
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community within the US reconstructed through a reformation of political democracy itself. 
And that to accomplish this, Occupy as a public must gain recognition of itself across wider 
society via civil society activity and interacting with political democracy. Moreover, 
Chomsky also recognises that Occupy's politics, whose aspirations are to form some form of 
Great Community, can only spring from a reform of democracy at home. In this sense, then, 
Chomsky clearly echoes a Deweyan position on democracy both nationally and globally by 
highlighting that it is imperative that progressive politics such as Occupy, which unlike its 
enemies such as The Tea party currently stands outside formal politicS, returns back home 
so that it can Occupy government as well as the streets. 
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Conclusion: Global Democracy: A Community Matter 
How then does Deweyan approach to global democracy relate to and help supplement 
contemporary GOT? At the start of this study I conjectured that Auden's poem Musee des 
Beaux Arts was questioning why, for example, any of us would, in the position of the 
ploughman or those on the delicate ship, deem the fall of Icarus or any event of suffering as 
an unimportant failure? And I went further in suggesting that these questions hit right at the 
heart of the GDT and its desire for global democracy. What this study has shown is that the 
answers to Auden's questions were given to us by Dewey via his argument that society does 
not automatically constitute a community. We live in a society, but we have to purposefully 
make our community out of the perception of our consequences of associated behaviour. 
Dewey's great contribution to the theorisation of global democracy revolves around how 
the issue of community complicates global democratic aspirations. On one hand, 
community at the international level doesn't just change because of the size scope or nature 
of life: the great community and the practise of creative democracy cannot simply be 
inferred by the existence of globalisation or what Dewey calls the great society but must be 
made through conscious effort. On the other hand, Dewey highlights how community at the 
global level is inherently dependant upon community at the national level. Or to put this 
with even more of a Deweyan accent: the possibility of democratic community at the 
international level is inherently dependant upon the health and status of the democratic 
community at the national level. What a Deweyan approach to assessing global democracy 
brings to fore then is an analytical focus that knits together the fate of democracy beyond 
the nation with democracy within the nation. 
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This brings into focus how Oewey's work rebalances the 'post-Westphalian ontology' or 
what I called the 'ontology of paradox' that is embraced by GOT. As I have shown GOT 
writers get the point of emphasis wrong: they believe that democracy beyond the nation 
will solve the problems of a lack democracy within the nation. The new elements of the 
'post-Westphalian ontology' such as economic globalisation and its consequences are taken 
to have made the older elements of the Westphalian order less important. However, as I 
pointed out at the end of chapter 6, this does not countenance for Oewey's work revealing 
that the post-Westphalian order is a lot older than we think. Nor does it acknowledge his 
equally important conclusion that democracy, even with a global aspiration, must begin at 
home due to the current power of the nation state and national community's role in 
regulating the nation state. 
Dewey's rebalancing of GOT thus has paradigm changing effects for the study of global 
democracy. In the last three chapters of this study, for instance, many of GOT's main 
assumptions have been shown to be empirically correct. The actions of political elites from 
2008 does bring to fore that nations states do have the power to create change at the 
international level. And the emergence of Occupy highlights that global civil society does 
exist and does have contestation and rhetorical based power. However, as we have seen 
, 
Dryzek's work cannot account for why transnational publics like Occupy cannot hold 
national politicians to account over international issues and Cosmopolitan Democrats 
cannot account for why national leaders do not form Cosmopolitan collations. And it 
becomes clear that Dewey's focus on the relationship between national and international 
community can help us to fill in such blanks. 
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Under a Deweyan gaze, the primary problem currently facing global democracy today is a 
democratic disconnection at national level and its consequent impact on democracy at the 
international level. As Wade (2011a: 17) suggests and as the evidence in the last few 
chapters prove: 
'Many governments, notably those of the United States and the UK, home of the two 
major financial centres, became beholden to the financial industry more than to any 
other (except possibly defence). They relied on it for political support, election 
campaign financing, and tax revenues and were readily persuaded by the self-serving 
idea that financial markets are efficient and self-adjusting (as distinct from self-
destructing), hence that "light-touch regulation" is sufficient ... One might expect that 
the neoliberal ideas that have shaped economic policy in the West for more than 
two decades would have crash-landed on facts and common sense about the current 
crisis; but the signs are that they retain much of their hold over policymakers and the 
economics profession only slightly softened at the edges' (Wade 2011a: 17,31-32) 
Nation state elites such as our political leaders in the Anglosphere and Europe are 
essentially obstacles to achieving a sense of democratic control of finance and Neo-
Liberalism. They have become institutionalised into believing that there is only one way to 
do things and that there is no alternative to neo-liberal globalisation. At the same time, the 
consequent actions of national elites have led their own populaces, as Dewey realised all 
those years before hand, into believing that there is little to no hope of redemption in 
national politics. The result is that capital, especially finance capital, has effectively filled the 
gap left by citizens (Englen et al. 2011). 
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The collapse of national democracy in turn makes international democracy a distant hope 
because as we have seen national political elites are the key for change at the international 
level. The inability of national elites to bring order over neo-liberal globalisation is inherently 
down to hegemonic influence of finance capital and neo-liberalism as economic blueprint. 
And what we saw in the elite Bank Recapitalisation, Keynesian Stimulus and more recent 
Austerity publics is very much akin to Dewey's fears about democratic realism and the idea 
of elite or expert publics detached from the democratic input of the masses. In first 
instance this was because the contours of bourgeois democracy before the crisis essentially 
left such elite publics free of democratic insight. And in the second instance because citizen 
publics that emerged in response to austerity like The Occupy Movement did not feel able 
to participate in political democracy. 
The debate about the vibrancy of global democracy therefore cannot simply be about social 
movements, global civil sOciety or collation of willing nation states but must also examine 
bourgeois democracy at home. Under this approach issues such political apathy, inequality, 
social mobility, educational practises and regulatory capture within the national context 
inform and affect the possibility of global democracy. As we have seen, one cannot for 
example understand the UK's pivotal role in forging austerity as a policy norm for advanced 
economies in 2010 without understanding how her political parties are linked to finance 
capital and embrace neo-Iiberalism. And one cannot understand Germany's role in the 
formation of austerity without understanding ordoliberalism or the narrative of export 
success that underlies her national polities. Equally, one cannot understand how such a 
state of affairs is perpetuated without understanding how civil society and its citizen publics 
have become disenchanted with formal mainstream politics. 
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And just as one cannot understand the non-extension of global democracy in the age of 
austerity without understanding the health and status of the national democratic 
community; it also apparent that the extension of global democracy will not happen unless 
the obstacle of bourgeois democracy is countered and eradiated at home. For example, the 
influence of finance capital over UK polities at the global level will not change unless 
democracy, via the rise of publics and reformation of the state and government (e.g. state 
funded parties), is enacted and creatively implemented to produce cosmopolitan 
nationalism. And one cannot see this very process happening unless those within civil 
society actually believe that they can achieve such change through the institutions of 
political democracy. Quite simply, then, the events from the fall of lehman Brothers 
onwards bring to the fore two things Dewey knew very well in the 1920's. Firstly, the health 
and status of the national democratic community is, and in the current configuration of the 
global economy and global governance is probably always going to be, key to any aspiration 
of global democracy. And as long as bourgeois democracy exists at the national level we will 
only ever get piecemeal or palliative democracy both at home and aboard. What then for 
the future of the democratic community both at home and beyond? 
In 1938, Dewey restated the belief that creative democracy should replace the bourgeois 
democracy of the Great Depression and what he saw as the half-house of the New Deal 
legislation: 
' ... every generation has to accomplish democracy over again for again for itself; that 
its very nature, its essence, is something that cannot be handed on from one person 
or generation to another, but has to be worked put in terms of needs, problems and 
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conditions of the social life which, as years go by, we are a part, a social life that is 
changing with extreme rapidity from year to year' (LW13: 299) 
The generation that would succeed Oewey would heed his call and out of the ashes of 
World War 11 create the regime that was embedded liberalism, both within and between 
nation states. However, as we have seen, Neo-Liberal globalisation has effectively ruptured 
the idea of the democratic community both at home and abroad. Ironically, then, the 
creative task facing us today, very much resembles Oewey's present, in that we need to 
reformulate our democracy at home to cope with the contours of a globalised world. Yes, 
the details may be different, after all Oewey's present contained no IMF, World Bank or 
WTO and the global economy still functioned on the decaying privilege of European 
imperialism. Yet, when turning to other issues which demand global democracy such as 
climate change, global poverty and food and energy security, it becomes clear that the 
creative task facing us today is the taking up of our democratic inheritance and 
reconstruction of democratic community both at home and beyond. And this centres, as it 
did in Oewey's time, on the eradication of capital's hegemonic control over government and 
dispelling the political apathy such a state of affairs casts over the masses. Will this happen? 
Who knows, my only hope is that on the lower frequencies, I speak for you? 
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